Consideration is given to the relevance of recent discussions of auto¬poiesis to the study of self-organizing systems. Mechanisms that could underly the physical realization of an autopoietic system are discussed. It is concluded that autopoiesis does not, by itself, provide the essential ingredient whose omission has prevented SOS studies from being more productive. Two other important missing ingredients are discussed.

The paper presents a social system’s perspective on the Internet, based mostly upon a radical constructivist approach. It summarizes the contributions of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann and outlines the theoretical boundaries between the theory of social systems and that of media studies. The paper highlights the self-referential nature of the Internet, which is depicted as both a system and an environment by means of a network of serialized selections and passing on of data. Therefore, whereas media theory pictures the Internet as a medium, this paper describes it as a system in regard to its self-referential dynamic, and as an environment in regard to the non-organized complexity of data within the medium. Even though the Internet is hereby depicted as an autopoietic system from a social system’s perspective, the paper does not resort to all the concepts of Luhmann’s theory.

The notion of structural coupling plays a central role in Maturana and Varela’s biology of cognition framework and strongly influenced Varela’s subsequent enactive elaboration of this framework. Building upon previous work using a glider in the Game of Life (GoL) cellular automaton as a toy model of a minimal autopoietic system with which to concretely explore these theoretical frameworks, this article presents an analysis of structural coupling between a glider and its environment. Specifically, for sufficiently small GoL universes, we completely characterize the nonautonomous dynamics of both a glider and its environment in terms of interaction graphs, derive the set of possible glider lives determined by the mutual constraints between these interaction graphs, and show how such lives are embedded in the state transition graph of the entire GoL universe.

Key words: autopoiesis, enaction, structural coupling, cellular automata, enactivism

This article revisits the concept of autopoiesis and examines its relation to cognition and life. We present a mathematical model of a 3D tesselation automaton, considered as a minimal example of autopoiesis. This leads us to a thesis T1: “An autopoietic system can be described as a random dynamical system, which is defined only within its organized autopoietic domain.” We propose a modified definition of autopoiesis: “An autopoietic system is a network of processes that produces the components that reproduce the network, and that also regulates the boundary conditions necessary for its ongoing existence as a network.” We also propose a definition of cognition: “A system is cognitive if and only if sensory inputs serve to trigger actions in a specific way, so as to satisfy a viability constraint.” It follows from these definitions that the concepts of autopoiesis and cognition, although deeply related in their connection with the regulation of the boundary conditions of the system, are not immediately identical: a system can be autopoietic without being cognitive, and cognitive without being autopoietic. Finally, we propose a thesis T2: “A system that is both autopoietic and cognitive is a living system.”

Key words: Autopoiesis, cognition, life, tessela- tion automaton, random dynamical system, boundary conditions

Purpose: This paper seeks to present a comprehensive overview of the supply chain as an autopoietic system. The new autopoietic approach suggests a transition from traditional cognitivist epistemology to the theory of learning as a creational matter, and this type of thinking can potentially shed light on the role of knowledge creation as a part of supply chain management. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is structured as follows: the first section describes the theoretical background of the concept of knowledge management in the supply chain. After that, the paper examines the general systems theory and the role of an autopoietic system within it. Then the paper addresses autopoietic epistemology. In particular, the notions of knowledge, learning, and knowledge flows are described so that the focus is on the context of the supply chain and supply chain management at operational level. Findings: The supplier’s, customer’s, and firm’s own organization and parts of the organization have autonomy system memories, which ultimately formulate how the intended development ideas are in fact realized and how they are adopted by the organization. Supply chain managers should take into account the fact that the routines and norms of the node are part of the system that are not controlled from outside. Instead, the system can modify its objectives internally as part of its autonomous operation, which should be taken into consideration in the knowledge sharing process. Originality/value – The description of a supply chain as an autopoietic knowledge system is a new way to examine knowledge sharing in a supply chain.

Key words: supply chain, knowledge creation, autopoietic epistemology, autopoietic system, system thinking.

We need to realize that a paradigm based on the view of the universe that makes irreversible time and evolution fundamental forces us to view man as a product of evolution and therefore an observer from inside the universe. The theories of the phenomenological life world and the hermeneutics of communication and understanding seem to defy classical scientific explanations. The humanities therefore send another insight the opposite way down the evolutionary ladder, with questions like: What is the role of consciousness, signs and meaning in evolution? These are matters that the exact sciences are not constructed to answer in their present state. Phenomenology and hermeneutics point out to the sciences that they have prerequisite conditions in embodied living as a conscious being imbued with meaningful language and a culture. One can see the world view that emerges from the work of the sciences as a reconstruction back into time of our present ecological and evolutionary self-understanding as semiotic intersubjective conscious cultural historical creatures, but unable to handle the aspects of meaning and conscious awareness. How can we integrate these two directions of explanatory efforts? The problem is that the scientific one is without concepts of qualia and meaning, and the phenomenological-hermeneutic “sciences of meaning” do not have a foundation in material evolution. Relevance: A modern interpretation of C.S. Peirce’s pragmaticistic evolutionary and phaneroscopic semiosis in the form of a biosemiotics is used and integrated with N. Luhmann’s evolutionary autopoietic system theory of social communication. This framework, which integrates cybernetics and semiotics, is called Cybersemiotics.

This article focuses on a scientific approach to the study of cognition that Warren McCulloch introduced in the era of cybernetics as “experimental epistemology.” In line with recent attempts to highlight its contribution to cognitive science and AI, our article intends to draw attention to its unexplored influence on contemporary embodied approaches to the investigation of mind and consciousness. To this end, we will survey a series of models of cognitive systems genealogically related to the McCulloch-Pitts networks-based modeling approach, i.e., von Foerster’s model of the biological computer, the Maturana-Varela model of the autopoietic system, and Varela’s model of emergent selves. Based on examination of the relevant aspects of these models, we will argue that they offered the McCulloch-Pitts “cybernetic of networks” a coherent methodological and theoretical line of development, complementary to the well-known computationalist one. As we will show, this alternative evolutionary line empowered the biological orientation of McCulloch’s experimental epistemology, laying foundations for contemporary “radically embodied” approaches to mind and consciousness – in particular the Thompson-Varela approach. We will identify the heritage of this tradition of inquiry for future research in cognitive science and AI by proposing guidelines that synthetize how its methodological and theoretical insights suggest taking into account the role(s) played by the biological body in cognitive processes – consciousness included.

Key words: autonomy, autopoiesis, constructivism, cybernetics of networks, (radical) embodiment, enaction, experimental epistemology, synthetic modeling

This chapter draws an analogy between computing mechanisms and autopoietic systems, focusing on the non-representational status of both kinds of system (computational and autopoietic). It will be argued that the role played by input and output components in a computing mechanism closely resembles the relationship between an autopoietic system and its environment, and in this sense differs from the classical understanding of inputs and outputs. The analogy helps to make sense of why we should think of computing mechanisms as non- representational, and might also facilitate reconciliation between computational and autopoietic/enactive approaches to the study of cognition.

Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis, and particularly his ideas on language and the ensuing construction of reality, are used as the major line of thought in this contribution. Some basic notions from his theory are used and extended as a framework to provide some explicit thoughts about what is considered as a particular omission in his theory: an affirmation of the impossibility to empirically observe the internal states of an autopoietic system. It is maintained that the definition of autopoiesis entails a concept of ‘state’ that coincides with ‘state transition’. A researcher who is interested in observing the internal states of an autopoietic system will become enmeshed in the impossibility to perceive his own perceptual acts. This is related to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a ‘negative philosophy’, i.e. a philosophy in which the central theme is the impossibility for consciousness to grasp itself as a consciousness of the world. Finally, the concept of a ‘one-sided boundary’ is presented as a metaphor for the inaccessibility of closure. It is maintained that entering a closed system is not so much a matter of observation, but rather of its cessation.

In this paper, a new, non-psychological and non-sociological approach to understanding creativity is proposed. The approach is based on autopoietic system theory, where an autopoietic system is defined as a unity whose organization is defined by a particular network of production processes of elements. While the theory was originally proposed in biology and then applied to sociology, I have applied it to understand the nature of creation, and called it “Creative Systems Theory”. A creative system is an autopoietic system whose element is “discovery”, which emerges only when a synthesis of three selections has occurred: “idea”, “association”, and “consequence”. With using these concepts, we open the way to understand creation itself separated from psychic and social aspects of creativity. On this basis, the coupling between creative, psychic, and social systems is discussed. I suggest, in this paper, the future of creativity studies, re-defining a discipline “Creatology” for inquiring creative systems and propose an interdisciplinary field as “Creative Sciences” for interdisciplinary connections among creatology, psychology, and so on.