Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Scott’s proposal is well-founded and opens interesting possibilities. We selected some critical aspects of his argumentation and discuss them in the context of the constructivist perspective. We highlight as Scott’s “blind spot” his statement - presented without further argument - of the need for a conceptual and theoretical unification of psychology from the perspective of second-order cybernetics. We find this especially worrisome as it is based on only one version of cybernetics.

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: Schmidt’s “philosophical argumentation” in favor of an action orientation for communication rewrites constructivism in terms of process. Though in support of his proposal, a philosophical argumentation about process works best for illuminating the writer’s own process and orienting readers to his own argument. I propose that arguments about the communication of social actors should make visible the social processes about which they argue.

Abstract: My argumentation boil down to the thesis that the distinction between “radical” and “moderate” leads to misunderstandings and should therefore be avoided. While radical constructivists in particular have forced these misunderstandings to some extent through exaggerated formulations, in my opinion every constructivism is radical per se; a non-radical constructivism would be a contradiction in terms. Radical means “not arbitrary,” because anyone who, when thinking about the roots (radices) of human cognitive faculties, sees that no observation is constituted independently of the observer, every claim to truth must inevitably be relativized. This relativization is not placed at the discretion of the reflective subject, but proves to be a feasible path (criterion of viability). However, radial does not mean “arbitrary” either, as a vulgar relativism might suggest, for which everything becomes indifferent because from its perspective relative truths appear to be equally valid if there is no absolute truth. Such vulgar relativism suppresses different degrees of validity. The differentiation and comparison of different observer perspectives enable consistent descriptions (criterion of coherence) and in social constructions people come to jointly supported insights (criterion of consensus). [Curator’s translation]

Abstract: The pandemic is an unprecedented unveiling of our deepest vital abilities. One of these abilities, unveiled here, is the unanticipated cooperative quality of the comments, which is the demonstration “on the spot” of a supportive enriching mode of co-philosophizing, also mostly unprecedented in the standard and conflictual violent hermeneutic argumentation. Another one is the existential pathological grid applied to a process of fragility, which I rather would like to see as a modal and processual ontological micro-dynamics, but which amplifies in a nice, elegant way my micro-experiential statement. Still another ability is the acute awareness of the general destabilizing of any scientific discourse and will for secure knowledge.

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: I agree with some of Quale’s general conclusions, in particular that each individual knower is responsible for choosing among alternatives and the pragmatic consequences that are related to this choice. However, in adopting implicitly the premise according which individual human existence precedes coexistence or social existence, and in focusing on the cognitive operations of a “generic subject” (that is, a disembodied subject coming from nowhere and deprived of any historicity and sociality), Quale’s argumentation becomes questionable. I illustrate this point of view by analysing his discourse concerning the role of language in the conceptualization of cognition and his attempt to ground the source of ethics in the individual construction of the world.

Working for decades as both theorist and teacher, Ranulph Glanville came to believe that cybernetics and design are two sides of the same coin. Working as both practitioners and teachers, the authors present their understanding of Glanville and the relationships between cybernetics and design. We believe cybernetics offers a foundation for 21st-century design practice. We offer this rationale: – If design, then systems: Due in part to the rise of computing technology and its role in human communications, the domain of design has expanded from giving form to creating systems that support human interactions, thus, systems literacy becomes a necessary foundation for design. – If systems, then cybernetics: Interaction involves goals, feedback, and learning, the science of which is cybernetics. – If cybernetics, then second-order cybernetics: Framing wicked problems requires explicit values and viewpoints, accompanied by the responsibility to justify them with explicit arguments, thus incorporating subjectivity and the epistemology of second-order cybernetics. – If second-order cybernetics, then conversation: Design grounded in argumentation requires conversation so that participants may understand, agree, and collaborate on effective action. Second-order cybernetics frames design as conversation for learning together, and order design creates possibilities for others to have conversations, to learn, and to act.

Key words: conversation, cybernetics, design knowledge, design methods, design rationale, design, systems, ethics, language, models, second-order cybernetics

Context: Practice-based design research is becoming more widely recognized in academia, including at doctoral level, yet there are arguably limited options for dissemination beyond the traditional conference format of paper-based proceedings, possibly with an exhibition or “demonstrator” component that is often non-archival. Further, the opportunities afforded by the traditional-format paper presentations is at times at odds with practice-based methodologies being presented. Purpose: We provide a first-hand descriptive account of developing and running a new international conference with an experimental format that aims to support more analogously the dissemination of practice-based design research. Method: Our approach herein is broadly interpretative, phenomenological and critically reflective in orientation, to analyze our own experiential insights from the conference conception, through to the event itself and post-conference reflections, alongside the reflections fed back by conference delegates. Results: We have found the roundtable format continues to function well for creating a discursive interactional context. However issues arose around the crucial nature of the session chair’s role in enabling rich and multi-voiced discussion and how presenters’, organizers’ and delegates’ voices were captured and documented, with implications for further developing the conference design. Looking forward, there are also questions raised about: balancing the stringency of a rigorous review process with provision of an encouraging platform for early-career researchers; and balancing the need for clear criteria and formatting standards (for assessing quality and rigor in submitted work) with the “openness” of the submission template and formatting guidelines (to encourage pioneering developments in visual argumentation. Implications: The article provides a valuable resource for practice-based design researchers who are committed to generating research understanding through applied endeavors (making things) and/or writing. This includes designers who are new to research cultures. It should also appeal to those working in interdisciplinary research in collaboration with design practitioners (but who may not be practitioners themselves. The conference aims to foster and support a burgeoning “research through design” academic community and to provide a fitting dissemination platform for this community. We hope that the conference will encourage academic communities to give proper consideration to the concept of design as a knowledge-generating activity. Constructivist content: Knowledge about design research is generated from meaningful interaction between people and artifacts as part of the unfolding conference experience. The organizational features of the conference aim to support knowledge dissemination through dialogical relations between people and things in particular contexts of interaction.

Key words: Research through design, practice-based research, dialogical relationships, embodied knowledge, new materialities, discursive dissemination platform

Context: Non-dualistic thinking is an alternative to realism and constructivism. Problem: In the absence of a distinct definition of the term “description,” the question comes up of what exactly can be included in non-dualistic descriptions, and in how far the definition of this term affects the relation between theory and empirical practice. Furthermore, this paper is concerned with the question of whether non-dualism and dualism differ in their implications. Method: I provide a wider semantic framework for the term “description” by means of George Spencer Brown’s terminology in his calculus of indications as laid out in Laws of Form. The connection of descriptions and distinctions enables descriptions to comprise reflections and language as well as empirical observations. Results: Non-dualism can be thought of in different ways but still has essential elements in common with dualism. Implications: Non-dualism, as well as dualism, is an argumentation technique suitable for specific situations, but without significant differences in implications.

Key words: Distinction and indication, neutralistic basis, temporal paradox, re-entry, semantic, empirical and operational non-dualism

The article presents the possibility of a dialogue between constructivism and the studies on historical reception. Based on the fixation on the location in historical epistemological efforts, it criticizes an unnecessarily radical constructivism with reference to evolutionary epistemology, and makes an appeal for a moderate ‘morphological constructivism’, which can be methodically applied in the form of ‘morphological imagology’. Subsequently, it illustrates a concrete example for the use of this morphological-constructivist method in the field of historical reception studies based on the Latin America reception of the German historian Georg Gottfried Gervinus. Even the argumentation of the representatives of radical constructivism is not able to negate the specific cognitive ambition of the historian to be able to make conclusive statements about the past. The historians’ obligation to the past, at least the right to veto the sources, prevails. Within this framework, however, the innovative potential of constructivist models and methods open a broad spectrum of possibilities for historical reception studies which take historical persons’ perceptions of reality seriously as a reality ‘sui generis’.

Context: The detection of objective reality, truth, and lies are still heated topics in epistemology. When discussing these topics, philosophers often resort to certain thought experiments, engaging an important concept that can be broadly identified as “the global observer.” It relates to Putnam’s God’s Eye, Davidson’s Omniscient Interpreter, and the ultimate observer in quantum physics, among others. Problem: The article explores the notion of the global observer as the guarantor of the determinability and configuration of events in the world. It analyzes the consistency of the notion “global observer” from the standpoint of logic and philosophy, and discusses why application of this notion in some contexts poses challenges and appears to be paradoxical. Method: The paper uses conceptual methods of argumentation, such as logical (deduction) and philosophical (phenomenology) kinds of proof. Its key approach is the engagement of thought experiments. Results: The notion of a global observer is incoherent: “being global” and “being an observer” appear to be incompatible features. It is claimed that from the standpoint of global observation, there are no events occurring in the world. Furthermore, the indefiniteness of the world as a whole is asserted, which is related to the uninformedness of the global observer regarding the “true state of affairs.” “Global observation” turns out to be incompatible with the concept of the observer, blocking, as a result, the opportunity for a determinable configuration of events. It only makes sense to discuss local observations, which are limited to mutual observation or introspections, and not to assume the existence of some absolute truth, reality, or the state of affairs beyond the local observations. Constructivist content: The article emphasizes the role of the observer and observation. It opens up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. Referring to von Foerster’s and Luhmann’s idea that we can only speak reasonably about local observations, the paper argues that reality is neither external to nor independent of the observer. Implications: The paper could be productive for epistemic theories, theories of quantum physics, and theories of non-classical logic.

Key words: Global observer, ultimate observer, omniscient observer, ideal observer, omniscient interpreter, local observer, limited observer, event, truth.