One important way of describing the teaching of science in schools is as a process whereby students reconstruct their understandings in undergoing conceptual change. How to help teachers to promote conceptual change in an effective way in their classrooms is now a central concern of research groups in a number of countries and reflects the way curriculum development is being understood and approached. It is in contrast with the forms of curriculum development that took place in the 1960s and 1970s in which project teams outside schools developed and promoted a course and a package of related materials.

This chapter presents a constructivist perspective on learning in science and discusses the implications of this perspective for teaching and learning in classrooms.

Excerpt: Over the last decade the teaching of science in secondary schools in the UK has been under scrutiny. Surveys undertaken on behalf of the Assessment of Performance Unit report the levels of performance attained by a national sample of pupils in a range of measures and point out, among other things, some of the difficulties that secondary school pupils have in understanding certain scientific ideas. In addition studies of secondary science classrooms including the survey undertaken by HMI suggest that didactic teaching methods still tend to predominate especially in upper secondary classes. When the Secondary Science Curriculum Review was instigated to address a number of issues in the teaching of science in secondary schools the Children’s Learning in Science Project was set up to work in collaboration with the Review. The intention was to develop revised teaching approaches which would be informed by research on children’s thinking in science and current theoretical developments in cognition. In particular we identify three potentially fruitful theoretical developments which suggest the need for rethinking our approach to teaching and learning science.

Two dichotomies in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed: the prescriptive – descriptive distinction, and the process – product distinction. By focusing on prescriptive matters, and on mathematics as a product, standard philosophy of mathematics has overlooked legitimate and pedagogically rewarding questions that highlight mathematics as a process of knowing which has social dimensions. In contrast the social-constructivist view introduced here can affect the aims, content, teaching approaches, implicit values, and assessment of the mathematics curriculum, and above all else, the beliefs and practices of the mathematics teacher.

Constructivism is one of the central philosophies of research in the psychology of mathematics education. However, there is a danger in the ambiguous and at times uncritical references to it. This paper critically reviews the constructivism of Piaget and Glasersfeld, and attempts to distinguish some of the psychological, educational and epistemological consequences of their theories, including their implications for the philosophy of mathematics. Finally, the notion of ‘cognizing subject’ and its relation to the social context is examined critically.

This paper begins by making a case for using personal construct psychology as a basis for a practical, constructivist approach to the learning of science. This is followed by the derivation of the approach through the generation of seven propositions from the psychology. The practical approach capable of implementation in a science classroom is then described and the links between the practical approach and the psychology are made clear so that the approach can be seen to be grounded in the psychology. The paper concludes with a summary of the results of the classroom implementation of the approach.

Describes a theoretical frame for understanding cognitive development to outline the planning and performance of a unit on electrostatics. Analyzes a female student’s learning process and the development of the complexity of her cognitive skills.

Recently, I saw the following inscription on a bumper sticker: SUBVERT THE DOMINANT PARADIGM. I asked myself if that bit of contemporary popular philosophy had any relevance to our work in science teaching. To examine the question, I asked, “What is the dominant paradigm in secondary science teaching? ” Since that question shaped much of my research over the past 10 years, I gave the following answer: In the dominant paradigm in secondary (and tertiary) science • Teaching is equated with transmitting information to students.

An influential view of constructivism in science and mathematics educational research and practice is that of Ernst von Glasersfeld. It is a peculiarly subjectivist form of constructivism that should not be attractive to science and mathematics educators concerned with retaining some sort of realism that leaves room for objectivity. The subjectivist constructivism of von Glasersfeld also becomes entangled in untenable mind/body and subject/object dualisms. Finally, these dualisms are unnecessary for social constructivism. I will provide one example of a social constructivist alternative to social constructivism, that of the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey. In presenting Dewey’s position I will appeal to Ockham’s razor, that is, the admonition not to multiply entities beyond necessity, to shave off the needless mentalistic and psychic entities that lead von Glasersfeld into his subjectivism and dualism.

Constructivism has become an important referent for research and practice in science education. A variety of more or less divergent forms of constructivism have developed: discussion between these is occasionally heated. Six such forms are briefly described in order to provide an overview of the held of constructivist theory. A scheme for characterising constructivist writing on the basis of its relative emphasis on (a) personal versus social construction of knowledge and (b) objectivist versus relativist views of the nature of science is suggested. Issues of theory creation and reflexivity, central to constructivist practice, are discussed. It is suggested that debate about the “best” form of constructivism is counterproductive. A more powerful approach to epistemology is that described by Feyerabend, the holding in dialectical tension of a variety of incompatible perspectives.