Anderson M., Deely J., Krampen M., Ransdell J., Sebeok T. A. & von Uexküll T. (1984) A semiotic perspective on the sciences: Steps toward a new paradigm. Semiotica 52(1/2): 7–47.
Semiotics has itself thrived in a generative atmosphere of specialization and synthesis. Now, in an expanding intellectual universe, we converge with several other strains of scholarship. In this brief paper, we not only acknowledge this convergence and complementarity, but actively welcome the emerging rapprochement, which we interpret as representing a radical shift in scientific paradigm. This conceptual revolution transcends a dichotomous Cartesian, analytic view of the world, in the direction of a view embracing the whole, respecting complexity, and fostering synthesis.
Gärtner K. & Clowes R. W. (2017) Enactivism, radical enactivism and predictive processing: What is radical in cognitive science? Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 18(1): 54–83. https://cepa.info/4501
According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.
Steffe L. P. (2011) The Honor of Working with Ernst von Glasersfeld. Partial Recollections. Constructivist Foundations 6(2): 172–176. https://constructivist.info/6/2/172
Purpose: My goals in this paper are to comment on some of the roles that Ernst von Glasersfeld played in our work in IRON (Interdisciplinary Research on Number) from circa 1975 up until the time of his death, and to relate certain events that revealed his character in very human terms. Method: Among my recollections of Ernst, I have chosen those that I felt would most adequately portray his impact on the field of mathematics education and his ethics in the field of human affairs. Findings: It has not often been said but, in his work in IRON, it was Ernst’s explicit intention to start a conceptual revolution in mathematics education and beyond. Other than serving as a revolutionary, Ernst also served as a mentor for many investigators in mathematics education, including myself. He excelled as a scientist as well an epistemologist, and his scientific work fueled his epistemological work. Ernst was a very ethical and wonderful human being who was dedicated to the betterment of humankind by means of his revolutionary ideas.
Vanderstraeten R. (2012) Rewriting theory: From autopoiesis to communication. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 29(4): 377–386. https://cepa.info/3665
This paper analyzes the causes and motives for the transition to a communication-based theory of social systems in the late work of Niklas Luhmann. In the first part of this paper, I present a brief sketch of advances in the field of cybernetics and systems research. I give special attention to some basic concepts introduced by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela: autopoiesis, organizational closure and enaction. In the second part, I discuss how these ideas may contribute to a ‘conceptual revolution’ in the social and behavioral sciences. In the late work of Niklas Luhmann, attempts to incorporate the idea of autopoiesis in his own social theory resulted in the preference for a communication-based, instead of an action-based, theory of social systems. Moreover, given the current transition to the information age or the knowledge society, it can also be argued that structural changes in society nowadays favor the rise of a communication-based theory of social systems.