Katrin Heimann is trained in Philosophy (MA) and Cognitive Neuroscience (MSc, PhD). She is currently assistant professor at the Interacting Minds Center at Aarhus University, where she uses and develops micro-phenomenology alone and in combination with various other qualitative and quantitative methods. While she acts as a consultant and co-researcher, using the method in a range of different fields, her own research focuses on the question of under which circumstances art – alone and in combination with science – can contribute to sustainable individual and societal transformation.
Fingerhut J. & Heimann K. (2017) Movies and the mind: On our filmic body. In: Durt C., Fuchs T. & Tewes C. (eds.) Embodiment, enaction, and culture: Investigating the constitution of the shared world. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 353–377. https://cepa.info/5081
Excerpt: Given that the average American citizen now spends one-fifth of her lifetime engaging with real and fictional worlds via moving images (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), we need a deeper understanding of how this medium influences our habits of perceiving, thinking, and feeling. 4EA cognitive science has already made ample reference to interactions between organisms and technologies (such as virtual realities or sensory substitution devices); yet film has largely been neglected. Here we will argue that an embodied approach to film can deepen our understanding of this medium, while at the same time providing the necessary means to understanding how film has already altered our embodied habits of perceiving and experiencing.
Heimann K. (2020) About Process and Progress - Suggestions About How to Investigate Subjective Experience Most Ecologically. Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 253–255. https://cepa.info/6602
Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: While appreciating Oblak’s call for and investment in more ecological research designs in psychology, I point out several aspects in Oblak’s own experimental setup that might themselves derive from traditional psychological concepts about cognition and which, therefore, might hinder his intended exploration of subjective experience by disregarding the very nature of this new “object of investigation.” Finally, I propose the use and development of micro-phenomenology to solve some of the possible issues raised, while at the same time promoting progress and change in the activity explored.