From the introduction: We will argue that OCD patients testify to the general condition that exercising an increased conscious control over actions can in fact diminish the sense of agency rather than increase the experience of freedom. Referring to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty we argue that conscious control and deliberation may be useful when the natural flow of action is disturbed: for instance when a necessary tool is broken or missing or when one learns a new skill. However, deliberation itself may also disturb the flow of unreflective action. Too much deliberation on and analysis of one’s unreflective, habitual actions may cause insecurity and even a breakdown of what was once ‘second nature’. We introduce three different ways in which too much deliberation can have negative effects on patients with OCD, rendering them even more unfree.

Key words: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, free will, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, conscious control, phenomenology

Excerpt: The topic of this Oxford handbook is “4E cognition”: cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended. However, one important “E” is missing: an E for ecological. enactive, and extended. However, one important “E” is missing: an E for ecological. In this chapter we will sketch an ecologicalenactive approach to cognition that presents a framework for bringing together the embodied/ enactive program (Chemero 2009; Thompson 2007) with the ecological program originally developed by James Gibson, in which affordances are central (e.g., Gibson 1979). We call this framework the skilled intentionality framework.