Abstract: This article argues for an epistemology of music, stating that dealing with music can be considered as a process of knowledge acquisition. What really matters is not the representation of an ontological musical reality, but the generation of music knowledge as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world. Three major positions are brought together: the epistemological claims of Jean Piaget, the biological methodology of Jakob von Uexküll, and the constructivistic conceptions of Ernst von Glasersfeld, each ingstress the role of the music user rather than the music. Dealing with music, in this view, is not a matter of representation, but a process of semiotization of the sonorous environment as the outcome of interactions with the sound. Hence the role of enactive cognition and perceptual-motor interaction with the sonic environment. What is considered a central issue is the way how listeners as subjects experience their own phenomenal world or Umwelt, and how they can make sense out of their sonic environment. Umwelt-research, therefore, is highly relevant for music education in stressing the role of the listener and his/her listening strategies.

Key words: Keywords: Musical epistemology, music knowledge construction, biosemiotics, music semiotics, enactive cognition, Umwelt, functional cycle, von Uexküll.

The various assumptions on which linguistic elements, structures, or usages are subjective in which respect seem to agree in relating subjectivity to a speaking subject. In the communication process, this speaking subject is usually ascribed the agentive role, language is thought of as ready-made object, and the hearer remains a rather passive recipient. However, conceptions of subjectivity relying on these assumptions are circular ( in referring to a speaking subject) and tautological (every choice of linguistic entities reflects a speaker’s choice). \\This article argues for a sign-centred approach to communication as providing the basis for an adequate conception of linguistic subjectivity. Based on a dynamic and dialogical model of sign processes, linguistic signs are regarded not as ready-made objects waiting to be used, but as agents getting and keeping the sign process going. Linguistic signs are provided with an inherent subjectivity potential – their establishing differences between system( s) and environment(s) – which is realized through observation. Subjectivity is to be regarded not as some exceptional case within an objective linguistic code, but as inherent property of the sign system itself

Key words: subjectivity, communication, autopoiesis, semiosis, observer, interpretant.

The various assumptions on which linguistic elements, structures, or usages are subjective in which respect seem to agree in relating subjectivity to a speaking subject. In the communication process, this speaking subject is usually ascribed the agentive role, language is thought of as ready-made object, and the hearer remains a rather passive recipient. However, conceptions of subjectivity relying on these assumptions are circular (in referring to a speaking subject) and tautological (every choice of linguistic entities reflects a speaker’s choice) This article argues for a sign-centred approach to communication as providing the basis for an adequate conception of linguistic subjectivity. Based on a dynamic and dialogical model of sign processes, linguistic signs are regarded not as ready-made objects waiting to be used, but as agents getting and keeping the sign process going. Linguistic signs are provided with an inherent subjectivity potential – their establishing differences between system(s) and environment(s) – which is realized through observation. Subjectivity is to be regarded not as some exceptional case within an objective linguistic code, but as inherent property of the sign system itself.

Key words: subjectivity, communication, autopoiesis, semiosis, observer, interpretant.

Excerpt: I aim at understanding what it is for psychic systems, qua living systems, to realize the sign-function, and what it is for them to genuinely recognize that something stands for something else. Are their various ways of psychically realizing and/or recognizing the sign-function? What are the developmental and systemic or structural conditions leading to those capacities? Moreover, I want to understand the relationship between realizing and recognizing the sign-function for psychic systems. Is the recognizing a precondition for the realizing or is it the other way around?

Excerpt: Much research in cognitive science, and in particular artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (ALife), has since the mid-1980s been devoted to the study of so-called autonomous agents. These are typically robotic systems situated in some environment and interacting with it using sensors and motors. Such systems are often self-organizing in the sense that they artificially learn, develop, and evolve in interaction with their environments, typically using computational learning techniques, such as artificial neural networks or evolutionary algorithms. Due to the biological inspiration and motivation underlying much of this research (cf. Sharkey and Ziemke 1998), autonomous agents are often referred to as “artificial organisms,” “artificial life,” “animats” (short for “artificial animals”) (Wilson 1985), “creatures” (Brooks 1990), or “biorobots” (Ziemke and Sharkey 1998). These terms do not necessarily all mean exactly the same; some of them refer to physical robots only, whereas others include simple software simulations. But the terms all express the view that the mechanisms referred to are substantially different from conventional artifacts and that to some degree they are “life-like” in that they share some of the properties of living organisms. Throughout this article this class of systems will be referred to as “artificial organisms” or “autonomous agents/robots” interchangeably. \\The key issue addressed in this article concerns the semiotic status and relevance of such artificial organisms. The question is whether and to what extent they are autonomous and capable of semiosis. This is not straightforward since semiosis is often considered to necessarily involve living organisms. Morris (1946), for example, defines semiosis as “a signprocess, that is, a process in which something is a sign to some organism.” Similarly, Jakob von Uexküll considered signs to be “of prime importance in all aspects of life processes” (T. von Uexküll 1992), and made a clear distinction between organisms, which as autonomous subjects respond to signs according to their own specific energy, and inorganic mechanisms, which lack that energy, and thus remain heteronomous.

Key words: cognitive science, artificial intelligence, artificial life, semiotics, umwelt, mechanistic theories, self-organization