Author H. Iizuka
Biography: Hiroyuki Iizuka received a Ph.D. in multi-disciplinary sciences from the University of Tokyo, Japan in 2004. Since 2005, he has been a research fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. In 2005 and 2006, he was also a visiting research fellow at the Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics at the University of Sussex. Since 2008, he has been working at Osaka University. His research interests include embodied cognition, complex adaptive systems, the origin of life, and virtual reality.
Di Paolo E. A. & Iizuka H. (2008) How (not) to model autonomous behavior. BioSystems 91(2): 409–423. https://cepa.info/5232
Di Paolo E. A. & Iizuka H.
(
2008)
How (not) to model autonomous behavior.
BioSystems 91(2): 409–423.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5232
Autonomous systems are the result of self-sustaining processes of constitution of an identity under precarious circumstances. They may transit through different modes of dynamical engagement with their environment, from committed ongoing coping to open susceptibility to external demands. This paper discusses these two statements and presents examples of models of autonomous behaviour using methods in evolutionary robotics. A model of an agent capable of issuing self-instructions demonstrates the fragility of modelling autonomy as a function rather than as a property of a system’s organization. An alternative model of behavioural preference based on homeostatic adaptation avoids this problem by establishing a mutual constraining between lower-level processes (neural dynamics and sensorimotor interaction) and higher-level metadynamics (experience-dependent, homeostatic triggering of local plasticity and re-organization). The results of these models are lessons about how strong autonomy should be approached: neither as a function, nor as a matter of external vs. internal determination.
Froese T. Iizuka H. & Ikegami T. (2014) Embodied social interaction constitutes social cognition in pairs of humans: A minimalist virtual reality experiment. Scientific Reports 4: 3672. https://cepa.info/1012
Froese T. Iizuka H. & Ikegami T.
(
2014)
Embodied social interaction constitutes social cognition in pairs of humans: A minimalist virtual reality experiment.
Scientific Reports 4: 3672.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1012
Scientists have traditionally limited the mechanisms of social cognition to one brain, but recent approaches claim that interaction also realizes cognitive work. Experiments under constrained virtual settings revealed that interaction dynamics implicitly guide social cognition. Here we show that embodied social interaction can be constitutive of agency detection and of experiencing another’s presence. Pairs of participants moved their “avatars” along an invisible virtual line and could make haptic contact with three identical objects, two of which embodied the other’s motions, but only one, the other’s avatar, also embodied the other’s contact sensor and thereby enabled responsive interaction. Co-regulated interactions were significantly correlated with identifications of the other’s avatar and reports of the clearest awareness of the other’s presence. These results challenge folk psychological notions about the boundaries of mind, but make sense from evolutionary and developmental perspectives: an extendible mind can offload cognitive work into its environment. Relevance: This paper builds on an enactivist approach to cognition (Varela et al.).
Sato Y., Iizuka H. & Ikegami T. (2013) Authors’ Response: From Bodily Extension to Bodily Incorporation. Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 89–92. https://constructivist.info/9/1/089
Sato Y., Iizuka H. & Ikegami T.
(
2013)
Authors’ Response: From Bodily Extension to Bodily Incorporation.
Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 89–92.
Fulltext at https://constructivist.info/9/1/089
Upshot: In the model simulation and the human experiment, we observed that attention shifted from a tool to a task. This was accompanied by bodily extension. However, our experiments lack a sense of bodily incorporation (the sense of ownership. Based on the valuable commentaries, we would like to discuss the necessary conditions for possible bodily incorporation in terms of redundant degrees of freedom, synchronous visual tactile stimulation, and 1/f noise.
Sato Y., Iizuka H. & Ikegami T. (2013) Investigating Extended Embodiment Using a Computational Model and Human Experimentation. Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 73–84. https://constructivist.info/9/1/073
Sato Y., Iizuka H. & Ikegami T.
(
2013)
Investigating Extended Embodiment Using a Computational Model and Human Experimentation.
Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 73–84.
Fulltext at https://constructivist.info/9/1/073
Context: Our body schema is not restricted to biological body boundaries (such as the skin), as can be seen in the use of a cane by a person who is visually impaired or the “rubber hands” experiment. The tool becomes a part of the body schema when the focus of our attention is shifted from the tool to the task to be performed. Problem: A body schema is formed through interactions among brain, body, tool, and environment. Nevertheless, the dynamic mechanisms underlying changes in the body schema are still not fully understood. Method: To study the changing conditions of the body schema (e.g., a shift of attention), a simulation model of object discrimination was extended to differentiate between two kinds of sensitivities – sensitivity to an object being directly manipulated and sensitivity to another object being manipulated by the first. The proposed model consisted of windmills with different numbers of vanes. A model agent was required to determine the number of vanes on a windmill by touching the vanes blindly with an arm controlled by a neural network. Placing a second windmill beside the first and gearing the two windmills to move associatively resulted in the agent using the first windmill as a tool with which to discern the number of vanes on the second windmill. In other words, an agent’s body schema can shift from its arm tip to the boundary between the first and second windmills. We then introduced an experiment with a real windmill model to test the hypothesis demonstrated by the theoretical model. Results: We demonstrated that even simple computational agents can have two different sensitivities to the windmills. One agent becomes sensitive to the first windmill and insensitive to the second one. Another agent becomes insensitive to the first windmill and sensitive to the second one by using the first one as a tool. Therefore, we concluded that the boundary of the body schema was extended to the first windmill in the case of the latter agent because paying attention to the task to be performed instead of the tool itself is essential for the tool to be considered as part of the body schema. Analysis of the experiments using a computational model and human experimentation revealed that a shift from an irregular to a regular movement of a windmill is an indication of extension of the body schema. Constructivist content: Our insights are beneficial for enactive cognitive science. This is because an extended body schema questions the Cartesian separation between subject and object, and the self and the environment.
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