Open peer commentary on the article “Phenomenological Properties of Perceptual Presence: A Constructivist Grounded Theory Approach” by Aleš Oblak, Asena Boyadzhieva & Jure Bon. Abstract: I focus on two observations made in the target article, wherein certain aspects of the phenomenology of perceptual presence are contrasted with the phenomenology of mental imagery. I offer additional context in light of the so-called mental imagery debate, provide additional empirical support for the mentioned observations, and identify what might be a blind spot in the research design presented by the target article.

Phenomenology and empirical research are not naturally compatible and devising an empirical technique aiming at researching experience is a challenge. This article presents second-person in-depth phenomenological inquiry – a technique that tries to meet this challenge by allowing the transformation of a participant greatly interested in the investigation of their own subjective experience, into a co-researcher. It then provides an example of this technique being used in a study on enaction of beliefs, more closely showing the cooperative research process of researcher and co-researcher and its result: a grounded theory. The article ends with a discussion on the techniques strengths and weaknesses.

Key words: phenomenological inquiry, first-person perspective, experience, enaction, belief