“Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply,” makes the case for grounding the autopoietic definition of living beings to the discrete bodies of organisms rather than to autopoietic systems that extend beyond the organisms into their environments. They attempt this grounding by amending a clause to the original formulation of autopoiesis that identifies living beings with their bodies, and then they explicitly define “bodies”. This commentary makes the case that bodily grounding can be derived from molecular autopoiesis by taking the molecular domain seriously, and no new amendment is required.
Alrøe H. F. & Noe E. (2012) The paradox of scientific expertise: A perspectivist approach to knowledge asymmetries. Fachsprache - International Journal of Specialized Communication XXXIV(3–4): 152–167. https://cepa.info/462
The paradox of scientific expertise is that the growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, this paper probes three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectivism is an important elaboration of constructivist approaches to help overcome problems in cross-disciplinary collaboration and use of science, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems.
Ayala D. C. (2020) Cohesiveness is not an adequate theory of general individuation and it does not account for living individuals. Adaptive Behavior 28(1): 31–32.
Villalobos and Razeto-Barry propose a theory of living individuals that includes both considerations about autopoietic systems and about material individuals. However, I think that their characterisation of individuality is problematic and would not be useful to account for living individuals.
Bakken T., Hernes T. & Wiik E. (2009) Innovation and organization: An overview from the perspective of Luhmann’s autopoiesis. In: Magalhães R. & Sanchez R. (eds.) Autopoiesis in organization theory and practice. Emerald, Bingley UK: 69–88. https://cepa.info/7958
Excerpt: Can autopoietic systems not be creative and innovative? Or does the biological roots of the concept and notions such as “structural determinism” and “structural states” make it impossible to capture “the new” in the system’s dynamics’? The aim of the following discussion is to outline the theory of autopoietic systems, as it pertains to action theory and the understanding of the phenomenon of innovation. This will be elucidated by examining how systems theory combines concepts of (1) the old and the new, (2) the real and the possible, and (3) the redundant and the variable.
Bausch K. C. (2015) Luhmann’s social systems: Meaning, autopoiesis, and interpenetration. In: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second edition, Volume 14: 390–395. https://cepa.info/7870
The problem of double contingency and its accompanying parable of the black boxes informs Luhmann’s conception of meaning and frequently provides illustration at critical junctures. In life, (we) ‘psychic systems’ and (societies) ‘social systems’ are constantly faced with situations that require choices. Our meanings develop from those choices. Each choice that we make is an element of our meaning. Autopoiesis forms the background of Luhmann’s theory. Psychic and social autopoietic systems live by constantly maintaining their reproduction as a closed system. At the same time, they constantly interact with their environment by incorporating elements from it and releasing unneeded elements back into it. In this process, what remains the same is the reproductive process, which incorporates those elements that foster its life and evolution. Interpenetration describes how closed autopoietic systems come to share meaning and come to cooperatre and understand each other.
Becerra G. (2013) A brief introduction to Niklas Luhmann’s “Theory of Autopoietic Social Systems” and “Theory of Functional Social-Autopoietic Systems”. Intersticios. Revista sociológica de pensamiento crítico 7(2): 21–35. https://cepa.info/932
The aim of this paper is to present synthetically the central concepts and fundamental laws of Niklas Luhmann’s “Theory of Autopoietic Social Systems” and “Theory of Functional Social-Autopoietic Systems.” To do this we outline the conceptualization of notions like time, communications, observations, elements, relationships, complexity, connection, operation, environment, function, code, program, generalized symbolic media and their interrelationships and place within the laws of the theory. The guiding questions of this paper are: What entities do Luhmannian theory tell us about? How do these entities behave within the laws of the theory? And finally, the practical evaluation over the aims and goals of Luhmann’s theoretical program:, for which purposes? Relevance: The document presents, in a clear way, the central concepts of Luhmann’s theory of autopoiesis and its relevance to the study of social phenomena.
Beer R. (2004) Autopoiesis and cognition in the game of life. Artificial Life 10: 309–326. https://cepa.info/1143
Maturana and Varela’s notion of autopoiesis has the potential to transform the conceptual foundation of biology as well as the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences. In order to fully realize this potential, however, the concept of autopoiesis and its many consequences require significant further theoretical and empirical development. A crucial step in this direction is the formulation and analysis of models of autopoietic systems. This article sketches the beginnings of such a project by examining a glider from Conway’s game of life in autopoietic terms. Such analyses can clarify some of the key ideas underlying autopoiesis and draw attention to some of the central open issues. This article also examines the relationship between an autopoietic perspective on cognition and recent work on dynamical approaches to the behavior and cognition of situated, embodied agents. Relevance: The article focuses on the theory of autopoiesis and related concepts such as structural coupling and cognitive domain.
Beyes T. P. (2005) Observing observers: von Foerster, Luhmann, and management thinking. Kybernetes 34: 448–459. https://cepa.info/7686
Purpose: The paper discusses possible implications of Heinz von Foerster’s notion of second‐order cybernetics for management thinking. The purpose of this paper is to outline challenges of as well as prospective further developments for management theory that emanate from second‐order cybernetics. Design/methodology/approach – As a conceptual paper, the paper tries to develop its findings through theoretically applying von Foerster’s insights to management thinking’s conventional assumptions. When looking for applications of von Foerster’s approach within the social sciences, at least in german‐speaking countries one sooner or later comes across Niklas Luhmann’s system sociology. Hence, Luhmann’s version of the theory of the observer is introduced and its take on organization and management is briefly outlined. Drawing upon von Foerster’s and Luhmann’s reflections, possible implications for management thinking are presented – ideas that might be disagreeable for “classical” management science but might set out a path for further developments of management thinking. Findings: What difference might second‐order cybernetics (and autopoietic systems sociology) make for management thinking? As a conclusion, deliberately poignant statements are formulated, calling for a higher degree of self‐reflection, for critical readings of conventional texts, for more complex descriptions of organizations and for a more modest, low‐key take on management theory’s endeavours. Originality/value – Whereas first‐order cybernetics has been fairly well‐received in management theory, second‐order cybernetics, which poses troubling questions to conventional epistemologies, remained relatively unpopular. Acts of “observing observers” reclaim these questions, possibly leading to valuable insights for researchers and reflected practitioners alike.
Bich L. (2006) Autopoiesis and emergence. In: Minati G., Pessa E. & Abram M. (eds.) Systemics of emergence: Research and development. Springer, Berlin: 281–292. https://cepa.info/2320
Autopoietic theory is more than a mere characterization of the living, as it can be applied to a wider class of systems and involves both organizational and epistemological aspects. In this paper we assert the necessity of considering the relation between autopoiesis and emergence, focusing on the crucial importance of the observer’s activity and demonstrating that autopoietic systems can be considered intrinsically emergent processes. From the attempts to conceptualize emergence, especially Rosen’s, autopoiesis stands out for its attention to the unitary character of systems and to emergent levels, both inseparable from the observer’s operations. These aspects are the basis of Varela’s approach to multiple level relationships, considered as descriptive complementarities.
Biggiero L. (2001) Are firms autopoietic systems. In: Geyer F. & van der Zouwen J. (eds.) Sociocybernetics. Complexity, autopoiesis, and observation of social systems. Greenwood Press, Westport CT: 125–139. https://cepa.info/2715
Excerpt: It is wondered whether firms are autopoietic systems that is, whether the paradigm of autopoiesis is applicable to for-profit organizations. Although only applications to other sciences will be touched upon, it will be clear that results can be extended to all kinds of social systems. This argument can be summarized as follows: Thesis I: Autopoiesis is not applicable to profit organizations or, in other words, firms are not autopoietic systems. Thesis II: Autopoiesis does not coincide with second-order cybernetics, whose basic concepts, if not taken as on/off conditions, can he applied to social systems.