Notions of embodiment, situatedness, and dynamics are increasingly being debated in cognitive sci ence. However, these debates are often carried out in the absence of concrete examples. In order to build intuition, this paper explores a model agent to illustrate how the perspective and tools of dynam ical systems theory can be applied to the analysis of situated, embodied agents capable of minimally cognitive behavior. Specifically, we study a model agent whose “nervous system” was evolved using a genetic algorithm to catch circular objects and to avoid diamond-shaped ones. After characterizing the performance, behavioral strategy and psychophysics of the best-evolved agent, its dynamics are analyzed in some detail at three different levels: (1) the entire coupled brain/body/environment sys tem; (2) the interaction between agent and environment that generates the observed coupled dynam ics; (3) the underlying neuronal properties responsible for the agent dynamics. This analysis offers both explanatory insight and testable predictions. The paper concludes with discussions of the overall picture that emerges from this analysis, the challenges this picture poses to traditional notions of rep resentation, and the utility of a research methodology involving the analysis of simpler idealized mod els of complete brain/body/environment systems.

Key words: dynamics, minimally-cognitive behavior, categorical perception

This paper explores the performance of a simple model agent using a reactive controller in situations where, from an external perspective, a solution that relies on internal states would seem to be required. In a visually-guided orientation task with sensory inversion and an object discrimination task a study of the instantaneous response properties and time-extended dynamics explain the non-reactive performance. The results question common intuitions about the capabilities of reactive controllers and highlight the significance of the agent’s recent history of interactions with its environment in generating behaviour. This work reinforces the idea that embodied behaviour exhibits properties that cannot be deduced directly from those of the controller by itself.

Key words: Sensory Node, Virtual Object, Categorical Perception, Circular Object, Reactive Controller.

This paper proposes an ecological-enactive account of utterances of concrete words – words used to indicate observable situations, events, objects, or characteristics. Building on the education of attention model of learning, utterances of concrete words are defined as attentional actions: a repeatable form of behaviour performed by a person to indicate (i.e. point out) a particular aspect of the current situation to someone in order to achieve something. Based on recent empirical evidence on categorical colour perception, attentional actions are proposed to constrain the ongoing phenotypic reorganisation of persons into task-specific devices. The paper ends by situating the proposed account in a wider theoretical perspective on language. This paper serves two purposes: first, it undermines the scope objection against the ecological-enactive approach, and second, it provides a novel explanation for recent empirical evidence with respect to the role of language in categorical colour perception

Key words: attentional action, enactivism, ecological psychology, word learning, word-meaning, categorical perception.