Many current programs for cognitive science sail under the banner of “embodied cognition.” These programs typically seek to distance themselves from standard cognitive science. The present proposal for a conception of embodied cognition is less radical than most, indeed, quite compatible with many versions of traditional cognitive science. Its rationale is based on two elements, each of which is theoretically plausible and empirically well-founded. The first element invokes the idea of “bodily formats,” i.e., representational codes primarily utilized in forming interoceptive or directive representations of one’s bodily states and activities. The second element appeals to wideranging evidence that the brain reuses or redeploys cognitive processes having different original uses. When the redeployment theme is applied to bodily formats of representation, they jointly provide for the possibility that body-coded cognition is a very pervasive sector of cognition. Keywords

Key words: Cognitive science, intentional object, distance judgment, motor simulation, mirror activity

In the past few decades, many practitioners of cognitive science and philosophy of mind have staked out programs and positions under the label of “embodied cognition” (EC). They have widely differing views, however, of what embodiment consists in and why a program of embodied cognition might be an improvement over classical cognitivism. Frederique de Vignemont and I have recently proposed a general characterization of embodied cognition (Goldman & Vignemont, 2009), and I have expanded on the ramifications of this conception when one adds to it evolutionary considerations and a certain attractive conception of neuroarchitecture (Goldman, 2012). On this occasion, I review the definitional proposal in the context of other conceptions of embodiment and show how an assortment of empirical evidence lends strength to our proposal. Finally, I reply to Lawrence Shapiro (this volume, Chapter 3), who raises a series of challenges for our conception. Existing proposals for EC can be divided into two general categories: proposals predominantly derived from computer science, artificial intelligence (AI), and robotics; and proposals predominantly derived from cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. In the first section, I look at samples of both kinds of proposals. The second section then reviews the definition of embodiment we have proposed and how extensive the range of embodiment is likely to be given the empirical findings that have already emerged. Finally, in the third section, I reply to Shapiro’s comments.