This article indicates something of the enormous influence of constructivism on contemporary science education. The article distinguishes educational constructivism (that has its origins in theories of children’s learning), from constructivism in the philosophy of science (usually associated with instrumentalist views of scientific theory), and from constructivism in the sociology of science (of which the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge is the best known example). It notes the expansion of educational constructivism from initial considerations of how children come to learn, to views about epistemology, educational theory, ethics, and the cognitive claims of science. From the learning-theory beginnings of constructivism, and at each stage of its growth, philosophical questions arise that deserve the attention of educators. Among other things, the article identifies some theoretical problems concerning constructivist teaching of the content of science.

The paper outlines the significant influence of constructivism in contemporary science and mathematics education and emphasizes the central role that epistemology plays in constructivist theory and practice. It is claimed that constructivism is basically a variant of old-style empiricist epistemology, which had its origins in Aristotle’s individualist and sense-based theory of knowledge. There are well-known problems with empiricism from which constructivism appears unable to dissociate itself.

Key words: Constructivism, empiricism, epistemology, Aristotle, Galileo

The research literature on educational constructivism is voluminous (see the Carmichael (1990) Pfundt & Duit (1994) and Driver et al. (1994b) bibliographies cited below). The research – in both the Piagetian and Alternative Conception traditions – covers children’s learning, cognitive development, curriculum development, classroom practices, teacher education, and much else. There is a further enormous literature on constructivism in philosophy of science (see Leplin (1984) and Churchland & Hooker (1985)), and on constructivism in the sociology of science (see Brown (1984), McMullin (1988, 1992). In turn these latter literatures overlap with the ocean of writing on post-modernist theory of knowledge and cognition (see Gross & Levitt (1994)). The following references relate mostly to educational constructivism, and then, with some exceptions, to articles that address epistemological and philosophical matters in science education. Even so it is not an exhaustive list, but hopefully it will be useful for teachers and researchers in the field. The author welcomes additions or omissions being brought to his attention.

This article indicates something of the enormous influence of constructivism on contemporary science education. The article distinguishes educational constructivism (that has its origins in theories of children’s learning), from constructivism in the philosophy of science (usually associated with instrumentalist views of scientific theory), and from constructivism in the sociology of science (of which the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge is the best known example). It notes the expansion of educational constructivism from initial considerations of how children come to learn, to views about epistemology, educational theory, ethics, and the cognitive claims of science. From the learning-theory beginnings of constructivism, and at each stage of its growth, philosophical questions arise that deserve the attention of educators. Among other things, the article identifies some theoretical problems concerning constructivist teaching of the content of science.

Excerpt: Dennis Lomas in his essay on “Paul Ernest’s Application of Social Constructivism to Mathematics and Mathematics Education” correctly indentifies Ernest as a major proponent of social constructivism in mathematics education. Lomas’s essay is quite circumscribed in its goals: he leaves aside whether Ernest has adequately, or otherwise, interpreted the arguments of I. Lakatos, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and L. S. Vygotsky that he appeals to develop his philosophy of mathematics; and Lomas declines to reflect on the more general relevance of social constructivism to “mathematics, mathematics education, or education in general.” Lomas wishes to focus upon Ernest’s account of mathematical objects, and to begin a critique of the “social, political, and ethical consequences that [Ernest] draws from his position” for the “great issues of freedom, justice, trust and fellowship.” I propose in this commentary to first take a broader view of Ernest’s work, locating his social constructivism on the larger canvas of constructivism in science and mathematics education, and then follow Lomas’s more narrowed concerns.