Excerpt: In this chapter, we argue that advocacy of group learning as a mechanism for knowledge construction oversimplifies important issues concerning the social structure of groups, the goals of individuals in groups, and the diverse nature of knowledge construction. The weight of evidence supports the conclusion that knowledge is constructed (e g., Eylon and Linn 1988), but the evidence on the process of co-construction is much less definitive. Although most research groups start with the premise that social interaction facilitates cognitive development (Azmitia and Perlmutter 1989; Brown and Palincsar 1989; Doise and Mugny 1984; Slavin 1983), they disagree about how and when group learning fosters effective knowledge construction (Cohen 1986; Damon and Phelps 1989; El shout, in press; Fraser 1989; Kulik and Kulik 1989; Salomon and Globerson 1989; Sehoenfeld 1989; Webb 1989). Our goal here is to define the merits of group learning more carefully. We will examine specific student needs and learning goals in terms of group learning. We will point out that co-construction of knowledge in group learning is but one of many constructive mechanisms. We will identify when group learning may be less effective than autonomous learning for certain students or for specific educational goals. Furthermore, we will argue that, considering the diverse goals we pursue in education, group learning may be helpful in attaining some of them but counterproductive in attaining others.

Advocates of constructivist science recommend that school science begins with children’s own constructions of reality. This notion of the way in which students’ knowledge of science grows is closely paralleled by recent research on teachers’ knowledge. This paper draws on case study evidence of teachers’ work to show how two experienced teachers’ attempts to develop alternative ways of teaching science involved reframing their previous patterns of understanding and practice. Two alternative interpretations of the case study evidence are offered. One interpretation, which focuses on identifying gaps in the teachers’ knowledge of science teaching, leads to theconstructivist paradox. The second interpretation explores theconstructivist parallel, an approach which treats the process of teachers’ knowledge growth with the same respect as constructivists treat students’ learning of science. This approach, the authors argue, is not only more epistemologically consistent but also opens up the possibilities of helping teachers lead students towards a constructivist school science.

This paper addresses the parallel between the changes in students’ and teachers’ learning advocated by constructivist science educators. It begins with a summary of the epistemology of constructivism and uses a vignette drawn from a set of case studies to explore the impact of a constructivist science in‐service programme on an experienced and formal elementary science teacher. Judged by constructivist standards, the teacher described in the vignette makes very little progress. The irony of applying a constructivist critique to his work, however, is that it fails to treat the teachers’ imperfect knowledge of teaching with the same respect as constructivists treat students’ imperfect learning of science. The remainder of the paper explores this constructivist paradox, and suggests that‐like students’ knowledge of science‐teachers’ knowledge of constructivist science teaching is likely to grow through slow and gradual re‐formation of their established understanding of classroom theory and practice.

Excerpt: In a typical study of students’ conceptions and conceptual change, researchers analyze what a student does or says in a classroom or in an interview and recognizes ideas that match or do not match their own understanding of the topic. Attributing the perspective they recognize in the student, those studies support the idea that a conception is the way by means of which an individual intrinsically conceives (of) a given phenomenon. They then hypothesize the existence of some mental structures that can be theoretically and objectively re-constructed based on what is observed in a student’s performance. Thus, researchers studying conceptions commonly assume that the observer and the observed are separate entities. However, even in the most theoretical and hardest of all sciences, physics, the independence of the measured object and the measuring subject is not taken for granted: Light, for example, will present itself as waves or as particles depending on how we examine it. The artificial sense of separation from the object(s) of study found in many accounts on students’ conceptions makes irrelevant the relationship that exists between the observer and the observed: an interdependence and co-emergence of the observer and the observed. This tight relation exists because each participant not only reacts upon what others say but also acts upon the reactions that his/her own actions give rise to. With this situation come epistemological, practical, and ethical implications for those researching in mathematics and science education. Positing or questioning the existence of an objective reality mediates how we accept or reject another human being and the worldviews s/he develops. It provides a rationale that guides our actions. This is especially important when it comes to teaching and learning at a time where the ability to deal with the plurality and diversity of human culture have emerged as significant referents for our social behavior.

The aim of the present article is to discover whether Piaget’s empirical work has been assimilated into subsequent studies, which are termed constructivist or as belonging to the ‘alternative conceptions movement’. To achieve this an extensive bibliographical review has been carried out of the ambit of both theories with reference to two topics: the notion of force and the particulate nature of matter. After completing a comparison it was observed that the majority of conceptions currently recognized were previously detected by Piaget. It is concluded, therefore, that Piaget’s empirical data have been eclipsed for motives which are unjustified.

For twenty years, social constructivism has been a paradigm in science teaching and not an easy bedfellow for piagetian constructivism, even though both have had the same thing in mind… a study of the learner. For this reason we attempt to find connections and bridges between them so that both may be enriched, to the benefit of science teaching.

This paper criticizes radical constructivism of the Glasersfeld type, pointing out some contradictions between the declared radical principles and their theoretical and practical development. These contradictions manifest themselves in a frequent oscillation between solipsism and realism, despite constructivist claims to be an anti-realist theory. The paper also points out the contradiction between the relativism of the radical constructivist principles and the constructivist exclusion of other epistemological or educational paradigms. It also disputes the originality and importance of the radical constructivist paradigm, suggesting the idea of an isomorphism between radical constructivist theory and contemplative realism. In addition, some pedagogical and scientific methodological aspects of the radical constructivist model are examined. Although radical constructivism claims to be a rational theory and advocates deductive thinking, it is argued that there is no logical deductive connection between the radical principles of constructivism and the radical constructivist ideas about scientific research and learning. The paper suggests the possibility of an ideological substratum in the construction and hegemonic success of subjective constructivism and, finally, briefly advances an alternative realist model to epistemological and educational radical constructivism.

This article indicates something of the enormous influence of constructivism on contemporary science education. The article distinguishes educational constructivism (that has its origins in theories of children’s learning), from constructivism in the philosophy of science (usually associated with instrumentalist views of scientific theory), and from constructivism in the sociology of science (of which the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge is the best known example). It notes the expansion of educational constructivism from initial considerations of how children come to learn, to views about epistemology, educational theory, ethics, and the cognitive claims of science. From the learning-theory beginnings of constructivism, and at each stage of its growth, philosophical questions arise that deserve the attention of educators. Among other things, the article identifies some theoretical problems concerning constructivist teaching of the content of science.

The paper outlines the significant influence of constructivism in contemporary science and mathematics education and emphasizes the central role that epistemology plays in constructivist theory and practice. It is claimed that constructivism is basically a variant of old-style empiricist epistemology, which had its origins in Aristotle’s individualist and sense-based theory of knowledge. There are well-known problems with empiricism from which constructivism appears unable to dissociate itself.

Key words: Constructivism, empiricism, epistemology, Aristotle, Galileo

Review of The Content of Science. A Constructivist Approach to its Teaching and Learning, edited by Peter Fensham, Richard Gunstone and Richard White, Farmer Press, London, 1994.