A review of eleven volumes in the Sage series, Inquiries in Social Construction, reveals a field that is marked by a great variety of positions, fundamental disagreements, and few common themes. Among the more important of the latter is an emphasis on the discursive constitution of knowledge and the related demystification of scientific authority. Fundamental disagreements exist on the meaning and scope of ‘discourse’. For some, discourse is essentially conversation and its reach more or less unbounded. For others, relationships of power, whether displayed at social or at somatic sites, constitute an irreducible reality beyond discourse.

Key words: constructionism, discourse, postmodernism, science critique.

Excerpt: As alternatives to the dominant computationalist approach to cognition develop toward scientific maturity, the taken-for-granted departure and end points of mind science begin to be questioned more systematically. The simple and apparently given starting points are often revealed as presupposing the more complex stages that are relegated to longer term explanatory goals. Similarly, the apparently complex feat is sometimes shown to be simpler to explain and more basic once certain methodological and conceptual blinders are removed. We witness this pattern in various regions of cognitive science, for instance, over the last two decades, in the embodied turn in artificial intelligence and robotics, the emerging field of cognitive linguistics and in embodied and dynamical accounts of action and perception.

Insights into the nondual relationship of organism and environment and their processual nature have resulted in numerous efforts at understanding human behavior and motivation from a holistic and contextual perspective. Meadian social theory, cultural historical activity theory (CHAT), ecological psychology, and some interpretations of complexity theory persist in relating human activity to the wider and more scientifically valid view that a process metaphysics suggests. I would like to articulate a concept from ecological psychology – that of affordance – and relate it to aspects of phenomenology and neuroscience such that interpretations of the self, cognition, and the brain are understood as similar to interpretations of molar behaviors exhibited in social processes. Experience with meditation as a method of joining normal reflective consciousness with “awareness” is described and suggested as a useful tool in coming to better understand the nondual nature of the body. Relevance: The article directly addresses problems and strategies for conceptualizing and working with nondual phenomena and the paradoxes therein.

Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: Von Glasersfeld’s paper, in my opinion, shows the incompatibility of radical constructivism and sociology. Sociology is an inherently realistic science that cannot be built upon von Glasersfeld’s claim, in the abstract of the target article, that society “can be considered an individual construct.”

This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems.

Key words: direct perception, theory theory, simulation theory, mirror neurons, social cognition.

I propose a distinction between two closely related problems: the problem of social cognition and the problem of participatory sense-making. One problem focuses on how we understand others; the other problem focuses on how, with others, we make sense out of the world. Both understanding others and making sense out of the world involve social interaction. The importance of participatory sense-making is highlighted by reviewing some recent accounts of perception that are philosophically autistic – i.e., accounts that ignore the involvement of others in our perception of the world.

Key words: intersubjectivity, participatory sense-making, perception, philosophical autism

This paper contrasts conservative and liberal interpretations of the extended mind hypothesis. The liberal view, defended here, considers cognition to be socially extensive, in a way that goes beyond the typical examples (involving notebooks and various technologies) rehearsed in the extended mind literature, and in a way that takes cognition to involve enactive processes (e.g., social affordances), rather than functional supervenience relations. The socially extended mind is in some cases constituted not only in social interactions with others, but also in ways that involve institutional structures, norms, and practices. Some of the common objections to the extended mind are considered in relation to this liberal interpretation. Implications for critical social theory are explored.

Key words: Extended mind, parity principle, institutions, enactivism, social affordances, critical theory

The paper shows the creation of an enactive technology of self-observation that facilitates the search for effective and collaborative action strategies for any observer that belongs to an organization or human activity system, with the experience of the user as the cornerstone of design. What is called “enactive technology” are tools that help different users to look for the improvement of actions and personal performances in a systemic view from their own experience, in the assumption of knowledge as enaction (sensu Varela).

How might teachers think about moving to challenge prejudice against persons with handicap? Drawing on Piaget’s and Bateson’s constructivist theories, prejudices are examined in terms of the processes by which they are formed within the individual, the role they play in identity, and the reasons they may be resistant to change. Consideration is then given to strategies which may be useful in inviting reconsideration of cognitive items of this type. Looking at the learner’s experience these include certain types of questioning strategies and counterexamples. Looking at the teacher’s experience a number of techniques are recommended including, neutrality, circular questioning, and parenthesising. Relevance: This is a constructivist approach proposing a method of attitude change in the context of special education. Clearly though, it has implications for attitude change generally.

Key words: Constructivist approach, attitude change, Piaget, Bateson, circular questioning