Author D. G. Gozli
Biography: Davood Gozli received his PhD in experimental psychology from the University of Toronto. He has been visiting researcher at University of Vienna and postdoctoral fellow at Leiden University. He is currently Assistant Professor of Psychology at University of Macau. His book, Experimental Psychology and Human Agency, is an overarching methodological critique of experimental method as applied to psychological questions.
Gozli D. G. (2016) Phenomenology as Critique, Discovery, and Justification. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 389–391. https://cepa.info/2592
Gozli D. G.
(
2016)
Phenomenology as Critique, Discovery, and Justification.
Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 389–391.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2592
Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: Consistent with constructivism, phenomenology attempts to ground knowledge in an understanding of subjectivity. Although the phenomenological method can serve as a source of new insights and important critique of the conventional modes of understanding, the method’s effectiveness in the context of justification remains problematic.
Gozli D. G. (2017) Progress in First-Person Method: A Few Steps Forward, a Few Steps Back. Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 205–206. https://cepa.info/4077
Gozli D. G.
(
2017)
Progress in First-Person Method: A Few Steps Forward, a Few Steps Back.
Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 205–206.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4077
Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: Supplementing physiological measures with first-person data involves several benefits and challenges. The collection and analysis of the two types of data might not be optimal within the same procedural framework. Therefore, the synthesis of the two remains problematic.
Gozli D. G. (2017) The Lackluster Role of Misperceptions in an Enactivist Paradigm. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 133–135. https://cepa.info/4417
Gozli D. G.
(
2017)
The Lackluster Role of Misperceptions in an Enactivist Paradigm.
Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 133–135.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4417
Open peer commentary on the article “Missing Colors: The Enactivist Approach to Perception” by Adrián G. Palacios, María-José Escobar & Esteban Céspedes. Upshot: While the objectivist view of perception provides us with a commonsensical starting point, it quickly gives rise to unsolvable puzzles. The enactivist view, on the other hand, starts by challenging common sense, but it does not lead to the same unsolvable puzzles of the objectivist line of thought. Enactivism does not deny perceptual illusions or individual differences; it simply strips them of the status of perennial philosophical puzzles.
Gozli D. G. (2020) Modes of Participation and Modes of Inquiry. Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 263–266. https://cepa.info/6606
Gozli D. G.
(
2020)
Modes of Participation and Modes of Inquiry.
Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 263–266.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6606
Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: In contrast to the experimental methods of studying visual memory, Oblak has used a less constrained method of investigation. The comparison between the conventional experimental methods and the present phenomenological method should be done, not in terms of a single difference, but in terms of three separable distinctions. Disentangling the three comparisons could benefit future research.
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