Binocular rivalry occurs when the eyes are presented with different stimuli and subjective perception alternates between them. Though recent years have seen a number of models of this phenomenon, the mechanisms behind binocular rivalry are still debated and we still lack a principled understanding of why a cognitive system such as the brain should exhibit this striking kind of behaviour. Furthermore, psychophysical and neurophysiological (single cell and imaging) studies of rivalry are not unequivocal and have proven difficult to reconcile within one framework. This review takes an epistemological approach to rivalry that considers the brain as engaged in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference about the causes of its sensory input. We describe a simple empirical Bayesian framework, implemented with predictive coding, which seems capable of explaining binocular rivalry and reconciling many findings. The core of the explanation is that selection of one stimulus, and subsequent alternation between stimuli in rivalry occur when: (i) there is no single model or hypothesis about the causes in the environment that enjoys both high likelihood and high prior probability and (ii) when one stimulus dominates, the bottom–up, driving signal for that stimulus is explained away while, crucially, the bottom–up signal for the suppressed stimulus is not, and remains as an unexplained but explainable prediction error signal. This induces instability in perceptual dynamics that can give rise to perceptual transitions or alternations during rivalry.
Høffding S., Martiny K. & Roepstorff A. (2021) Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological objections. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online first. https://cepa.info/7289
The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less reliable or less valid than quantitative or experimental methods in general. It responds to several skeptic objections such as those raised against introspection, those targeting the unreliability of episodic memory, and those claiming that interviews cannot address the psychological, cognitive and biological correlates of experience. It argues that the skeptic must either heed the methodological and epistemological justification of the phenomenological interview provided, or embrace a more fundamental skepticism, a “deep mistrust”, in which scientific discourse can have no recourse to conscious processes as explananda, with ensuing dire consequences for our conception of science.
Petitmengin C., Beek M. B. M., Nissou J.-M. & Roepstorff A. (2017) Que vit le méditant? Méthodes et enjeux d’une description micro-phénoménologique de l’expérience méditative [What is it like to meditate? Methods and issues for a micro-phenomenological description of meditative experience]. Intellectica 67: 219–242. https://cepa.info/7343
In our society where interest in Buddhist meditation is expanding enormously, numerous scientific studies are now conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practice and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate – from instant to instant, at different stages of the practice – remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. New concrete “ micro-phenomenological” interview methods have recently been designed to help us become aware of our lived experience and describe it with rigor and precision. The present article presents the results of a pilot project aiming at applying these methods to the description of meditative experience. The first part of the article describes these methods and the adjustments made to them in order to investigate meditative experience. The second part provides microphenomenological descriptions of two processes of which meditation practice enables the practitioner to become aware: the process of loss of contact with the current situation and generation of virtual ones in “ mind-wandering” episodes, and the process of emergence of a thought. The third part of the article highlights the interest of such descriptions for meditation practitioners and meditation teachers, defines the status of these results and outlines the research directions they open.
Petitmengin C., Van Beek M, Bitbol M., Nissou J.-M. & Roepstorff A. (2017) Que vit le méditant? Méthodes et enjeux d’une description micro-phénoménologique de l’expérience méditative [What is it like to meditate? Methods and issues for a micro-phenomenological description of meditative experience]. Intellectica 64: in press.
In our society where interest in Buddhist meditation is expanding enormously, numerous scientific studies are now conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practice and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate – from instant to instant, at different stages of the practice – remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. New concrete “micro-phenomenological” interview methods have recently been designed to help us become aware of our lived experience and describe it with rigor and precision. The present article presents the results of a pilot project aiming at applying these methods to the description of meditative experience. The first part of the article describes these methods and the adjustments made to them in order to investigate meditative experience. The second part provides micro-phenomenological descriptions of two processes of which meditation practice enables the practitioner to become aware: the process of loss of contact with the current situation and generation of virtual ones in “mind-wandering” episodes, and the process of emergence of a thought. The third part of the article highlights the interest of such descriptions for meditation practitioners and meditation teachers, defines the status of these results and outlines the research directions they open.
Petitmengin C., Van Beek M, Bitbol M., Nissou J.-M. & Roepstorff A. (2017) What is it like to meditate? Methods and issues for a micro-phenomenological description of meditative experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 24(5–6): 170–198. https://cepa.info/4439
In our society, where interest in Buddhist meditation is expanding enormously, numerous scientific studies are now conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practices and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate – from moment to moment, at different stages of practice – remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. Recently, ‘micro-phenomenological’ interview methods have been developed to help us become aware of lived experience and describe it with rigour and precision. The present article presents the results of a pilot project1 aimed at applying these methods to the description of meditative experience. The first part of the article describes these methods and their adjustment for the investigation of meditative experience. The second part provides microphenomenological descriptions of two processes of which meditation practice enables the practitioner to become aware: the process of losing contact with the current situation and generation of virtual ones in ‘mind-wandering’ episodes, and the process of emergence of a thought. The third part of the article highlights the interest such descriptions may have for practitioners and for teachers of meditation, defines the status of these results, and outlines directions for further research.
Petitmengin C., van Beek M., Bitbol M., Nissou J. M. & Roepstorff A. (2019) Studying the experience of meditation through micro-phenomenology. Current Opinion in Psychology 28: 54–59. https://cepa.info/6665
Numerous scientific studies are conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practices and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate – from moment to moment, at different stages of different forms of practice – remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. Recently, ‘micro-phenomenological’ interview methods have been developed to help us become aware of lived experience and describe it with rigor and precision. This article presents the results of a pilot project aiming at applying these methods to the description of meditative experience, and highlights the interest of such descriptions for understanding, practicing and teaching meditation. Highlights: (a) What it is like to meditate remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. (b) Micro-phenomenological interview methods help meditators become aware of the micro-dynamics of their practice and describe it. (c) These fine-grained description help meditators to refine, deepen and stabilize their practice. (d) The therapeutic effect of meditation could be explained by the process of regaining contact with experience, regardless of its content.