The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry.

Key words: non-trivial research, first-person research, quantum mechanics, niels bohr, enaction, constructivism.

The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. To overcome this barrier, ‘science’ has imposed “enabling constraints” – hidden assumptions which are given the status of ceteris paribus. Such assumptions allow ambiguity to be bracketed away at the expense of transparency. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions, which we refer to throughout the article as “uceps.” The meanings of the various uceps are shown via their applicability to the science of climate change. Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. Second order science reveals hidden issues, problems and assumptions which all too often escape the attention of the practicing scientist (but which can also get in the way of the acceptance of a scientific claim) This article lays out initial foundations for second order science, its ontology, methodology, and implications.

Key words: model, ambiguity, metaphysics, dependence, science.

The traditional sciences often bracket away ambiguity through the imposition of “enabling constraints” – making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science reveals hidden issues, problems and assumptions which all too often escape the attention of the practicing scientist. These hidden values – precisely because they are hidden and not made explicit – can get in the way of the public’s acceptance of a scientific claim. A conflict in understood meaning – between the scientist’s restricted claims and the public’s broader understanding of those same claims can result in cognitive dissonance or the equivalent of the Mori Uncanny Valley. Scientists often react to these differences by claiming “incommensurability” between their restricted claim and the public’s understanding. Second order science, by explicating the effects of variations in values assumed for these uceps and associated impacts on related scientific claims, can often moot these assertions of incommensurability and thereby promote greater scientific understanding. This article explores how second order science can address issues of public doubt regarding the scientific enterprise using examples from medicine, diet and climate science.

Key words: incommensurability, causality, realism, constructivism, metaphor, dissonance.

Appreciating the undeniable value of General Systems Theory (GST), Alfred Locker considers the question whether or not GST is able to go beyond a mere scientific point of view. Locker’s own systems theoretical approach, Trans-Classical Systems Theory, proposes not only to include usual observations into a systems view, but likewise their theoretical presuppositions. Locker hereby creates two levels of observation; an ortho- and a meta-level, where otherwise incommensurable viewpoints are united into whole. In this way, Locker is able to articulate a holistic systems theory of seeming opposites, like, for example, creation and evolution.

Key words: System, observer, systems theory, system allology, ganzheit

This paper presents and discusses an authentic landmark in the history of science, namely H. v. Foerster’s Cybernetics of Cybernetics, 1974. This is a book rarely known even by many specialists. This paper argues that von Foerster’s book constitutes a unique achievement in the history of science. A thorough presentation is introduced that brings a complete panorama of concepts, problems and approaches.

Our purpose in this essay is to introduce new concepts (dynamic architecture and dynamic ecological organism-niche unity, among other) in a wide and recursive view of the systemic consequences of the following biological facts that I (Maturana 1970, 1974; Maturana & Varela 1980, 1984; Maturana & Mpodozis 2000) and we (Maturana & Dávila 2008) have presented that can be resumed as: (1) that as living systems we human beings are molecular autopoietic system; (2) that living systems live only as long as they find themselves in a medium that provides them with all the conditions that make the realization of their living possible, that is, in the continuous conservation of their relation of adaptation to the circumstances in which they find themselves; (3) that as a living system exists only in a relation of adaptation with the medium that operates as its ecological niche, its reproduction necessarily occurs as a process of systemic duplication or multiplication of the ecological organism-niche unity that it integrates; (4) that the worlds of doings that we generate as languaging beings in our conversations, explanations, reflections and theories are part of our ecological niche; and (5) that we human beings as living beings that exist in languaging, are biological–cultural beings in which our cultural and our biological manners of existences can be distinguished but cannot be separated. Of the systemic consequences of these biological facts that we consider in this essay, we wish to mention two as the principal: (1) that the diversification || of manners of living produced in biological evolution is the result of differential survival in a changing medium through the conservation of adaptation, and not through competitive survival of the best; and (2) that we in our living as languaging human beings (observers) are the epistemological fundament of all that we do and know as such.

Key words: Humanness, cognition, evolution, living beings, epistemology, reality.

Realism and surrealism claim, respectively, that a scientific theory is successful because it is true, and because the world operates as if it is true. Lyons (2003) criticizes realism and argues that surrealism is superior to realism. I reply that Lyons’s criticisms against realism fail. I also attempt to establish the following two claims: (1) Realism and surrealism lead to a useful prescription and a useless prescription, respectively, on how to make an unsuccessful theory successful. (2) Realism and surrealism give the credit for the success of a theory to an appropriate factor and to an inappropriate factor, respectively. Finally, I point out that surrealism is vulnerable to my pessimistic induction (Park 2014a) against antirealism.

Key words: As-if-true, empirical adequacy, pessimistic induction, realism, success, surrealism, truth

This paper addresses the questions concerning the relationship between scientific and cognitive processes. The fact that both, science and cognition, aim at acquiring some kind of knowledge or representation about the “world” is the key for establishing a link between these two domains. It turns out that the constructivist framework represents an adequate epistemological foundation for this undertaking, as its focus of interest is on the (constructive) relationship between the world and its representation. More specifically, it will be shown how cognitive processes and their primary concern to construct a representation of the environment and to generate functionally fitting behavior can act as the basis for embedding the activities and dynamics of the process of science in them by making use of constructivist concepts, such as functional fitness, structure determinedness, etc. Cognitive science and artificial life provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interaction between each other and with the environment enabling us to establish this link between cognitive processes and the development/dynamics of scientific theories. The concepts of activation, synaptic weight, and genetic (representational) spaces are powerful tools which can be used as “explanatory vehicles” for a cognitive foundation of science, more specifically for the “context of discovery” (i.e., the development, construction, and dynamics of scientific theories and paradigms). Representational spaces do not only offer us a better understanding of embedding science in cognition, but also show, how the constructivist framework, both, can act as an adequate epistemological foundation for these processes and can be instantiated by these representational concepts from cognitive science. The final part of this paper addresses some more fundamental questions concerning the positivistic and constructivist understanding of science and human cognition. Among other things it is asked, whether a purely functionalist and quantitative view of the world aiming almost exclusively at its prediction and control is really satisfying for our intellect (having the goal of achieving a profound understanding of reality).

Key words: cognitive science, functional fitness, human person, knowledge (representation), (natural) science, representational space

Constructivism is the idea that we construct our own world rather than it being determined by an outside reality. Its most consistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC), claims that we cannot transcend our experiences. Thus it doesn’t make sense to say that our constructions gradually approach the structure of an external reality. The mind is necessarily an epistemological solipsist, in contrast to being an ontological solipsist who maintains that this is all there is, namely a single mind within which the only world exists. RC recognizes the impossibility of the claim that the world does not exist. Yet, RC has the potential to go much further. I claim that RC provides the foundation of a new world-view in which we can overcome hard scientific problems. Thus, the paper is urging us to carry RC further, not just on philosophical grounds, but also into the domain of science.

The way physics and other parts of science work can be explained in the framework of radical constructivism. However, this constructivist view itself shows that a uniquily accepted epistemology, constructivism or any other, would not be an advantage for the development of science. Unlike physics some parts of science successfully use constructivist concepts inside their theories. Because this is the case particularly in learning theory, constructivist ideas can help to improve physics teaching.

Key words: consensuality, language-games, quantum theory, realism in physics, scientific education