Building on and extending Maturana’s biology of cognition and language – the idea that humans are structure determined living systems operating in a consensual domain of interactions, and that language is a special dimension of human cognition with an identifiable biological function – this paper questions the presumptions standing behind such firmly established notions in conventional mainstream linguistics as “native speakers”, “mother tongue”, “linguistic fact”, “monoglot community”. While linguists routinely appeal to native speakers as “informants” in defining “facts” about a particular language spoken by a particular community, these “facts” then being used in identifying individual languages as separate semiotic systems governed by specific sets of rules, there do not seem to be clearly delineated grounds on which native speakers’ linguistic performance is viewed as “exemplary” for communication in a given tongue, thus serving as a kind of “standard” to be achieved by those whose mother tongue is different and whose cultural identity, for that reason, is also different. It is argued that the empirical value of “linguistic competence,” allegedly characteristic of native speakers, is insubstantial, and the concept of “monoglossia” ought to be radically revised.

A critique of the traditional dualistic view of grammar as linguistics is given, and an approach is suggested that emphasizes the relational nature of linguistic signs in the framework of the biology of cognition. Using the epistemological lining in the study of language provided by the biology of cognition, grammar studies should take into account the cognitive dynamics of languaging as consensual coordinations of consensual coordinations of behavior, or, semiosis.

Context: Strongly influenced by Cartesian dualist philosophy, contemporary linguistic orthodoxy is unable to explain the nature and function of language in the human praxis of living. Structuralists and cognitivists alike continue to dehumanize language, viewing it as something external to body and mind, thereby impeding our understanding of life and world. Problem: Inability to change the orthodox perspective on language and failure to come to grips with the biology of language and cognition tells on the overall efficacy of linguistics, making it a prescience that negatively affects institutionalized social practices, especially education. Method: Building on Humberto Maturana’s biology of cognition as a constructivist epistemology, I identify the epistemological errors of linguistics and show how a systems-theory approach helps us to arrive at a holistic view of language as our existential domain in which we arise as observers. Results: Consistent application of the tenets of the biology of cognition in theorizing language helps us to understand anew or reconceptualize many problems that have been stumbling blocks in linguistics, providing simple and coherent explanations of various linguistic phenomena as distinctions made in language by the observer. Implications: Instead of focusing on language as a system of abstract symbols used as a “tool” to be studied “in itself and for itself,” language scientists should make a concerted effort to transform the humanities into a unified science of humanness.

Key words: Ecology, epistemology, language, linguistics, Maturana, observer, systems theory, world construction.

After half a century of cognitive revolution we remain far from agreement about what cognition is and what cognition does. It was once thought that these questions could wait until the data were in. Today there is a mountain of data, but no way of making sense of it. The time for tackling the fundamental issues has arrived. The biogenic approach to cognition is introduced not as a solution but as a means of approaching the issues. The traditional, and still predominant, methodological stance in cognitive inquiry is what I call the anthropogenic approach: assume human cognition as the paradigm and work ‘down’ to a more general explanatory concept. The biogenic approach, on the other hand, starts with the facts of biology as the basis for theorizing and works ‘up’ to the human case by asking psychological questions as if they were biological questions. Biogenic explanations of cognition are currently clustered around two main frameworks for understanding biology: self-organizing complex systems and autopoiesis. The paper describes the frameworks and infers from them ten empirical principles – the biogenic ‘family traits’ – that constitute constraints on biogenic theorizing. Because the anthropogenic approach to cognition is not constrained empirically to the same degree, I argue that the biogenic approach is superior for approaching a general theory of cognition as a natural phenomenon.

Key words: cognition, theory, explanation, biology of cognition.

This column is a journey that considers both the failure of second-order cybernetics (SOC), radical constructivism (RC), and the biology of cognition (BoC) to achieve wide acceptance, particularly in science, and the opportunities for SOC, RC, and BoC in the social sciences and other disciplines. Relevance: This column is cited in New Horizons for Second-Order Cybernetics (2018) World Scientific in connection with the Kline-Martin Hypothesis – an examination of whether second-order cybernetics has succeeded or failed.

Key words: second-order cybernetics, radical constructivism, biology of cognition, paradigm of science

With a preface by Pier Luigi Luisi, this book sketches the complexity of Humberto Maturana’s life, through his early works, his studies in England, his doctoral thesis at Harvard, and leading towards the publication of “Biology of Cognition��� in 1970. The author includes anecdotes and the poetry in Maturana’s works that contribute to the development of his ideas. She presents the theoretical web he and his student and co-worker Francisco Varela were weaving. In particular, the book focusses on aspects of visual perception and the theory of knowledge designed in “dialogue,” including with classical philosophical authors such as Nietzsche. By anchoring itself in the turning points in his biography and by using the inherent redundancies in Maturana’s language, the book wraps in on itself again in a way that reveals the inescapable circularities of living.

Context: Introduced in 1970, bioethics is now more and more commonly used since it applies to a variety of concepts belonging to traditional Western thought. Just like other dualisms that are typical of traditional Western thought (e.g., mind/body, subject/object, philosophy/science), bioethics is developing in areas that are mostly isolated from each other, with each argument restricted to its specific space, without affecting the general concept of bioethics. It is also characterized by the dualism ought/being. Purpose: I maintain that the definition of a relevant moral criterion should include the whole scope of thinking and the whole adopted perspective. Consequently, the current conception of bioethics should be changed. Such an alternative view objects to the fragmentation of knowledge. In this way, specifically in bioethics, our way of living and life itself acquire an ethical dimension. Maturana’s theory is expected to be a useful instrument for dealing with the difficulties that the concept of “bioethics” brings. Method: First, traditional bioethics and its way of dealing with some of its typical problems are discussed. Then, Maturana’s epistemology, including his emphasis on the observer, his biology of cognition located in “languaging,” and his ethics of love are described. Its features, such as trust and respect, will be highlighted, taking into account his modality of speaking as a biologist, exposed to the risk of “naturalistic fallacy” but dispelling it thanks to – I argue – the radical difference between Maturana’s theory and the traditional Western epistemology. Results: Maturana’s definition of ethics leads to the conclusion that the whole of living is ethics, the whole of life is ethics, and there is no separation existing between the “ought” and the “being.” Bioethics, and also ethics, dissolve themselves in the circularity of the living, which operates in the living-acting of each human being in the systemic texture they belong to and which they contribute to creating in an open-ended process of “languaging.”

Key words: bioethics, ethics, post-Cartesian theory of knowledge, love, facts/values, ought/being, naturalistic fallacy, autopoiesis, traditional Western thought, observer

In this introduction I wish to make some comments in relation to the two essays that make this book [“Biology of Cognition��� and “Autopoiesis: The organization of the living”], but in order to do so I must, at least in part, write about how they came into being.

Key words: The living, perception, anthropology, autopoiesis, biology of cognition, society, ethics.

Humberto Maturana (1928-) and Francisco Varela (1946–2001) have made a major contribution to systems theory by empirically and theoretically defi ning, describing, and interpreting living systems as autopoietic. Additionally, they have substantially developed dynamic systems perspectives on biology of cognition, perception and action, immunology, neurophenomenology, ethics, and pedagogy.

The immune self is our reified way to describe the processes through which the immune system maintains the differentiated identity of the organism and itself. This is an interpretative process, and to study it in a scientifically constructive way we should merge a long hermeneutical tradition of asking questions about the nature of interpretation together with modern understanding of the immune system, emerging sensing technologies and advanced computational tools for analyzing the sensors’ data. Relevance: The author claims that our immune system is a meaning-making system in the context of biology of cognition as well as the hermeneutical tradition.