Hutto and Satne, Philosophia (2014) propose to redefine the problem of naturalizing semantic content as searching for the origin of content instead of attempting to reduce it to some natural phenomenon. The search is to proceed within the framework of Relaxed Naturalism and under the banner of teleosemiotics which places Ur-intentionality at the source of content. We support the proposed redefinition of the problem but object to the proposed solution. In particular, we call for adherence to Strict Naturalism and replace teleosemiotics with autopoietic theory of living beings. Our argument for these adjustments stems from our analysis of the flagship properties of Ur-intentionality: specificity and directedness. We attempt to show that the first property is not unique to living systems and therefore poses a problem of where to place a demarcation line for the origin of content. We then argue that the second property is a feature ascribed to living systems, not their intrinsic part and therefore does not form a good foundation for the game of naturalizing content. In conclusion we suggest that autopoietic theory can not only provide a competitive explanation of the basic responding of pre-contentful organisms but also clarify why Ur-intentionality is attributed to them in such an intuitive manner.

This paper has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it suggests ways of making autopoietic theory more precise and more operational for concrete communication analysis. I discuss concepts such as distinction, system, bound- ary, environment, perturbation, and compen- sation. The explication of the concepts is ba- sed on catastrophe theory, and in order to make them operational I emphasise their affinity to traditional semiotics and communi- cation theory. On the other hand I propose changes to the semiotic tradition in order to incorporate insights from autopoietic theory, namely that the human condition is characte- rised by the phenomenon of self-reference and therefore also by the unavoidability of para- doxes. Firstly, this means that truth cannot be a basic semiotic concept; instead the notion of stability is suggested. Secondly, in order to act in a paradoxical context, we need to unfold the paradox in time, which again calls for a dynamic theory of meaning.

Excerpt: We would argue that an autopoietic theory of organization is in fact also a theory of innovation. Without the possibility of novelty, autopoietic organization is hardly possible. A second argument we make in this chapter is that, contrary to much of the literature on organization and innovation, an autopoietic view does not consider the degree to which innovation takes place. Instead it considers how the nature of communication shapes expectations, thus influencing the search for novelty. If we assume that different functions within an organization operate according to different modes of communication, we may come to a different understanding of how the organization engages with novelty. Key to this understanding is that different organizational functions operate with different degrees of redundancy in their communication.

Recent accounts of the relation between law and other social spheres have emphasized law’s “relative autonomy. ” The intui- tion behind the “relative autonomy” formula is that law is neither wholly independent of, nor entirely reducible to, political, eco- nomic and other social processes. Sensible as this intuition is, however, the idea of “relativeautonomy” by itself remainspurely negative. It excludes two unpalatableextremes-pure formalism and pure instrumentalism-butit does not by itself characterize, in positive theoreticalterms, the relation between law and other social discourses or practices. This Article examines an attempt in recent German social thought to specify theoretically the relation between law and other social spheres. The theory examined-Niklas Luhmann’s theory of “autopoiesis”-is,though familiar to Continentalread- ers, not yet well-known to American legal academics. This Arti- cle presents autopoietic theory to the American legal audience, with particularattention to the way in which Luhmann reformu- lates the “relative autonomy” problematic. Throughout, the Ar- ticle focuses on the connections between autopoietic theory and issues in American law and contemporaryAmerican legal theory. The Article’s strategy is to criticize those aspects of autopoietic theory that deserve criticism, but at the same time, to show how he theory might operate as a productive stimulus for American legal theorists.

The theory of autopoiesis, developed in biology by Maturana and Varela, deprives information of any significant role in self-producing systems, because such systems are organizationally closed. After exploring the rejection of the notion of information, and laying out the main tenets of the theory, this paper considers some of the implications of the theoretical position for the discipline and practice of information systems (IS). The chief consequence is to shift focus from abstraction, representation, and design toward cooperation and use. The paper goes on to discuss different approaches to applying the theory of autopoiesis in IS. Some benefit might, for instance, be had from using the ideas as metaphors. The role of information is seen to be restored in Luhmann’s development of an autopoietic theory for social systems. A more radical use of the theory in IS would be to develop the basic ontology proposed by Maturana and Varela. A start on this is made from a phenomenological perspective.

Autopoietic theory is more than a mere characterization of the living, as it can be applied to a wider class of systems and involves both organizational and epistemological aspects. In this paper we assert the necessity of considering the relation between autopoiesis and emergence, focusing on the crucial importance of the observer’s activity and demonstrating that autopoietic systems can be considered intrinsically emergent processes. From the attempts to conceptualize emergence, especially Rosen’s, autopoiesis stands out for its attention to the unitary character of systems and to emergent levels, both inseparable from the observer’s operations. These aspects are the basis of Varela’s approach to multiple level relationships, considered as descriptive complementarities.

Key words: Autopoiesis, emergence, observer, descriptive complementarity, Robert Rosen, Francisco Varela

In this article I will outline the basic theoretical assumptions of two examples of the confederative and the integrative views of the living – respectively Ganti’s Chemoton theory and Maturana and Varela’s autopoietic theory – by showing that they are both consistent perspectives, but they differ in the accounts they make of the role of organization in biological systems. In doing so I will also put into evidence how the choice between these two theoretical frameworks is strictly connected to the problem of structure and function in living organisms and entails different strategies of investigation.

Key words: biological autonomy, organization, autopoiesis, Chemoton theory

In this article a constructivist framework is proposed in order to integrate emergentist thought with systemic studies on biological autonomy – specifically: the autopoietic theory - which are focused on the role of organization. A particular attention is paid to the role of the observer’s activity, especially to the different operations he performs in order to identify the pertinent elements at each descriptive level and to the relationships between the different models he builds from them. An epistemological notion of emergence as non-derivability – that of “complex emergence” – is introduced, that allows a) a distinction between autonomy and self-organization, and b) a reinterpretation of downward causation not as a direct or indirect influence of the whole on its parts, but instead as an epistemological problem of interaction between descriptive domains.

In this paper we criticize the “Ashbyan interpretation” (Froese & Stewart, 2010) of autopoietic theory by showing that Ashby’s framework and the autopoietic one are based on distinct, often incompatible, assumptions and that they aim at addressing different issues. We also suggest that in order to better understand autopoiesis and its implications, a different and wider set of theoretical contributions, developed previously or at the time autopoiesis was formulated, needs to be taken into consideration: among the others, the works of Rosen, Weiss and Piaget. By analyzing the concepts of organization and closure, the idea of components, and the role of materiality in the theory proposed by Maturana and Varela, we advocate the view that autopoiesis necessarily entails selfproduction and intrinsic instability and can be realized only in domains characterized by the same transformative and processual properties exhibited by the molecular domain. From this theoretical standpoint it can be demonstrated that autopoietic theory neither commits to a sharp dualism between organization and structure nor to a reflexive view of downward causation, thus avoiding the respective strong criticisms.

In this article, we would like to discuss some aspects of a theoretical framework for Artificial Life, focusing on the problem of an explicit definition of living systems useful for an effective artificial construction of them. The limits of a descriptive approach will be critically discussed, and a constructive (synthetic) approach will be proposed on the basis of the autopoietic theory of Maturana and Varela.

Key words: self-organization, autopoiesis, biological autonomy, artificial life, constructivism