Pier Luigi Luisi became Professor of Chemistry in the Department of Material Sciences at the ETH Zurich in 1971. In 2003, he went back to Italy as Professor of Biochemistry at the University of Rome 3. His research focuses on synthetic biology, in particular micelles and liposomes, and their importance for the origin of life. At the ETH, he created (1985) the Cortona-week, an interdisciplinary residential week mostly for graduate students and young managers.
Bachmann P. A., Walde P., Luisi P. L. & Lang J. (1990) Self-replicating reverse micelles and chemical autopoiesis. Journal of the American Chemical Society 112(22): 8200–8201.
Excerpt: In conclusion, this work confidently demonstrates that the reverse micellar system presented here is endowed with the property of self-replication. Since the reaction is localized within the boundary of the structure itself, and since the reaction leads to the production of the components of the boundary which in terms define the identity of the structure, this work also provides the first chemical example of autopoietic organization. The fidelity of self-replication is not perfect, as the dimensions of the micelles become smaller from generation to generation; however, this “single-phase autopoietic cycle” can in principle be amended by a continuous supply of water. More generally, micellar systems appear as suitable model systems for autopoiesis; and we are presently pursuing this work with a CTAB-based micellar aqueous system and with a lecithin-based liposomal system.
Bitbol M. & Luisi P. L. (2004) Autopoiesis with or without cognition: Defining life at its edge. Journal of the Social Society Interface 1: 99–107. https://cepa.info/2262
This paper examines two questions related to autopoiesis as a theory for minimal life: (i) the relation between autopoiesis and cognition; and (ii) the question as to whether autopoiesis is the necessary and sufficient condition for life. First, we consider the concept of cognition in the spirit of Maturana and Varela: in contradistinction to the representationalistic point of view, cognition is construed as interaction between and mutual definition of a living unit and its environment. The most direct form of cognition for a cell is thus metabolism itself, which necessarily implies exchange with the environment and therefore a simultaneous coming to being for the organism and for the environment. A second level of cognition is recognized in the adaptation of the living unit to new foreign molecules, by way of a change in its metabolic pattern. We draw here an analogy with the ideas developed by Piaget, who recognizes in cognition the two distinct steps of assimilation and accommodation. While assimilation is the equivalent of uptake and exchange of usual metabolites, accommodation corresponds to biological adaptation, which in turn is the basis for evolution. By comparing a micro-organism with a vesicle that uptakes a precursor for its own self-reproduction, we arrive at the conclusion that (a) the very lowest level of cognition is the condition for life, and (b) the lowest level of cognition does not reduce to the lowest level of autopoiesis. As a consequence, autopoiesis alone is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for life. The broader consequences of this analysis of cognition for minimal living systems are considered.
Damiano L. & Luisi P. L. (2010) Towards an autopoietic redefinition of life. Origin of Life and Evolution of Biospheres 40(2): 145–149. https://cepa.info/2689
In this paper we develop the autopoietic approach to the definition of the living developed by Maturana and Varela in the Seventies. Starting from very simple observations concerning the phenomenology of life, we propose a reformulation of the autopoietic original definition of life which integrates some of the contemporary criticism to it. Our definitional proposal, aiming to stimulate the further development of the autopoietic approach, expresses what remains implicit in the definition of the living originally given by Maturana and Varela: life, as self-production, is a process of cognitive coupling with the environment.
Lucantoni M. & Luisi P. L. (2012) On the universality of the living: A few epistemological notes. Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres 42(5): 385–387. https://cepa.info/8132
Excerpt: One can make the point that all living must be autopoietic. Autopoiesis is the necessary condition for any organism in order to be defined as living – there is no exception to this statement and therefore we consider autopoiesis as transcendental – autopoiesis then as the logic of organization of a living organism, or better yet, its Transcendental Phenomenology. Within the field, there is a discussion on whether autopoiesis is the necessary and sufficient condition, or whether it is only a necessary one. There is also a discussion of the relation between autopoiesis and cognition, whereby cognition has to do with the “cognitive” interaction with the environment, and is a further qualification of the notion of living. But here, in the context of this meeting, it is enough to make the point that autopoiesis is the necessary condition shared by any living entity – regardless of whether we are considering microorganisms, plants, fish, mammals… And therefore is universal.
Luisi P. L. (1993) Defining the transition to life: Self-replicating bounded structures and chemical autopoiesis. In: Stein W. & Varela F. J. (eds.) Thinking about biology: An introduction to theoretical biology. Addison-Wesley, Reading MA: 17–39. https://cepa.info/7809
Excerpt: The autopoietic approach has the advantage of offering a simple and operative definition of the minimal living being – although, as pointed out, each definition automatically means a self-imposed restriction. Within the limits of this restriction, the notion of autopoiesis suggests that life must be based on autopoietic units, and, conversely, any structure which is autopoietic must correspond to the minimal form of life. Accordingly, the self-replicating bounded structures illustrated in this article should be considered as minimal synthetic life. Such a statement may possess an unappealing flavor, but I believe one should not be afraid of it. This feeling of unappealingness probably arises for psychological reasons, but it should not cloud the scientific issue. The scientific issue is whether or not a certain set of self-imposed definitions and criteria are implemented by a given experimental system. Even if we give a positive answer to these criteria, certainly nothing is taken away from the mystery of life at large.
Luisi P. L. (1994) The chemical implementation of autopoiesis. In: Fleischaker G. R., Colonna S. & Luigi P. L. (eds.) Self-production of supramolecular structures: From synthetic structures to models of minimal living systems. Kluwer, Dordrecht: 179–197. https://cepa.info/5892
Abstract: The notion of autopoiesis, as originally formulated in the seventies by Maturana and Varela, is first reviewed and it is pointed out how this view offers a definition of minimal life which differs in some respect from the more conventional view, which is based on the template recognition mechanism of nucleic acids. The main criterium for autopoiesis is self-maintenance of the autopoietic unity from within its own. Here it is shown, however, that self-reproduction, when it is originated from reactions taking place within the boundary of the autopoietic unity, can also be seen as a criterium for autopoiesis. Examples of self-reproducing micelles are then reviewed and it is discussed to what extent they can be considered as autopoietic unities. One experiment is discussed in some more detail, as it bears a relation with the origin of life: this is the case of caprylate micelles in water which are spontaneously build from the hydrolysis of water-insoluble ethylcaprylate (EC) – once the first micelles are formed, there is a fast autocatalytic hydrolysis of further EC which produces more micelles in a superexponentially accelerated process. The plan for future experiments in the area, e.g. core-and-shell-replication, is there also outlined. It is finally argued that the progress of this work on autopoietic structures, more than on micelles, must be based on vesicles and liposomes, and preliminary work on this field is discussed.
Luisi P. L. (2002) Emergence in chemistry: Chemistry as the embodiment of emergence. Foundations of Chemistry 4(3): 183–200.
The main aim of the paper is to reinforce the notion that emergence is a basic characteristic of the molecular sciences in general and chemistry in particular. Although this point is well accepted, even in the primary reference on emergence, the keyword emergence is rarely utilized by chemists and molecular biologists and chemistry textbooks for undergraduates. The possible reasons for this situation are discussed. The paper first re-introduces the concept of emergence based on very simple geometrical forms; and considers some simple chemical examples among low and high molecular weight compounds. On the basis of these chemical examples, a few interesting philosophical issues inherent to the field of emergence are discussed – again making the point that such examples, given their clarity and simplicity, permit one to better understand the complex philosophical issues. Thus, the question of predictability is discussed, namely whether and to what extent can emergent properties be predicted on the basis of the component’s properties; or the question of the explicability (a top down process). The relation between reductionism and emergentism is also discussed as well as the notion of downward causality and double causality (macrodeterminism); namely the question whether and to what extent the emergent properties of the higher hierarchic level affect the properties of the lower level components. Finally, the question is analyzed, whether life can be considered as an emergent property. More generally, the final point is made, that the re-introduction of the notion of emergence in chemistry, and in particular in the teaching, may bring about a deeper understanding of the meaning of chemical complexity and may bring chemistry closer to the humanistic areas of philosophy and epistemology.
Luisi P. L. (2003) Autopoiesis: A review and a reappraisal. Naturwissenschaften 90(2): 49–59. https://cepa.info/2465
The concept of autopoiesis was proposed 40 years ago as a definition of a living being, with the aim of providing a unifying concept for biology. The concept has also been extended to the theory of knowledge and to different areas of the social and behavioral sciences. Given some ambiguities of the original definitions of autopoiesis, the concept has been criticized and has been interpreted in diverse and even contradictory ways, which has prevented its integration into the biological sciences where it originated. Here I present a critical review and conceptual analysis of the definition of autopoiesis, and propose a new definition that is more precise, clear, and concise than the original ones. I argue that the difficulty in understanding the term lies in its refined conceptual subtlety and not, as has been claimed by some authors, because it is a vacuous, trivial or very complex concept. I also relate the concept of autopoiesis to the concepts of closed systems, boundaries, homeostasis, self-reproduction, causal circularity, organization and multicellularity. I show that under my proposed definition the concept of a molecular autopoietic system is a good demarcation criterion of a living being, allowing its general integration into the biological sciences and enhancing its interdisciplinary use.
I review here my personal and scientific interactions with Francisco Varela, starting from our meeting in 1983 in Alpbach, Austria, a momentous meeting, which was also the place where the Mind and Life Institute and independently the Cortona week were conceived. Later on, the scientific cooperation focussed on autopoiesis and permitted to arrive at the experimental autopoiesis on the basis of the self-reproduction of micelles and vesicles. I then briefly describe how Francisco, based on the complementary notion of cognition, was able to draw the bridge between biology and cognitive sciences. The main keywords here are enaction and embodied mind. From here, and towards the end of his life, Francisco focussed mostly on neurobiology, where he introduced the notion of neurophenomenology centred on first-person reports. However, his seminal work on autopoiesis was instrumental to conceive the new field of research on the minimal cells, which is briefly described. I conclude with an overview of the meaning of the work of Francisco for life sciences at large.
Luisi P. L. (2012) Comments on Prebiotic Ecology, Supramolecular Selection and Autopoiesis. Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres 42(5): 451–452. https://cepa.info/6254