This article proposes a description of the structural dynamics of the act of becoming aware based on the phenomenological method of épochè (or reduction), but also incorporating observations from psychological and contemplative sources. We propose as the core of this specific act an initial phase of suspension of habitual thought and judgement, followed by a phase of conversion of attention from “the exterior” to “the interior,” ending with a phase of letting-go or of receptivity towards the experience.

The target article concludes that it is essential to introduce the personal level in cognitive science. We propose to take this conclusion one step further. The personal level should consist of first-person accounts of specific, contextualized experiences, not abstract or imagined cases. Exploring first-person accounts at their own level of detail calls for the refinements of method that can link up with neural accounts.

In this article I am not going to try and define introspection. I am going to try to state as precisely as possible how the practice of introspection can be improved, starting from the principle that there exists a disjunction between the logic of action and of conceptualization and the practice of introspection does not require that one should already be in possession of an exhaustive scientific knowledge bearing upon it. (Just suppose that before studying cognition, you were required to define it or that you were required to have a complete knowledge of perception before being permitted to read a set of instructions). To make matters worse, innumerable commentators upon what passes for introspection do not seem to have practised it and have certainly never contributed anything to its development. My aim is therefore to bring to light a procedure for progressive improvement in the practice of introspection when it is employed in a programme of research.

The main objective of this article is to capitalise on many years of research, and of practice, relating to the use of introspection in a research context, and thus to provide an initial outline description of introspection, while developing an introspection of introspection. After a description of the context of this research, I define the institutional conditions which would enable the renewal of introspection as a research methodology. Then I describe three aspects of introspective practice: 1) introspection as a process of becoming aware, theorized through Husserl’s model of consciousness modes; 2) introspection as recollection, through the model of retention and awakening in Husserl’s theory of memory; 3) the use of universal descriptive categories for the description of all lived experiences, as a guide for skilled practice of introspection in research. Finally I examine the question of the validation of introspective data, suggesting a strong distinction between the ethical criterion and the epistemic criterion of truth.

Key words: Consciousness, Husserl, descriptive categories, explicitation interview, introspection, lived experience, phenomenology, pre-reflective

Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: This commentary supports the view of the target article concerning the interest of taking into account the coupling between the observing scientist and the subject, and applying it in particular to the study of subjective experience. I propose to identify three aspects of coupling: (a) the technical conditions of coupling between the observer and the subject being observed in order to guide introspection; (b) the requirements for coupling between the scientist and social transmission during the experiential learning of non-inductive aid to introspection; (c) the essential coupling of the reflexive application of the tool to itself, i.e., the explicitation of explicitation.

Open peer commentary on the article “Excavating Belief About Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of the Reflective Act” by Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar. Upshot: I discuss four points: (1) The “excavation fallacy” is a skeptical assertion, therefore, it is not a valid argument; (2) Nisbett & Wilson’s results are experimental artefacts; (3) Guiding to recall enables the exceeding of limits ruled by experimental psychology of memory; (4) A typology of research situations must be introduced to the way we consider methodology.