Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both challenge representationist cognitive science, but the two approaches have only begun to engage in dialogue. Further conceptual clarification is required in which differences are as important as common ground. This paper enters the dialogue by focusing on important differences. After a brief account of the parallel histories of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism, we cover incompatibility between them regarding their theories of sensation and perception. First, we show how and why in ecological theory perception is, crutially, not based on sensation. We elucidate this idea by examining the biological roots of work in the two fields, concentrating on Gibson and Varela and Maturana. We expound an ecological critique of any sensation based approach to perception by detailing two topics: classic retinal image theories and perception in single-celled organisms. The second main point emphasizes the importance of the idea of organism-environment mutuality and its difference from structural coupling of sensations and motor behavior. We point out how ecological – phenomenological methods of inquiry grow out of mutualism and compare Gibson’s idea of visual kinesthesis to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the lived body. Third, we conclude that Ecological Psychology and varieties of Enactivism are laying down different paths to pursue related goals. Thus, convergence of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism is not possible given their conflicting assumptions, but cross-fertilization is possible and desirable.

Key words: direct perception, perception-action, sensorimotor theory, james gibson, organicism, varela

In this theoretical review article, our primary goal is to contribute to the post-cognitivist understanding of learning to perceive and perceiving as learning, by discussing a framework for perception and perceptual learning initiated by James J Gibson, and extended by Eleanor J Gibson and others. This Ecological Psychology has a coherent set of assumptions based on the concept of mutualism between the perceiving organism and its surroundings, and the idea of affordances as action possibilities of the surround that are perceptible by the organism. At the same time, Ecological Psychology, broadly construed, consists of different perspectives that take different routes to address questions related to the core concepts of perceptual learning. In this article, we focus on three theoretical stances within Ecological Psychology on the issue of perceptual learning: that of Eleanor J Gibson, the current theory of direct learning by Jacobs and Michaels, and the “organicist” approach based on ideas of organicist biology and developments in evolutionary biology. We consider perceptual learning as embedded in development and evolution, and we explore perceptual learning in more depth in the context of tool use and language development. We also discuss the relation between Ecological Psychology and Enactivism on the nature of perception. In conclusion, we summarize the benefits of Ecological Psychology, as a robust but still developing post-cognitivist framework, for the study of perceptual learning and cognitive science in general.

Key words: ecological psychology, enactivism, perceptual learning, direct learning, enactive cognitive science, tool use, language development, james j gibson, eleanor j gibson