This paper shows how recognition of biological form, of which the dynamics of closure is an integral part, is mandated by research on autopoietic systems, self-organization, evolutionary theory, and on topics in a variety of other areas, including infant and child development. It shows how a “matter pure and simple” (a mechanical concept of nature) is inimical to veridical understandings and explanations of emergent organization from the level of cells to the level of intact organisms-animate forms. By means of an analysis and discussion of writings by prominent researchers in diverse fields, a brief inquiry into neuron firing, and a consideration of intrinsic dynamics and primal animation, this paper shows that a principle of motion or animation informs biological nature. In other words, the fundamentally dynamic character of biological form at all levels exemplifies the kinetic character of living matter. The final section of this paper pinpoints implications for closure, emphasizing the need for an acknowledgement of the dynamics of closure and the need for theoretical and biological reformulations of living systems that incorporate that dynamics. It exemplifies the implication in each instance with reference to authors represented in this volume.

Excerpt: I would like to begin by citing a statement Piaget made in conjunction with one of his documented observations of an infant, specifically a mouth gesture made by his sixteen-month-old daughter Lucienne as she was trying to open a matchbox. The statement highlights in a dramatic way both the phenomenon of thinking in movement and the all-too-common oversight of thinking in movement. To lead up to the statement and put it in its proper context, I need to say something first about our spatial perceptions and cognitions as infants and cite some supporting literature.

This paper considers dimensions of animate life that are readily “embodied” by phenomenologists and by other philosophy and science researchers as well. The paper demonstrates how the practice of “embodying” short-circuits veritable phenomenological accounts of experience through a neglect of attention to Husserl’s basic conception of, and consistent concern with, animate organism. The paper specifies how in doing so, the practice muddies a clear distinction between the body ‘I have’ and the body ‘I am’, and a clear account of their lived conjunction in existential fit. In turn, the paper shows how the practice falls short of recognizing synergies of meaningful movement created by animate organisms; how it is tethered to talk of posture and sensation over kinesthesia and dynamics; and how, in general, the practice of embodying generates static rather than dynamic understandings of everyday life. The paper then critically considers how such liabilities preclude in-depth phenomenological insights into topics such as ‘ownership’ and ‘agency,’ and why inquiries into the nature of animate organisms require nothing less than fine-tuned attention to foundational experiences of animate life, including foundational ontogenetical experiences that undergird adult proficiencies and abilities, and hence fine-tuned attention to learning and to retaining what is learned in kinesthetic memory.

Key words: animate organism, embodied mind, ownership, agency, dynamics, kinesthesia