Barrett L. (2016) Why brains are not computers, why behaviorism is not satanism, and why dolphins are not aquatic apes. The Behavior Analyst 39(1): 9–23. https://cepa.info/5060
Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.
De Jesus P. (2016) Autopoietic enactivism, phenomenology and the deep continuity between life and mind. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 15: 265–289. https://cepa.info/2385
In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin (H&M) make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism (AE). These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not only appear to warrant H&M’s initial claims but also seem to point to further uneasy tensions within the AE framework. The paper goes beyond H&M by tracing the roots of these criticisms and apparent tensions to phenomenology and the role it plays in AE’s distinctive conception of strong life-mind continuity. It is highlighted that this phenomenological dimension of AE contains certain unexamined anthropomorphic and anthropogenic leanings which do not sit comfortably within its wider commitment to life-mind continuity. In light of this analysis it is suggested that AE will do well to rethink this role or ultimately run the risk of remaining theoretically unstable. The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical development of AE by highlighting potential internal tensions within its framework which need to be addressed in order for it to continue to evolve as a coherent paradigm.
Autopoietic enactivism (AE) is a relatively young but increasingly influential approach within embodied cognitive science, which aims to offer a viable alternative framework to mainstream cognitivism. Similarly, in biology, the nascent field of biosemiotics has steadily been developing an increasingly influential alternative framework to mainstream biology. Despite sharing common objectives and clear theoretical overlap, there has to date been little to no exchange between the two fields. This paper takes this under-appreciated overlap as not only a much needed call to begin building bridges between the two areas but also as an opportunity to explore how AE could benefit from biosemiotics. As a first tentative step towards this end, the paper will draw from both fields to develop a novel synthesis – biosemiotic enactivism – which aims to clarify, develop and ultimately strengthen some key AE concepts. The paper has two main goals: (i) to propose a novel conception of cognition that could contribute to the ongoing theoretical developments of AE and (ii) to introduce some concepts and ideas from biosemiotics to the enactive community in order to stimulate further debate across the two fields.
Development of artificial cognition, one of the major challenges of contemporary science, requires better understanding of the nature and function of mind. This paper follows the idea of Searle that mind is more than computation, and explores the notion that mind has to be embodied in agency that actively interacts with the outside world. To avoid anthropocentrism and dualism, I develop the concept of agency using principles of biosemiotics, a new discipline that integrates semiotics (science on signification and meaning) with biology. In evolutionary terms, human cognition is an advanced form of agency that emerged from simpler ancestral forms in animals, plants, and single-cell organisms. Agency requires autonomy, informed choice, and goal-directedness. These features imply a capacity of agents to select and execute actions based on internal goals and perceived or stored signs. Agents are always constructed by parental agents, except for the most simple primordial molecular-scale self-reproducing agents, which emerged from non-living components. The origin of life coincides with the emergence of agency and primitive communication, where signs are not yet associated with objects, and instead used to activate or regulate actions directly. The capacity of agents to perceive and categorize objects appeared later in evolution and marks the emergence of minimal mind and advanced communication via object-associated signs. Combining computation with agential features such as goal-directedness, adaptability, and construction may yield artificial systems comparable in some respects to human mind.