By considering an enterprise to be a system of agents that observe and construct theories about themselves immediately raises issues of closure. These in turn pose questions about the identity and evolution of that which is exhibiting such closure. We address these questions by assigning enterprises to a class of systems whose models are triply articulated. The existential articulation provides an account of the possible behaviors of the enterprise’s agents and of their interoperation. The referential articulation specifies outcomes that its agents are required to satisfy. The deontic articulation imposes constraints on the composition of the other two articulations that are sufficient to ensure that the enterprise effectively implements its specified requirements. Any of these articulations may be under-determined in that they admit more than one elaboration. The behavioral closure of an enterprise is a kind of composition (formally, a category theoretic limit construction) of its three articulations. If the enterprise is its own observer, then the articulations are its models of itself. The enterprise has many opportunities for error in constructing this model. In particular, it may find that it cannot choose among its under-determined articulations in such a way that their composition is internally consistent. Such errors necessitate changes to its model, which may be denoted as steps in an irreversible trajectory through a space of such models. This approach seems to provide a conceptual bridge across the gulf between systems theory and psychoanalysis, and has provided valuable insights into strategy formulation within large enterprises.

Emergence is the process by which new structures and functions come into being. There are two fundamental, but complementary, conceptions of emergence: combinatoric emergence, wherein novelty arises by new combinations of pre-existing elements, and creative emergence, wherein novelty arises by de novo creation of new kinds of elements. Combinatoric emergence is exemplified by new strings constructed from existing alphabetic letters, whereas creative emergence is exemplified by the addition of new kinds of letters to an alphabet. The two conceptions are complementary, providing two modes for describing and understanding change: as the unfolding consequences of a fixed set of rules or as new processes and interactions that come into play over time. Within an observer-centered, operational framework, the two kinds of emergent novelty can be distinguished by what an external observer must do in order to successfully predict the behavior of an evolving system. Combinatoric and creative emergence can be operationally distinguished by changes in apparent effective dimensionality. Whenever a new independent observable is added to a model, its dimensionality increases by one. A system that only recombines requires no new observables, and does not expand in effective dimension. In contrast, a system that creates new primitives requires new observables for its description, such that its apparent dimensionality increases over time. Dimensional analysis can be applied to signaling systems. Signals have two basic functional properties: signal-type (category, variable, type) and signal-value (state, value, token). These properties can be conveyed by a variety of means: by the signal’s physical channel, by the internal form of the signal (waveform, Fourier spectrum), by its time of arrival, and by its magnitude (average power). Neural coding schemes can similarly be based on which neurons fire, which temporal patterns of spikes are produced, when volleys of spikes arrive, or how many spikes are produced. Traditional connectionist networks are discussed in terms of their assumptions about signal-roles and neural codes. For the most part, connectionist networks are conceptualized in terms of new linkage combinations rather than in terms of new types of signals being created. Neural networks that increase their effective dimensionalities can be envisioned. Some kinds of neural codes, such as temporal pattern and time-of-arrival codes, permit encoding and transmission of multidimensional information by the same elements (multiplexing). We outline how synchronous time-division and asynchronous code-division multiplexing might be realized in neural pulse codes. Multidimensional temporal codes permit different kinds of information to be encoded in different time patterns. Broadcast-based coordination strategies that obviate the need for precise, specified point-to-point connections are then made possible. In such systems new signal types arise from temporal interactions between time-coded signals, without necessarily forming new connections. Pitches of complex tones are given as examples of temporally-coded, emergent Gestalts that can be seen either as the sums of constituent micro-patterns (combinatoric emergence) or as the creation of new ones. Within these temporally-coded systems, interacting sets of neural assemblies might ramify existing, circulating signals to construct new kinds of signal primitives in an apparently open-ended manner.

Key words: combinatoric and creative emergence, dimensionality, observables, signaling systems, temporal coding, neural assemblies.

The present article analyses the signficance and relevance of dialectic in Piaget’s and Vigotsky’s psychological studies. On one hand, it highlights the common dialectical methodology present in units of analysis in research. On the other hand, it focuses on the peculiar features dialectic acquires within both authors’ explanation of psychological development. Lastly, a characterization of dialectic features based on previous analysis is introduced. The present article argues against the unique dialectic and its a priori features in Developmental Psychology and Human Sciences areas. It also justifies its diversity in relation to the subject matters under investigation as well as the existence of certain limits in the use of that category in empirical research. The use of dialectics requires the adoption of diverse forms regarding different issues and theoretical focuses.

Key words: dialectic, unit of analysis, contradiction, dialectic inference, equilibration.

Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: I present a critical review of Depraz et al.’s target article and its promise to provide a novel “generative method” of analyzing first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. I argue that although indeed promising, the generative method may still be haunted by the issues pertaining to the other (neuro)phenomenological methods, like experimenter and respondent biases, and the problem with mistaking first-person with second-person data. In the end, I analyze the category of surprise and the way it was extracted from the data. The Philosopher’s Stone

Constructivism is a theory that carries on the ancient epistemological debate about skepticism, which denies the possibility of attaining objective knowledge. Constructivism poses basic questions about scientific inquiry. Social constructivism has become a transdisciplinary endeavor that encompasses all social sciences. Various arguments for and against constructivism are brought forth, with the most important debates revolving around the issue of relativism regarding both morality and science. Constructivist theories differ considerably from each other as well, especially regarding the need to rethink methodology and constructivism’s impetus of social change via the exposing of truth claims. Constructivism has shaped the understanding of the political, broadened the subject of political communication, and redefined power as a category of analysis. It challenges realist positions in a recognizable pattern across different fields. Different takes on framing theory exemplify disputes between realism and constructivism in political communication and beyond.

What is being discribed as differences between organic and cultural evolution (for example that one is Darwinian, the other, Lamarckian in character) depends on the implicit agreements made on what are analogue issues in culture and life. A special consequence of the definitions used is that opposite causal mechanisms are attributed. The development of empirical scientific theories is seen as an internal adaptation to external data. Organic evolution, however, is seen as an external selection of internal modifications. Seeing science as a special cognitive tool in the sense of evolutionary epistemology (EE) which then has to evolve according to the same principles as evolution of organic tools does, would require some notional realignments in order to level the established organismic/cultural dichotomy. Central to the approach used here is the notion of reality and adaptation. The EE declares that human categories of perception and thinking (space, time, object, causality etc.) result from evolutionary adaptation to the independent structures of an ontological reality (Campbell: “natural-selection-epistemology”). Here a “Constructivist evolutionary epistemology” (CEE) is proposed which goes one step further and considers also the category of reality itself to be a special mental concept acquired phylogenetically to immunize proven ideas under the label of “reality.” According to the CEE, the evaluation criteria for strategies and theories are the consistency with the previously and phylogenetically acquired organic and mental structures, rather than the adaptation to external data. A similar view can also be held in organic evolution where the various metabolic processes and higher strategies modify the external data according to their previously established own requirements rather than changing those requirements in adaptation to external data. Thus cognitive and scientific as well as organic evolution is an enterprise of conquest rather than of discovery and reality will lose its role as a universal legislator and evaluator. The CEE implements this thought, by considering all regularities perceived and the laws of nature derived from them as invariants of mental or sensory operators. The extension of human sense organs by means of physical measurement operators leads to the completion of classical physics if the experimental and the inborn cognitive operators commute. Otherwise non-classical (i.e. “non-human”) approaches are required such as quantum mechanics, which are based on the invariants brought about experimentally. As the set of possible experimental facilities (and therefore of new invariants) is not closed it follows that evolution of science will not end in a definitive “theory of everything” but in basically endless co-evolution between experiments and their theoretical interpretations. The same applies to organic evolution which can be considered as coevolution between genomic structures and their interpretation by the epigenetic system which itself is subject to genomic modifications. This may lead to non-stable recursive processes described here as nonlinear genetics. Some general evolutionary strategies and principles are discussed with a view to being applicable in organic evolution as well as in cultural and social evolution. Special consideration is given to the view that the need to master the physical world (mainly being done by scientific efforts) may be superseded in the long run by the need to master our social environment.

Excerpt: The question arises whether it is possible in science to assume an observer for whose description geometrical systems of co-ordinates or statistical data do not suffice at all. In fact all social scientists would fall under this category of observers. This is where the description of the observer becomes a problem for cybernetics of social systems. How can one solve this problem of cybernetics of second order without which cybernetics of social systems loses much of its significance (Lorenzen 1978)? How far can Maturana’s theory of autopoietic systems or von Forester’s theory of recursive generation of knowledge offer solutions to this problem?

The goal of this article is to explore the website communication of urban activist gardeners by focusing on the concept of ritual as a heuristic category. In contrast to the majority of those doing research on ritual, I use a systems-theoretical approach in applying the concept of ritual to communication processes. I explore the role played by ritual in communication in order to answer questions such as, “What is specifically unique about the ritual mode of communicating?” and, following from this, “What function do these rituals serve in communication?” My subject, urban garden activism, is thus addressed from the perspective of media- and communication research. First, I briefly describe urban activist gardening and how communication is usually structured on their websites. Second, I present an outline of some theories and concepts of communication and ritual within media studies, and give a brief account of the systems-theoretical approach that I use. Third, I define some areas of ritual – that is, ritualized patterns of communication found in the urban activist gardeners’ empirical material – so as to provide answers regarding the means and function of ritual in communication. Relevance: The role of ritual is explored from Luhmann’s systems-theoretical approach.

Autism has puzzled and intrigued psychiatrists, psychologists, and philosophers of mind since it was first identified as a diagnostic category by Kanner 1943 and Asperger 1944. The syndrome raises important questions about scientific knowledge and the knowledge possessed by autistic and normal subjects. This paper examines critically the theory of mind hypothesis, which is currently the most widely accepted explanation for the disorder. It argues that the computational model that supports the hypothesis cannot carry its explanatory burden, and it proposes an alternative explanation based on the principles of situated robotics, ethology, and dynamical systems theory. This allows knowledge to be conceptualized as the embodied and situated ability to act appropriately in a variety of contexts, and it sheds new light on the knowledge justification problem.

The problem of representing information in automaton models of self-replication is considered. It is shown that, unlike in the natural reproduction process, in a computable model the reproduced entities do not contain all the information necessary for guiding the process. Current theoretical understanding of life and its replication, based on such models, is argued to be essentially inadequate. The solution to this problem is claimed to require recognition of the theoretical fact that information in living systems is different from that subsumed under the category of “knowledge”, which is representable as computer programs or triggers of state transitions. A discussion of fundamentals of a new theory of information and its relationship to replication models is given and a new direction of further developments of biological theories is envisioned.