Open peer commentary on the article “The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond” by Shaun Gallagher. Upshot: A triple schematic connection between affect, action and time-consciousness can be represented as follows: “affect → action (anticipation) → time-consciousness (protention.” Two questions are raised: what is the exact directional causality between these three phenomena? And does empirical evidence from the study of certain conditions where the time-experience, affect and action were shown to be transformed support the proposed connections? While psychiatric disorders show a similar schematic causation between these phenomena, this is not the case for meditation. One possible explanation of the inconsistency is the question of the interplay in affect between arousal and valence.

In arguing that the philosophical works of Jean Piaget could be used as a `remedy’ for the flaws in those of Thomas Kuhn, Tsou overlooked some crucial aspects of the problem: the early history between them, the biological foundation supporting Piaget’s method, and a preexisting suggestion regarding the intended future extension of his work. There was also no mention of the existence of a `lost’ manuscript by Kuhn, which supposedly presents the mature articulation of his theory. This comment therefore proposes some `friendly amendments’ to Tsou’s exposition, with a view to helping achieve his synthetic vision once the `lost’ work has finally been published. Yet the basic message, in anticipation of this future endeavor, is also exceedingly simple: the implicit direction of Piaget’s (and Kuhn’s) epistemological constructivism can be characterized as evolutionary-developmental `progress from, ’ rather than vitalist-teleological `progress toward. '

Topics addressed include: constructive alternativism and the knowledge–reality relation; anticipation, self-organisation, and structural determinism; constructs, systems, and complementarity; identity, sociality, and the mind–body problem; acceptance, orthogonal interaction, and the psychotherapeutic relationship; and person-as-scientist and the narrative approach.

This paper outlines an interactivist-constructivist theory of autonomy as the basic organisational form of life, and the role we see it playing in a theory of embodied cognition. We distinguish our concept of autonomy from autopoiesis, which does not emphasise interaction and openness. We then present the basic conceptual framework of the I-C approach to intelligence, including an account of directed processes, dynamical anticipation, normative evaluation, and selfdirectedness as the basis of intelligence and learning, and use this to briefly reflect on other contemporary dynamical systems approaches.

Although prediction plays a prominent role in mental processing, we have only limited understanding of how the brain generates and employs predictions. This paper develops a theoretical framework in three steps. First I propose a process model that describes how predictions are produced and are linked to behavior. Subsequently I describe a generative mechanism, consisting of the selective amplification of neural dynamics in the context of boundary conditions. I hypothesize that this mechanism is active as a process engine in every mental process, and that therefore each mental process proceeds in two stages: (i) the formation of process boundary conditions; (ii) the bringing about of the process function by the operation – within the boundary conditions – of a relatively ‘blind’ generative process. Thirdly, from this hypothesis I derive a strategy for describing processes formally. The result is a multilevel framework that may also be useful for studying mental processes in general.

Key words: anticipation, embodied valuation, forward model, mental simulation, objectification, predictive coding

This paper targets the constitutive basis of social cognition. It begins by describing the traditional and still dominant cognitivist view. Cognitivism assumes internalism about the realisers of social cognition; thus, the embodied and embedded elements of intersubjective engagement are ruled out from playing anything but a basic causal role in an account of social cognition. It then goes on to advance and clarify an alternative to the cognitivist view; namely, an enactive account of social cognition. It does so first by articulating a diachronic constitutive account for how embodied engagement can play a constitutive role in social cognition. It then proceeds to consider an objection; the causal-constitutive fallacy (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Block, 2005) against enactive social cognition. The paper proceeds to deflate this objection by establishing that the distinction between constitution and causation is not co-extensive with the distinction between internal constitutive elements and external causal elements. It is then shown that there is a different reason for thinking that an enactive account of social cognition is problematic. We call this objection the ‘poverty of the interactional stimulus argument’. This objection turns on the role and characteristics of anticipation in enactive social cognition. It argues that anticipatory processes are mediated by an internally realised model or tacit theory (Carruthers, 2015; Seth, 2015). The final part of this paper dissolves this objection by arguing that it is possible to cast anticipatory processes as orchestrated as well as maintained by sensorimotor couplings between individuals in face-to-face interaction.

Key words: social cognition, enactivism, intersubjectivity, diachronic constitution, theory of mind, sensorimotor contingencies, causal-constitutive fallacy

Synaptic communication, nonsynaptic diffusion neurotransmission and glial activity each update the morphology of the other two. These interactions lead to an endogenous structure of causal entailment. It has internal ambiguities rendering it incomputable. The entailed effects are bizarre. These include abduction of novelty in response to conflicting cues, a resolution of the seeming conflict between freewill and determinism, and anticipatory behavior. Such inherent ambiguity of the causal entailment structure does not preclude the implementation of brain-like activities artificially. Although an algorithm is incapable of neuromimetically reproducing self-referential character of the brain, there is a currently-feasible strategy for wiring a “human in the loop” to use the cognitive powers of anticipation and unconscious integration to provide dramatic improvement in the operation of large engineered systems.

Key words: hyperset, endogenous system, bizarre system, recursion, impredicative, incomputable, anticipatory system, unconscious integration.

The field of semiotics is described as a general study of knowing. Knowing in a broad sense as a process that assumes (and includes) at least memory (together with heredity), anticipation, communication, meaningful information, and needs, is a distinctive feature of living systems. Sciences are distinguished accordingly into phi-sciences (that use physicalist methodology) and sigma-sciences (that use semiotic methodology). Jesper Hoffmeyer’s book Biosemiotics is viewed

Key words: Biosemiotics, Hoffmeyer, adaptation, knowing

Recent studies have shown that non-linear analysis of intracranial activities can detect a ‘pre-ictal phase’ preceding the epileptic seizure. Nevertheless, the dynamical nature of the underlying neuronal process and the spatial extension of this pre-ictal phase still remain unknown. In this paper, we address these aspects using a new non-linear measure of dynamic similarity between different parts of intracranial recordings of nine patients with medial temporal lobe epilepsy recorded during transitions to seizure. Our results confirm that non-linear changes in neuronal dynamics allow, in most cases (16 out of 17), a seizure anticipation several minutes in advance. Furthermore, we show that the spatial distribution of pre-ictal changes often involves an extended network projecting beyond the limits of the epileptogenic region. Finally, the pre-ictal phase could frequently (13 out of 17) be characterized with a marked shift toward slower frequencies in upper delta or theta frequency range.

Key words: long-term non-stationarity, non-linear analysis, pre-ictal phase, seizure anticipation, temporal lobe epilepsy

Background: New methods derived from non-linear analysis of intracranial recordings permit the anticipation of an epileptic seizure several minutes before the seizure. Nevertheless, anticipation of seizures based on standard scalp- electroencephalographical (EEG) signals has not been reported yet. The accessibility to preictal changes from standard EEGs is essential for expanding the clinical applicability of these methods. Methods: We analysed 26 scalp-EEG/video recordings, from 60 min before a seizure, in 23 patients with temporal-lobe epilepsy. For five patients, simultaneous scalp and intracranial EEG recordings were assessed. Long-term changes before seizure onset were identified by a measure of non-linear similarity, which is very robust in spite of large artifacts and runs in real-time. Findings: In 25 of 26 recordings, measurement of non-linear changes in EEG signals allowed the anticipation of a seizure several minutes before it occurred (mean 7 min). These preictal changes in the scalp EEG correspond well with concurrent changes in depth recordings. Interpretation: Scalp-EEG recordings retain sufficient dynamical information which can be used for the analysis of preictal changes leading to seizures. Seizure anticipation strategies in real-time can now be envisaged for diverse clinical applications, such as devices for patient warning, for efficacy of ictal-single photon emission computed tomography procedures, and eventual treatment interventions for preventing seizures.