Christian Tewes is an adjunct Professor (Privatdozent) of Philosophy at the University of Jena and Principal Investigator of the Heidelberg Marsilius Project “Embodiment as Paradigm for an Evolutionary Cultural Anthropology” at the University of Heidelberg. His research interests comprise embodiment theories, phenomenology, topics in the philosophy of mind and anthropology. He coedited the books Embodiment in Evolution and Culture (2016) together with Gregor Etzelmüller and Embodiment, Enaction and Culture (2017) with Christoph Durt and Thomas Fuchs and in 2018 with the latter the special issue on The Formation of Embodied Memory in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. https://www.marsilius-kolleg.uni-heidelberg.de/projekte/verkoerperung/tewes.html
Tewes C. (2019) First-Person Experiences, Privatism and the Evaluation of Structural Content. Constructivist Foundations 14(2): 156–158. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5764
Open peer commentary on the article “An Analysis Procedure for the Micro-Phenomenological Interview” by Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky & Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati. Abstract: I analyze how the micro-phenomenological analysis deals with the challenge of “privatism,” before noting some remaining questions concerning the justification of the procedure and its findings.
Tewes C., Durt C. & Fuchs T. (2017) Introduction: The interplay of embodiment, enaction, and culture. In: Durt C., Fuchs T. & Tewes C. (eds.) Embodiment, enaction, and culture: Investigating the constitution of the shared world. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 1–21. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5079
Excerpt: Here we have brought together philosophical, neurophysiological, psychological, psychiatric, sociological, anthropological, and evolutionary studies of the interplay of embodiment, enaction, and culture. The constitution of the shared world is understood in terms of participatory and broader collective sense-making processes manifested in dynamic forms of intercorporeality, collective body memory, artifacts, affordances, scaffolding, use of symbols, and so on. The contributors investigate how preconscious and conscious accomplishments work together in empathy, interaffectivity, identifications of oneself with others through emotions such as shame, we-intentionality, and hermeneutical understanding of the thoughts of others. The shared world is seen as something constituted by intersubjective understanding that discloses things in the shared significance they have for the members of a culture. Special emphasis is put on phenomenological approaches to cognition and culture and their relation to other approaches. Our introduction explicates the key concepts, relates them to relevant empirical research, raises guiding questions, and explains the structure of the book. Starting with a phenomenological approach to the intertwinement of mind, body, and the cultural world, we continue with an exploration of the concepts of intercorporeality and interaffectivity. The ideas underlying these concepts are put in dialogue with central tenets of enactivism. We then consider further cultural conditions, such as those of cognitive scaffolding, and explain how these cultural conditions in turn depend on the embodied interaction of human beings. Finally, we outline the book’s structure and introduce the individual chapters.