Matsuno K. (2000) The internalist stance: A linguistic practice enclosing dynamics. In: Chandler J. & Van de Vijver G. (eds.) Closure: Emergent organizations and their dynamics. New York Academy of Sciences, New York: 332–349.
Natural dynamics, as manifested in evolutionary processes, refer to material bodies in movement in the present progressive mode. Any interacting material body in the present progressive mode must be sentient to others because there can be no global agency coordinating it to others in a globally synchronous manner. The internalist perspective, or the worm’s eye view, referring primarily to the present progressive mode, renders local material bodies, large or small, subject to an inevitable inconsistency among local representations of neighborhood events registered in the local present perfect tense. Any sentient material body experiencing this inconsistency subsequently transforms itself into an inconsistency-free representation. The descriptive scheme unique to the internalist stance is internal and dynamic in the sense that it constantly strives to update constituent local representations, attempting to eliminate any inconsistencies residing within antecedent local representations. Compared to external descriptions of invariable universals grounded upon the Cartesian epistemic split, which are complementary to dynamics, internal description serves as a linguistic means of embodying natural dynamics even without recourse to the notion called forces. This makes our language powerful enough to enclose natural dynamics of material bodies in the empirical domain.
Matsuno K. & Salthe S. N. (1995) Global idealism/local materialism. Biology and Philosophy 10(3): 309–337.
We are concerned with two modes of describing the dynamics of natural systems. Global descriptions require simultaneous global coordination of all dynamical operations. Global dynamics, including mechanics, remain invariant in the absence of external perturbation. But, failing impossible global coordination, dynamical operations could actually become coordinated only locally. In local records, as in global ones, the law of the excluded middle would be strictly observed, but without global coordination it could only be fullfilled sequentially by passing causative factors forward onto subsequent contiguous operations. The local dynamics of sequential operations would be indefinite with regard to how commitments will be made which will avoid violating the law of the excluded middle, but any resulting record will be as definite as if there had been global coordination. While maintaining an agential capacity for making contingent choices internally, local dynamics could be cumulated into a global record of seemingly simultaneous operations. Natural selection within a framework of local dynamics would have a capacity for making opportunistic commitments, but its effects in a posterior record can be reduced to the mechanistic neodarwinian version as if there had been a global dynamics. However, the resulting global description falsifies the actual material nature of the dynamics.
Salthe S. N. & Matsuno K. (1995) Self-organization in hierarchical systems. Journal of Social and Evolurionary Systems 18(4): 327–333. https://cepa.info/4837
Currently there are two movements emerging within systems theory in connection with biology: self-organization and hierarchy theory. They are treated together here because they represent polar oppositional perspectives. Self-organization is concerned with change viewed as from within a changing system; whereas hierarchy theory, in the form familiar to most systems workers, is an externalist descriptive framework for dealing with constraints bearing on a system from multiple scalar levels. Hierarchy theory also deals externally, in another form (the specification hierarchy), with integrative levels as developmental stages within an ontogenetic trajectory. In this article we conclude that, although self-organization and hierarchies are incommensurable discourses, they could be taken to be complementary, each supplying what the other lacks in understanding systems.