The main contribution of this paper is a naturalized account of the phenomenon of computation. The key idea for the development of this account is the identification of the notion of syntactical processing (or information processing) with the dynamical evolution of a constrained physical process, based on the observation that both evolve according to an arbitrary set of rules. This identification, in turn, revealed that, from the physical point of view, computation could be understood in terms of the operation of a component subdivided into two parts, (a) the constrained process and (b) the constraints that control its dynamics, where the interactions with the rest of the system are mediated by configurational changes of the constrained process. The immediate consequence of this analysis is the observation that this notion of computation can be readily integrated into the enactive paradigm of cognition.

Key words: enaction, computation, syntax, arbitrariness, computation, varela, organism, searle.

Radical constructivists appeal to self‐legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self‐legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self‐legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O’Neill anchors self‐legislation more firmly to the self‐disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self‐legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self‐legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self‐legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.

Problem: The task of developing an ethics for the media according to constructivist principles is heavily loaded in two respects. On the one hand, critics of constructivism insist that this discourse generally legitimates forgery, arbitrariness, and laissez-faire – a hotchpotch of facts and fictions; on the other, constructivists protest that their very school of thought inspires the maximum measure of personal responsibility and ethical-moral sensibility. Method: Taking as its point of departure a media falsification scandal that received wide publicity in Germany, this article seeks to outline some of the fundamental questions of a constructivist media ethics. The close scrutiny of the scandal involving the interview fabricator, Tom Kummer, leads the author to identify three fundamental questions of a constructivist media ethics: (1) the question of autonomy; (2) the question of fact and fiction; (3) the question of responsibility. These questions are discussed at length, and with particular attention to the current debates regarding the ethics of media and communication studies. Findings: The author is able to show that constructivist premises and postulates will certainly help to create ethical-moral sensibility, but cannot supply, as immediate derivatives of constructivist epistemology, programmes for action or concrete regulations of behaviour that can be implemented step by step. For an ethics of the media, constructivism can thus primarily provide meta-reflections and meta-rules.

Key words: constructivist media ethics, media scandal, constructivist meta-rules, journalistic forgery, fact and fiction

Purpose: Radical Constructivism has been subject to extensive criticism and denigration such as that it is a naturalized biologism which supports an “anything goes” philosophy of arbitrarily constructed realities. In an extreme case RC is equated with intellectual silliness. These accusations are to be refuted. Approach: Based on the concept that cognition can work only with experiences, we investigate the question of where their apparent order comes from. Arguments are presented that favor the amorphousness of the “external” world. To support the idea of “internal” order we review results in formal network research. Findings: The properties of networks suggest that order arises without influence from the outside. Conclusions: RC based on network models (a) does not need any empirical support and is therefore no biologism nor naturalism, (b) forgoes arbitrariness, and (c) goes beyond narrative (armchair) philosophy.