This chapter presents a constructivist perspective on learning in science and discusses the implications of this perspective for teaching and learning in classrooms.

Excerpt: Over the last decade the teaching of science in secondary schools in the UK has been under scrutiny. Surveys undertaken on behalf of the Assessment of Performance Unit report the levels of performance attained by a national sample of pupils in a range of measures and point out, among other things, some of the difficulties that secondary school pupils have in understanding certain scientific ideas. In addition studies of secondary science classrooms including the survey undertaken by HMI suggest that didactic teaching methods still tend to predominate especially in upper secondary classes. When the Secondary Science Curriculum Review was instigated to address a number of issues in the teaching of science in secondary schools the Children’s Learning in Science Project was set up to work in collaboration with the Review. The intention was to develop revised teaching approaches which would be informed by research on children’s thinking in science and current theoretical developments in cognition. In particular we identify three potentially fruitful theoretical developments which suggest the need for rethinking our approach to teaching and learning science.

Two dichotomies in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed: the prescriptive – descriptive distinction, and the process – product distinction. By focusing on prescriptive matters, and on mathematics as a product, standard philosophy of mathematics has overlooked legitimate and pedagogically rewarding questions that highlight mathematics as a process of knowing which has social dimensions. In contrast the social-constructivist view introduced here can affect the aims, content, teaching approaches, implicit values, and assessment of the mathematics curriculum, and above all else, the beliefs and practices of the mathematics teacher.

Constructivism is one of the central philosophies of research in the psychology of mathematics education. However, there is a danger in the ambiguous and at times uncritical references to it. This paper critically reviews the constructivism of Piaget and Glasersfeld, and attempts to distinguish some of the psychological, educational and epistemological consequences of their theories, including their implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Finally, the notion of ‘cognizing subject’ and its relation to the social context is examined critically.

Recently, I saw the following inscription on a bumper sticker: SUBVERT THE DOMINANT PARADIGM. I asked myself if that bit of contemporary popular philosophy had any relevance to our work in science teaching. To examine the question, I asked, “What is the dominant paradigm in secondary science teaching? ” Since that question shaped much of my research over the past 10 years, I gave the following answer: In the dominant paradigm in secondary (and tertiary) science • Teaching is equated with transmitting information to students.

An influential view of constructivism in science and mathematics educational research and practice is that of Ernst von Glasersfeld. It is a peculiarly subjectivist form of constructivism that should not be attractive to science and mathematics educators concerned with retaining some sort of realism that leaves room for objectivity. The subjectivist constructivism of von Glasersfeld also becomes entangled in untenable mind/body and subject/object dualisms. Finally, these dualisms are unnecessary for social constructivism. I will provide one example of a social constructivist alternative to social constructivism, that of the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey. In presenting Dewey’s position I will appeal to Ockham’s razor, that is, the admonition not to multiply entities beyond necessity, to shave off the needless mentalistic and psychic entities that lead von Glasersfeld into his subjectivism and dualism.

Constructivism has become an important referent for research and practice in science education. A variety of more or less divergent forms of constructivism have developed: discussion between these is occasionally heated. Six such forms are briefly described in order to provide an overview of the held of constructivist theory. A scheme for characterising constructivist writing on the basis of its relative emphasis on (a) personal versus social construction of knowledge and (b) objectivist versus relativist views of the nature of science is suggested. Issues of theory creation and reflexivity, central to constructivist practice, are discussed. It is suggested that debate about the “best” form of constructivism is counterproductive. A more powerful approach to epistemology is that described by Feyerabend, the holding in dialectical tension of a variety of incompatible perspectives.

After an impressive development throughout the last two decades, supported by a greatamount of research and innovation, science education seemed to be becoming a newscientific domain. This transformation of Science Education into a specific field of researchand knowledge is usually associated with the establishment of what has been called an‘emergent consensus’ about constructivist positions. However, some voices have begunto question these constructivist positions and therefore the idea of an advancementtowards a coherent body of knowledge in the field of science education. The goalof this work is to analyse some of the current criticisms of the so-called constructivistorientations and to study their implications for the development of science education asa coherent body of knowledge.

Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs is summarized and discussed for Piagetian schools and alternative conceptions movement. Commonalities/differences between these two rival programs are presented along with fundamental assumptions, auxiliary hypotheses, and research policy. Suggests that research findings should not be merely translated from one program to the other.

The questions I try to answer in the pages that follow were raised after talks I gave at the National Association for Research in Science Teaching (NARST) meeting in Atlanta, GA (April 1990) and at an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) symposium in Washington, D. C. (February 1991). Given the time limitation at both occasions, I could address only a small selection. While reviewing the whole collection at a later date, I found that the material could be roughly divided into three subject areas. I begin with the specifically epistemological ones, then consider those that concern the problem of social interaction, and I end with some implications the constructivist orientation might have for teachers and the philosophy of instruction. Because the answers I give are not derived from an established dogma butspringfrom my subjective point of view, the reader will find a certain amount of overlapping between the three sections. I would like to claim that this is inevitable because, in my experience, once one shifts to the constructivist orientation, everything one thinks and does changes in a way that seems remarkably similar and coherent. Let me emphasize a point I have made in many of my papers: constructivism, as far as I am concerned, is one possible way of thinking. It is a model, and models, no matter how useful they may prove, must never be claimed to be “true. "