Meditation as a scientific first-person investigative tool has been discussed for decades, but remains largely a mere idea. One reason may be lack of relevant theory. Maps of mind developed by meditation traditions could prove helpful. The map used by orthodox Indian traditions, for example, identifies six phenomenologically distinct levels (senses, discursive thinking, discriminative intellect, pure individuality and pure consciousness/emptiness). This map, if valid, would have implications for many fields. It would indicate, for example, that the introspective awareness of major philosophers such as Descartes, Hume and Kant was open to particular levels and not others, and suggest why each favored particular theories and found particular problems unresolvable. Identification of physiological correlates of the levels could provide evidence for the map’s validity. Significant correlates of the deepest level already appear to be identified. Research relevant to other levels has been conducted. Identifying correlates of all the levels would provide an objective way to evaluate many mind-related questions. It would also provide an objective, tradition-invariant way to identify individuals capable of sustaining attention at specific levels and using meditation to investigate diverse levels-related topics. Meditation research faces strong questions of appearances of bias. A consortium, including researchers associated with competing traditions and non-associated researchers, overseeing replications and meta-analyses could respond to these questions directly.

This paper will explore the integration of elements of traditional Eastern meditative procedures with modern objective scientific methodologies. In contrast to the introspective methods usually relied on in modern Western treatments of consciousness, the Eastern procedures in question have the possible advantage of being the products of centuries of effort to develop systematic first-person exploratory methodologies. But since these methodologies developed outside of the context of our traditions of science, their reported results of course cannot simply be taken at face value. Nevertheless, aspects of their internal logic and putative results appear to be cross-culturally congruent, despite great differences of metaphysical frameworks and social milieux. Thus examining them and their effects in the context of modern scientific methodologies and criteria may well prove useful to us in our own task of developing a significant science of consciousness. In the paper we will accordingly describe some common methodological features and claimed results found in several major Eastern meditative traditions, discuss conceptual and methodological problems they raise, review some relevant scientific research on contemporary meditating subjects, and suggest some implications for the scientific study of consciousness. In particular, it will be suggested that the existing meditation-related research already indicates that Eastern varieties of meditative procedures should prove to be a useful component of any future science of consciousness.

Excerpt: By first-person events we mean the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events. Sometimes terms such as ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and even ‘qualia’ are also used, but it is natural to speak of ‘conscious experience’ or simply ‘experience’. These terms imply here that the process being studied (vision, pain, memory, imagination, etc.) appears as relevant and manifest for a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ that can provide an account, they have a ‘subjective’ side. In contrast, third-person descriptions concern the descriptive experiences associated with the study of other natural phenomena. Although there are always human agents in science who provide and produce descriptions, the contents of such descriptions (i.e. of biochemical reactions, black holes or synaptic voltages) are not clearly or immediately linked to the human agents who come up with them. Their defining characteristics refer to properties of world events without a direct manifestation in the experiential-mental sphere, they can only be linked to this sphere indirectly (via the actual laboratory life, the modes of scientific communication and so on). Such ‘objective’ descriptions do have a subjective-social dimension, but this dimension is hidden within the social practices of science. The ostensive, direct reference is to the ‘objective’, the ‘outside’, the content of current science that we have today concerning various natural phenomena, such as physics and biology.