Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive processes extend in the physical world beyond the bounds of the brain and the body. We argue that, while transcranial cognition may be both a logical and a nomological possibility, no case has been made for its current existence. In other words, we defend a form of contingent intracranialism about the cognitive.
Adams F. & Aizawa K. (2009) Why the mind is still in the head. In: Robbins P. & Aydede M. (eds.) The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 78–95. https://cepa.info/4734
Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head.
Aizawa K. (2014) Extended cognition. In: Shapiro L. (ed.) The Routledge handbook of embodied cognition. Routledge, London: 31–38. https://cepa.info/4462
Excerpt: This brief chapter will focus on two types of arguments for extended cognition inspired by Clark and Chalmers (1998). First, there has been the thought that cognition extends when processes in the brain, body, and world are suitably similar to processes taking place in the brain. We might describe these as cognitive equivalence arguments for extended cognition. Second, there has been the thought that, when there is the right kind of causal connection between a cognitive process and bodily and environmental processes, cognitive processes come to be realized by processes in the brain, body, and world. We might describe these as coupling arguments for extended cognition. What critics have found problematic are the kinds of similarity relations that have been taken to be applicable or suitable for concluding that there is extended cognition and the conditions that have been offered as providing the right kind of causal connection.
Aizawa K. (2017) Cognition and behavior. Synthese Online first94(11): 4269–4288.
An important question in the debate over embodied, enactive, and extended cognition has been what has been meant by “cognition”. What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied, enactive, or extended? Rather than undertake a frontal assault on this question, however, this paper will take a different approach. In particular, we may ask how cognition is supposed to be related to behavior. First, we could ask whether cognition is supposed to be (a type of) behavior. Second, we could ask whether we should attempt to understand cognitive processes in terms of antecedently understood cognitive behaviors. This paper will survey some of the answers that have been (implicitly or explicitly) given in the embodied, enactive, and extended cognition literature, then suggest reasons to believe that we should answer both questions in the negative.
Bietti L. M. (2010) Can the Mind Be Extended? And How? Review of “Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension” by Andy Clark. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. Constructivist Foundations 5(2): 97-99. https://constructivist.info/5/2/097
Upshot: The “Extended Mind Thesis” claims that cognitive processes are situated, embodied and goal-oriented actions that unfold in real world interactions with the immediate environment, cultural tools and other persons. The body and the “outside” world, undoubtedly, have a crucial influence, driving human beings’ cognitive processes. In his book, Andy Clark goes slightly further by claiming that the mind is often extended into the body and the world.
Bishop J. M. (2009) A cognitive computing fallacy? cognition, computations and panpsychism. Cognitive Computation 1: 221–233. https://cepa.info/831
Whilst the usefulness of the computational metaphor in many areas of psychology and neuroscience is clear, it has not gone unchallenged and in this article I will review a group of philosophical arguments that suggest either such unequivocal optimism in computationalism is misplaced – computation is neither necessary nor sufficient for cognition – or panpsychism (the belief that the physical universe is fundamentally composed of elements each of which is conscious) is true. I conclude by highlighting an alternative metaphor for cognitive processes based on communication and interaction. Relevance: This paper argues against computational accounts of mind and cognition, discussing Searle, Bishop and Penrose and suggesting a new metaphor for cognition based on interactions and communication. The new metaphor is sympathetic to modern post-symbolic, anti-representationalist, embodied, enactive accounts of cognition.
Carello C., Turvey M. T., Kugler P. N. & Shaw R. E. (1984) Inadequacies of the computational metaphor. In: Gazzaniga M. (ed.) Handbook of cognitive neuroscience. Plenum Press, New York: 229–248. https://cepa.info/2532
One of the most popular tacks taken to explain cognitive processes likens them to the operations of a digital computer. Indeed, the tasks for the cognitive scientist and the artificial intelligence scientist are often seen as indistinguishable: to understand how a machine or a brain “can store past information about the world and use that memory to abstract meaning from its percepts” (Solso, 1979, p. 425). The fact that there are machines that appear to do this, to varying degrees of success, is often taken to imply, almost by default, that cognition would have to embody the same steps in order to achieve the same results. In what folIows, we outline our objections to this attitude and briefly consider some alternatives.
Caruana F. & Borghi A. M. (2013) Embodied cognition, una nuova psicologia [Embodied cognition: A new psychology]. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia 1/2013: 23–48. https://cepa.info/938
Embodied Cognition represents the most important news in cognitive psychology in the last twenty years. The basis of its research program is the idea that cognitive processes depend, mirror, and are influenced by bodily control systems. A whole class of novel perspectives entered into the psychologists’ agenda only after the emergence and success of EC. In the paper we will deal with some of the main topics debated within EC, from the discussion on the role of representation, to the relationship with enactivism, with functionalism and with the extended mind view. Against an interpretation according to which EC is simply an evolution of the classical cognitivist program, we will focus on the aspects that highlight crucial discontinuities with it, suggesting instead that the EC perspective is indebted to previous theoretical traditions such as American pragmatism, ecological psychology and phenomenology. In the present paper we will discuss some of the most important achievements of EC in different areas of experimental research, from the study of affordances to that of the bodily experience, from the investigation on emotions to that on language. Our aim is to force the Italian public, particularly recalcitrant to EC, to critically reflect on the debts to previous traditions. Relevance: The paper reviews embodied theories with a special focus on enactivist approaches.
Ceruti M. & Damiano L. (2018) Plural embodiment(s) of mind: Genealogy and guidelines for a radically embodied approach to mind and consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 9: 2204. https://cepa.info/5611
This article focuses on a scientific approach to the study of cognition that Warren McCulloch introduced in the era of cybernetics as “experimental epistemology.” In line with recent attempts to highlight its contribution to cognitive science and AI, our article intends to draw attention to its unexplored influence on contemporary embodied approaches to the investigation of mind and consciousness. To this end, we will survey a series of models of cognitive systems genealogically related to the McCulloch-Pitts networks-based modeling approach, i.e., von Foerster’s model of the biological computer, the Maturana-Varela model of the autopoietic system, and Varela’s model of emergent selves. Based on examination of the relevant aspects of these models, we will argue that they offered the McCulloch-Pitts “cybernetic of networks” a coherent methodological and theoretical line of development, complementary to the well-known computationalist one. As we will show, this alternative evolutionary line empowered the biological orientation of McCulloch’s experimental epistemology, laying foundations for contemporary “radically embodied” approaches to mind and consciousness – in particular the Thompson-Varela approach. We will identify the heritage of this tradition of inquiry for future research in cognitive science and AI by proposing guidelines that synthetize how its methodological and theoretical insights suggest taking into account the role(s) played by the biological body in cognitive processes – consciousness included.
Cheung K. C. (1993) On meaningful measurement: Issues of reliability and validity from a humanistic constructivist information-processing perspective. In: Proceedings of the Third International Seminar on Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics. Cornell University, Ithaca, 1–4 August 1993. Misconceptions Trust, Ithaca NY. https://cepa.info/7243
In the past decade, there have been ample interests in the assessment of cognitive and affective processes and products for the purposes of meaningful learning. Meaningful measurement has been proposed which is in accordance with a humanistic constructivist information-processing perspective. Students’ responses to the assessment tasks are evaluated according to an item response measurement model, together with a hypothesized model detailing the progressive forms of knowing/competence under examination. There is a possibility of incorporating student errors and alternative frameworks into these evaluation procedures. Meaningful measurement drives us to examine the composite concepts of “ability” and “difficulty.” Under the rubric of meaningful measurement, validity assessment (i.e. internal and external validities) is essentially the same as an inquiry into the meanings afforded by the measurements. Reliability, measured in terms of standard errors of measurement, is guaranteed within acceptable limits if testing validity is secured. Further evidences of validity may be provided by indepth analyses of how “epistemic subjects” of different levels of competence and proficiency engage in different types of assessment tasks, where affective and metacognitive behaviors may be examined as well. These ways of undertaking MM can be codified by proposing a three-level conceptualization of MM, where reliability and validity are central issues for an explication of this conceptualization.