Høffding S. (2017) The Perils of “Open Science”: How Radical and How Many? Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 72–73. https://cepa.info/4398
Høffding S.
(
2017)
The Perils of “Open Science”: How Radical and How Many?
Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 72–73.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4398
Open peer commentary on the article “Varela’s Radical Proposal: How to Embody and Open Up Cognitive Science” by Kristian Moltke Martiny. Upshot: I ask exactly how “open” we should be in “opening up cognitive science” and how many scientists should embrace the radical openness Martiny advocates. I suggest that the most fruitful realization of Martiny’s vision would consist in the creation of research groups with a balance between scholars of singular disciplines and transdisciplinary cognitive scientists.
Høffding S. & Martiny K. M. (2016) Framing a phenomenological interview: What, why, and how. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15: 539–564. https://cepa.info/4346
Høffding S. & Martiny K. M.
(
2016)
Framing a phenomenological interview: What, why, and how.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15: 539–564.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4346
Research in phenomenology has benefitted from using exceptional cases from pathology and expertise. But exactly how are we to generate and apply knowledge from such cases to the phenomenological domain? As researchers of cerebral palsy and musical absorption, we together answer the how question by pointing to the resource of the qualitative interview. Using the qualitative interview is a direct response to Varela’s call for better pragmatics in the methodology of phenomenology and cognitive science and Gallagher’s suggestion for phenomenology to develop its methodology and outsource its tasks. We agree with their proposals, but want to develop them further by discussing and proposing a general framework that can integrate research paradigms of the well-established disciplines of phenomenological philosophy and qualitative science. We give this the working title, a “phenomenological interview”. First we describe the what of the interview, that is the nature of the interview in which one encounters another subject and generates knowledge of a given experience together with this other subject. In the second part, we qualify why it is worthwhile making the time-consuming effort to engage in a phenomenological interview. In the third and fourth parts, we in general terms discuss how to conduct the interview and the subsequent phenomenological analysis, by discussing the pragmatics of Vermersch’s and Petitmengin’s “Explicitation Interview”.
Schiavio A. & Høffding S. (2015) Playing together without communicating? A pre-reflective and enactive account of joint musical performance. Musicae Scientiae 19(4): 366–388. https://cepa.info/6123
Schiavio A. & Høffding S.
(
2015)
Playing together without communicating? A pre-reflective and enactive account of joint musical performance.
Musicae Scientiae 19(4): 366–388.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6123
In this article we explore the role of pre-reflective, embodied, and interactive intentionality in joint musical performance. Putting together insights from phenomenology and current theories in cognitive science, we present a case study based on qualitative interviews with the Danish String Quartet (DSQ). A total of 12 hours of interviews was recorded, drawing on ethnography-related methodologies during tours with the DSQ in Denmark and England in 2012 and 2013, focusing mainly on their experience of perception, intentionality, absorption, selfhood and intersubjectivity. The analysis emerging from our data suggests that expert musicians’ experience of collective music-making is rooted in the dynamical patterns of perception and action that co-constitute the sonic environment(s) in which they are embedded, and that the role of attention and other reflective processes should therefore be reconsidered. In putting forward our view on ensemble cohesion, we challenge Keller’s and Seddon and Biasutti’s influential positions, maintaining that the cognitive processes at play in such intersubjective context are grounded in the concrete (inter)actions of the players, and are not reducible to processes and structures ‘in the head’. We argue that this is a significant step forward from more traditional accounts of joint musical performances, which often involve mental representations as principal explanatory tools – downplaying the embodied and participatory dimension of music-making – and we conclude that ensemble performance can take place without attention to either shared goals, or to the other ensemble musicians. We finally suggest that if other researchers want to understand what it is like to play with other musicians then they must shift their focus from Joint Musical Attention (JMA) to Joint Musical Experience (JME), facilitating the development of more ecologically valid models of collective musical performance.