We present an evolutionary robotics investigation into the metabolism constrained homeostatic dynamics of a simulated robot. Unlike existing research that has focused on either energy or motivation autonomy the robot described here is considered in terms of energy-motivation autonomy. This stipulation is made according to a requirement of autonomous systems to spatiotemporally integrate environmental and physiological sensed information. In our experiment, the latter is generated by a simulated artificial metabolism (a microbial fuel cell batch) and its integration with the former is determined by an E-GasNet-active vision interface. The investigation centres on robot performance in a three-dimensional simulator on a stereotyped two-resource problem. Motivationlike states emerge according to periodic dynamics identifiable for two viable sensorimotor strategies. Robot adaptivity is found to be sensitive to experimenter-manipulated deviations from evolved metabolic constraints. Deviations detrimentally affect the viability of cognitive (anticipatory) capacities even where constraints are significantly lessened. These results support the hypothesis that grounding motivationally autonomous robots is critical to adaptivity and cognition.

This thesis advocates a perspective on embodiment that emphasizes the role of non-neural bodily dynamics in the constitution of cognitive processes in both natural and artificial systems. In the first part, it critically examines the theoretical positions - including cybernetic, autopoietic and enactive approaches - that have influenced current theories and the author’s own position. The second part presents the author’s experimental work, based on the computer simulation of simple robotic agents engaged in energy-related tasks. Proto-metabolic dynamics, modeled on the basis of actual microbial fuel cells for energy generation, constitute the foundations of a powerful motivational engine. Following a history of adaptation, proto-metabolic states bias the robot towards specific behaviors, viably attuned to the current context, and facilitate swift re-adaptation to novel tasks. Proto-metabolic dynamics put the situated nature of the sensorimotor interaction within a perspective that is functional for the maintenance of the robot’s overall viability.

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.

Key words: autonomy, cognitive modelling, cognitive robotics, embodiment, emotion, enaction.