Open peer commentary on the article “The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond” by Shaun Gallagher. Upshot: A triple schematic connection between affect, action and time-consciousness can be represented as follows: “affect → action (anticipation) → time-consciousness (protention.” Two questions are raised: what is the exact directional causality between these three phenomena? And does empirical evidence from the study of certain conditions where the time-experience, affect and action were shown to be transformed support the proposed connections? While psychiatric disorders show a similar schematic causation between these phenomena, this is not the case for meditation. One possible explanation of the inconsistency is the question of the interplay in affect between arousal and valence.

In arguing that the philosophical works of Jean Piaget could be used as a `remedy’ for the flaws in those of Thomas Kuhn, Tsou overlooked some crucial aspects of the problem: the early history between them, the biological foundation supporting Piaget’s method, and a preexisting suggestion regarding the intended future extension of his work. There was also no mention of the existence of a `lost’ manuscript by Kuhn, which supposedly presents the mature articulation of his theory. This comment therefore proposes some `friendly amendments’ to Tsou’s exposition, with a view to helping achieve his synthetic vision once the `lost’ work has finally been published. Yet the basic message, in anticipation of this future endeavor, is also exceedingly simple: the implicit direction of Piaget’s (and Kuhn’s) epistemological constructivism can be characterized as evolutionary-developmental `progress from, ’ rather than vitalist-teleological `progress toward. '

Excerpt: Anyone who has seen Monty Python’s Life of Brian will probably remember the scene where a heated and hilarious argument breaks out between the Judean Liberation Front and the People’s Front for the Liberation of Judea. Although both have a common enemy – the Romans – they cannot make common cause because of their differences (small to us, but huge to them). One can sometimes be reminded of this when seeing the disputes between constructivists and social constructionists. Yes, there are differences between them, but might it not be better to focus on what they have in common? In a world dominated by objectivist psychology, would it not make more sense to build bridges and look for commonalities? This book sets out to do just that, and its aim is to build bridges between personal and social constructionism. It is divided into four sections: The Personal Meets the Social, The Personal and Social in Psychotherapy, The Personal and Social in Research, and Dialogue, Reflection and Anticipation: Future Directions. The chapters come mainly from two North American conferences (an APA and a NAPCN conference in 2002), although there are also two from the XV International Congress on Personal Construct Psychology held in Huddersfield, UK in 2003 as well as a further two prepared specially for this volume.

Topics addressed include: constructive alternativism and the knowledge–reality relation; anticipation, self-organisation, and structural determinism; constructs, systems, and complementarity; identity, sociality, and the mind–body problem; acceptance, orthogonal interaction, and the psychotherapeutic relationship; and person-as-scientist and the narrative approach.

This paper outlines an interactivist-constructivist theory of autonomy as the basic organisational form of life, and the role we see it playing in a theory of embodied cognition. We distinguish our concept of autonomy from autopoiesis, which does not emphasise interaction and openness. We then present the basic conceptual framework of the I-C approach to intelligence, including an account of directed processes, dynamical anticipation, normative evaluation, and selfdirectedness as the basis of intelligence and learning, and use this to briefly reflect on other contemporary dynamical systems approaches.

Although prediction plays a prominent role in mental processing, we have only limited understanding of how the brain generates and employs predictions. This paper develops a theoretical framework in three steps. First I propose a process model that describes how predictions are produced and are linked to behavior. Subsequently I describe a generative mechanism, consisting of the selective amplification of neural dynamics in the context of boundary conditions. I hypothesize that this mechanism is active as a process engine in every mental process, and that therefore each mental process proceeds in two stages: (i) the formation of process boundary conditions; (ii) the bringing about of the process function by the operation – within the boundary conditions – of a relatively ‘blind’ generative process. Thirdly, from this hypothesis I derive a strategy for describing processes formally. The result is a multilevel framework that may also be useful for studying mental processes in general.

Key words: anticipation, embodied valuation, forward model, mental simulation, objectification, predictive coding

This paper targets the constitutive basis of social cognition. It begins by describing the traditional and still dominant cognitivist view. Cognitivism assumes internalism about the realisers of social cognition; thus, the embodied and embedded elements of intersubjective engagement are ruled out from playing anything but a basic causal role in an account of social cognition. It then goes on to advance and clarify an alternative to the cognitivist view; namely, an enactive account of social cognition. It does so first by articulating a diachronic constitutive account for how embodied engagement can play a constitutive role in social cognition. It then proceeds to consider an objection; the causal-constitutive fallacy (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Block, 2005) against enactive social cognition. The paper proceeds to deflate this objection by establishing that the distinction between constitution and causation is not co-extensive with the distinction between internal constitutive elements and external causal elements. It is then shown that there is a different reason for thinking that an enactive account of social cognition is problematic. We call this objection the ‘poverty of the interactional stimulus argument’. This objection turns on the role and characteristics of anticipation in enactive social cognition. It argues that anticipatory processes are mediated by an internally realised model or tacit theory (Carruthers, 2015; Seth, 2015). The final part of this paper dissolves this objection by arguing that it is possible to cast anticipatory processes as orchestrated as well as maintained by sensorimotor couplings between individuals in face-to-face interaction.

Key words: Social cognition, enactivism, intersubjectivity, diachronic constitution, theory of mind, sensorimotor contingencies, causal-constitutive fallacy

Synaptic communication, nonsynaptic diffusion neurotransmission and glial activity each update the morphology of the other two. These interactions lead to an endogenous structure of causal entailment. It has internal ambiguities rendering it incomputable. The entailed effects are bizarre. These include abduction of novelty in response to conflicting cues, a resolution of the seeming conflict between freewill and determinism, and anticipatory behavior. Such inherent ambiguity of the causal entailment structure does not preclude the implementation of brain-like activities artificially. Although an algorithm is incapable of neuromimetically reproducing self-referential character of the brain, there is a currently-feasible strategy for wiring a “human in the loop” to use the cognitive powers of anticipation and unconscious integration to provide dramatic improvement in the operation of large engineered systems.

Key words: hyperset, endogenous system, bizarre system, recursion, impredicative, incomputable, anticipatory system, unconscious integration.

The field of semiotics is described as a general study of knowing. Knowing in a broad sense as a process that assumes (and includes) at least memory (together with heredity), anticipation, communication, meaningful information, and needs, is a distinctive feature of living systems. Sciences are distinguished accordingly into phi-sciences (that use physicalist methodology) and sigma-sciences (that use semiotic methodology). Jesper Hoffmeyer’s book Biosemiotics is viewed

Key words: Biosemiotics, Hoffmeyer, adaptation, knowing

Neurophenomenology (Varela 1996) is not only philosophical but also empirical and experimental. Our purpose in this article is to illustrate concretely the efficiency of this approach in the field of neuroscience and, more precisely here, in epileptology. A number of recent observations have indicated that epileptic seizures do not arise suddenly simply as the effect of random fluctuations of brain activity, but require a process of pre-seizure changes that start long before. This has been reported at two different levels of description: on the one hand, the epileptic patient often experiences some warning symptoms that precede seizures from several minutes to hours in the form of very specific lived events. On the other hand, the analyses of brain electrical activities have provided strong evidence that it is possible to detect a pre-seizure state in the neuronal dynamics several minutes before the electro-clinical onset of a seizure. We review here some of the ongoing work of our research group concerning seizure anticipation. In particular, we discuss experimental evidence of upward (local-to-global) formation of conscious experience and its neural substrate, but also of the downward (global-to-local) determination of local neuronal activity by situated conscious activity and its substrate large-scale neural assemblies. This causal role of conscious experience may lead to new kinds of therapy for epileptic patients.