Excerpt: In this chapter we would like to stress the contingency of the socially constructed world along with the social and political consequences of reifying and decontextualizing knowledge so as to make it appear necessary, indubitable, and unalterable. We want to develop a critical-constructivist stance toward the production and ownership of knowledge, in particular scientific knowledge, in society at large. We will examine some of the issues of power and social regulation involved in the social production of knowledge.

An influential view of constructivism in science and mathematics educational research and practice is that of Ernst von Glasersfeld. It is a peculiarly subjectivist form of constructivism that should not be attractive to science and mathematics educators concerned with retaining some sort of realism that leaves room for objectivity. The subjectivist constructivism of von Glasersfeld also becomes entangled in untenable mind/body and subject/object dualisms. Finally, these dualisms are unnecessary for social constructivism. I will provide one example of a social constructivist alternative to social constructivism, that of the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey. In presenting Dewey’s position I will appeal to Ockham’s razor, that is, the admonition not to multiply entities beyond necessity, to shave off the needless mentalistic and psychic entities that lead von Glasersfeld into his subjectivism and dualism.

Excerpt: Constructivism must be careful not to confine itself to the purely cognitive domain of human experience. Educators must strive to include the body, its actions, and its passions more prominently in the curriculum. The pragmatic social constructivism of George Herbert Mead and John Dewey allows us to do so. Mead and Dewey maintained a lifelong friendship and were colleagues for many years during which they visited each other nearly every day. So intermeshed was their influence on each other that it is often impossible to determine who originated what. Such entwinement is typical of socially constructive contexts and illustrates a central thesis of pragmatic social constructivism – it decenters the locus of mind and self.

In recent years there has been a great deal of methodological debate among educational researchers, theoreticians, and practitioners concerning issues such as relativism raised by the so-called “new,” “Kuhnian” or “postpositivistic” philosophy of science. The intensity of this debate notwithstanding, the fundamental principles and their relations that comprise the postpositivistic view have not always been carefully spelled out. Some of the principles discussed will include (a) the problem of confirmation, (b) the underdetermination of theory by logic, (c) the underdetermination of theory by experience, (d) the Quine-Duhem thesis, (e) the theoryladenness of experience, and (f) the incommensurability of theories. No attempt will be made to evaluate these principles. However, those who are prepared to accept all of these will be hard pressed to avoid the dangers of relativism. I will argue that these dangers, if they exist, may be lessened if not eliminated by practicing the pragmatic virtues of epistemological conservatism and good sense.

Drawing on perspectives from a range of different fields (ethics, mathematics education, philosophy, social psychology, science education, social studies), the essays in this book invite us to reposition ourselves in relation to the major currents that have influenced education in this century, namely pragmatism, genetic epistemology, and social interactionism. They call for new reflection on the validity of knowledge and types of knowledge, the compartmentalization of school subjects, the mediating role of teachers, and, above all, the ends of education.

Reality monitoring processes are necessary for discriminating between internally generated information and information that originated in the outside world. They help us to identify our thoughts, feelings, and imaginations, and to distinguish them from events we may have experienced or have been told about by someone else. Reality monitoring errors range from confusions between real and imagined experiences, that are byproducts of normal cognition, to symptoms of mental illness such as hallucinations. Recent advances support an emerging neurocognitive characterization of reality monitoring that provides insights into its underlying operating principles and neural mechanisms, the differing ways in which impairment may occur in health and disease, and the potential for rehabilitation strategies to be devised that might help those who experience clinically significant reality monitoring disruption.