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Results for “Demšar E.”
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Demšar E. (2017) Enacting Science: Extending Enaction Beyond the Content of a Theory. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 46–48. https://cepa.info/4391
Demšar E.
(
2017
)
Enacting Science: Extending Enaction Beyond the Content of a Theory.
Constructivist Foundations
13(1): 46–48.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4391
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Open peer commentary on the article “Enacting Enaction: A Dialectic Between Knowing and Being” by Sebastjan Vörös & Michel Bitbol.
Upshot:
In general agreement with the target article, I relate Vörös and Bitbol’s elucidation of Varelian philosophical roots of enaction to a discussion of enaction put forward by Varela’s co-authors Rosch and Thompson in their introductions to the revised edition of The Embodied Mind. I align Vörös and Bitbol’s multi-layered understanding of enaction to Rosch’s distinction between its “phase 1” and “phase 2” accounts. I consider the implications of the relationship between the pseudo-subject and the meta-subject of the enactive account of mind for the general enactivist conception of science and scientific knowledge.
Demšar E. (2017) The circular character of the conceptual space of cognitive science: Between scientific and lived realities of the mind. . https://cepa.info/5627
Demšar E.
(
2017
)
The circular character of the conceptual space of cognitive science: Between scientific and lived realities of the mind.
.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5627
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The thesis puts forward an exploration of the relationship between two perspectives on the mind: the scientific perspective, through which the mind is described and explained by the disciplines of cognitive science, and the lived perspective, through which the mind is experienced and understood in the context of everyday life. In articulating this apparent duality of views I draw upon two influential philosophical accounts: Edmund Husserl’s (1970) investigation of the life-world and the world of science and Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963) analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of the human being in relation to the world. The presentation and juxtaposition of the two analyses opens a way to an exploration of the interdependence of science and the life-world. It also sets the stage for a critique of naturalism in mind sciences. Following Husserl, I show that the naturalistic attitude stems from forgetting that the idea of the objective scientific reality is but an abstraction from the concrete life-world of experience, value, and meaning. Surveying the conceptual space of philosophy of mind, I further challenge the naturalistic attitude by demonstrating the untenability of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. As I argue, naturalism amounts to a particularly inconsistent stance in studying human epistemic processes, where it must paradoxically presuppose the very aspects of the world that it set out to disclose. Concluding that cognitive science lacks absolute metaphysical or epistemological foundations, I suggest that studying the mind needs to recognize the importance of the lived perspective of being a mind. I explore the multifaceted ways in which the scientific perspective on the mind is both rooted in the life-world and shapes it in turn. I conceptualize two dimensions of this interrelatedness through the presentation of Varela et al.’s (1991) enactive approach to cognitive science and Ian Hacking’s (1995) theory of the looping of human kinds. I conclude by proposing that consistent study of mind which acknowledges the impossibility of separating the cognizing subject from her cognized world is bound to remain open to revision of its own foundations. Cognitive science is thus imbued with a demand for reflexivity towards its own theory and practice which would recognize the historical, experiential and socio-political embeddedness of its concepts as well as the role which cognitive science itself plays in shaping societal conceptions of the mind and the way in which the mind is concretely understood, experienced, lived, and acted upon in the context of everyday life.
Key words:
cognitive science
,
naturalism
,
life-world
,
manifest image
,
enactivism
,
looping effects
,
critical neuroscience.
Demšar E. & Kordeš U. (2018) A Different Vocabulary, or a Different Metaphor? Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 22–25. https://cepa.info/5579
Demšar E.
&
Kordeš U.
(
2018
)
A Different Vocabulary, or a Different Metaphor?
Constructivist Foundations
14(1): 22–25.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5579
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Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher.
Abstract:
In agreement with Gallagher’s call to re-examine the standard neurocentric view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-approaches to cognition (in particular predictive processing accounts) and constructivist ideas originating from the tradition of second-order cybernetics, demonstrating the potential for a productive dialogue between contemporary cognitive science and constructivist theory. Further elaborating Gallagher’s proposal, we suggest an alternative, autopoiesis-based metaphor of the mind.
Kordeš U. & Demšar E. (2018) Authors’ Response: If First-Person Knowledge is Excavated, What Kind of Research Follows? Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 241–249. https://cepa.info/4614
Kordeš U.
&
Demšar E.
(
2018
)
Authors’ Response: If First-Person Knowledge is Excavated, What Kind of Research Follows?
Constructivist Foundations
13(2): 241–249.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4614
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Upshot:
We begin our response by restating and clarifying the principal argument of the target article. We go on to focus on four main themes addressed by the commentators: (a) the question of the inevitability of a horizon in enacting beliefs about experience; (b) the consequences of our epistemological position for second-person research methodologies; (c) the importance of distinguishing between the feeling of veracity of what is observed and the unquestioned realistic intuitions of the natural attitude; and finally (d) the implications of our discussion for first-person science. We conclude by addressing the question about the relationship between inferred and apprehended experience.
Kordeš U. & Demšar E. (2018) Excavating Belief About Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of the Reflective Act. Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 219–229. https://cepa.info/4607
Kordeš U.
&
Demšar E.
(
2018
)
Excavating Belief About Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of the Reflective Act.
Constructivist Foundations
13(2): 219–229.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4607
Copy
Context:
Philosophical and - more recently - empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research of lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called “excavation fallacy” has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice.
Problem:
What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results?
Method:
Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience.
Results:
We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines - rather than distorts - its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation “fallacy” is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of expectations.
Implications:
Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience.
Constructivist content:
We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment.
Key words:
Reflection
,
enaction
,
constructivism
,
past experience
,
excavation fallacy
,
second-person methodology
Kordeš U. & Demšar E. (2019) A long overdue encounter of constructivism and cognitive science. In: Hug T., Mitterer J. & Schorner M. (eds.) Radikaler Konstruktivismus, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1917–2010). Innsbruck University Press, Innsbruck: 411–429. https://cepa.info/6138
Kordeš U.
&
Demšar E.
(
2019
)
A long overdue encounter of constructivism and cognitive science.
In: Hug T., Mitterer J. & Schorner M. (eds.)
Radikaler Konstruktivismus, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1917–2010)
. Innsbruck University Press, Innsbruck: 411–429.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6138
Copy
In recent years, cognitive science has witnessed the emergence of various ideas that challenge standard conceptions of perception, cognition, and action by emphasizing the cognizing subject’s active role in the construction of experiential world and questioning the subject-world relationship. However familiar these insights might sound to a constructivist, they are rarely linked to constructivist philosophy. This chapter aims at exploring the possibility of relating constructivist epistemology to recent empirical work in cognitive science by focusing on two examples: the predictive processing approach and the interface theory of perception. We suggest that constructivist epistemology could importantly contribute to these developing lines of research. Conversely, these new approaches might offer a suitable framework for the operationalization of constructivist concepts and their further empirical and computational examination.
Kordes U., Oblak A., Smrdu M. & Demsar E. (2019) Ethnography of meditation: An account of pursuing meditative practice as a tool for researching consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(7–8): 184–237.
Kordes U.
,
Oblak A.
,
Smrdu M.
&
Demsar E.
(
2019
)
Ethnography of meditation: An account of pursuing meditative practice as a tool for researching consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Studies
26(7–8): 184–237.
Copy
The article explores meditation-based examination of experience as a means for developing a contemplative, nonnaturalized, and existentially meaningful empirical research of consciousness in which the experiencing person is regarded as the primary investigator. As the first phase of a broader project, a group of seven researchers carried out a series of five meditation retreats. We sampled the ongoing experience of the researchers at the same random moments during meditation practice. The acquired data, consisting of more than 500 journal entries, interview transcripts, and participatory analysis records, set the ground for three lines of enquiry: (1) What, if any, kind of meditative practice is suitable for researching experience? How can it be cultivated? (2) Can a group of researchers skilled in meditation systematically investigate selected experiential phenomena? (3) What is the actual lived experience of a group of researchers engaged in a continuous meditation-based examination of experience? In this report, we primarily focus on the third question, offering a concrete ethnographic overview of our research enterprise. We conclude by relating our findings to the discussion of the phenomenological practice of the epoché as an empirical tool for the study of consciousness.
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