Lyngdoh S. & Sungoh S. (2017) Attitude of student teachers towards constructivist approach in teaching. IRA International Journal of Education and Multidisciplinary Studies 7(2): 83–88. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5529
A constructivist approach in teaching is very different from the traditional approach in teaching. It requires the teacher to take upon the role of a guide and a facilitator and encouraging learners to actively participate in the learning process. Attitude of teachers towards this approach will determined the way it will be adopted in classroom teaching and organization. This study aims to find out the attitude of teachers towards constructivist approach in teaching. For this, a Teachers Attitude Scale towards Constructivist Approach in Teaching (TASCAT) was administered to 524 student teachers. Findings reveal that the participants of the study have an unfavourable attitude towards constructivist approach in teaching and there is no significant difference in the attitude towards constructivist approach with respect to gender.
McAuliffe A. (2018) Concerns with the Validity and Practicality of First-Person Data: Where Do We Go from Here? Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 238–239. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4612
Open peer commentary on the article “Excavating Belief About Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of the Reflective Act” by Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar. Upshot: This commentary highlights the validity and practicalities of first-person methodologies through the lens of a constructivist approach. Building on some of the arguments put forth by the authors of the target article, some criticisms of phenomenological methods are approached with a view to using these data for second-person methodologies that would complement a number of different research enquiries.
Mingers J. (1997) A critical evaluation of Maturana’s constructivist family therapy. Systems Practice 10(2): 137–151.
This paper presents a critical evaluation of the impact of Maturana’s constructivist approach to (systemic) family therapy. After an historical introduction and a brief description of the main ideas, a number of criticisms are considered. These concern the radical antirealist epistemology, and problems in dealing with the social context of the family, and power relations within the family
Mohapatra A. K. & Mohapatra P. (2015) Exploring the effectiveness of constructivist approach on academic achievement in biology at higher secondary level. In: Chandrasekharan S., Murthy S., Banerjee G. & Muralidhar A. (eds.) epiSTEME 6: Emerging computational media and science education. Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education, Mumbai: 150–159. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5528
A quasi-experimental study was conducted to explore whether constructivist approach could promote perception of nature of biology among higher secondary students. Close-ended questionnaires were administered before and after the treatment. Analysis of covariance test was performed to control the initial variance. The findings revealed that students taught through constructivist approach had higher scores on the concepts of digestion and absorption in the post-test compared to those exposed to conventional (traditional) method of teaching. The results confirm research supporting the positive effect of constructivist learning practices and view that constructivist approach to teach biology is a viable alternative to traditional modes of teaching.
Norman J. (2001) Perceptual constancy: Direct versus constructivist theories. In: Smelser N. J. & Baltes P. B. (eds.) International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences. Elsevier, Amsterdam: 11221–11224.
Our ability to perceive our environment veridically and the stability of perception are noted. These occur in spite of the continuously varying stimulation impinging upon our senses, and are ascribed to what is labeled perceptual constancy. Two very contrasting theoretical approaches to explaining constancy have been put forth. The constructivist approach explains veridical perception by means of an inference-like process where an ‘intelligent’ perceptual system utilizes high-level mental processes in order to supplement the variable and/or insufficient sensory stimulation. The direct approach, on the other hand, maintains that the sensory information picked up by our perceptual system suffices to enable veridical perception and there is no need for positing the involvement of higher mental processes. The two theoretical approaches are described in some detail with Rock’s The Logic of Perception (1983) serving as the model of a constructivist approach, and Gibson’s The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979) as the central exposition of the direct approach. The final section consists of a brief account of an attempt to reconcile the two theoretical approaches based on recent research pointing to the existence of two parallel visual systems.
Nowotny H. (1990) Actor-networks vs. science as a self-organizing system: A comparative view of two constructivist approaches. In: Krohn W., Küppers G. & Nowotny H. (eds.) Selforganization. Portrait of a scientific revolution. Kluwer, Dordrecht: 223–239. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2743
Excerpt: It is not the purpose of this contribution to assess the epistemological monoor interdisciplinary implications that reconceptualizations revolving around theories of self-organization may bring with them, nor to pursue the question under what social and cognitive conditions concepts gain acceptability in fields that are otherwise literally “worlds apart.” Other contributions in this volume provide at least partial answers. Rather, I want to address a theory of self-organization of science, such as it has been proposed by Krohn and Küppers in this volume, in the context of historical developments as well as in a contemporary, comparative perspective: (i) where does such a theory stand with regard to the oppositionary dualism that has characterized the sociology of knowledge, separating “social constructions” from “scientific facts,” but also “the social” from “nature” or “objects” (things, technological artifacts) and (ii) compare it with another constructivist approach whose foremost and outspoken proponent is Bruno Latour. My thesis is that much of sociology of science and also of sociology of knowledge is heir to a general predicament of social science when it comes to conceptualizing and accessing the world of “nature” and its objects as well as those of the material world, notably in the form of technology, and that social constructivism has to be seen as a rather limited case of constructivism. While a theory of science based upon principles of self-organization does not entirely escape the traps of previous theories of science, notably either wanting to be a meta-theory or of being based upon a notion of science modelled after the leading discipline of the day, it offers a wider range for including other empirical as well as theoretical accounts, with some interesting points of convergence with alternative approaches.
Pépin Y. (1998) Practical knowledge and school knowledge: A constructivist representation of education. In: Larochelle M., Bednarz N. & Garrison J. (eds.) Constructivism and education. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 173–192.
Excerpt: I would like to show how the constructivist point of view makes it possible to develop a vision of the whole of educational phenomena which is comprehensive and penetrating and which, at the same time, is both viable and even fertile. This kind of vision would embrace education as much in terms of its psychological, developmental, socioaffective, and psychopedagogical aspects as of its cognitive and didactic aspects. By the same token, I would also like to show what occurs when the constructivist approach is widened to include all educational phenomena: It is possible at that point to contextualize and delimit application of the approach in relation to more specific problematics involved with schooling and teaching – two areas that, after all, form only a subset of the entire educational field.
Perotto F. S. (2013) A Computational Constructivist Model as an Anticipatory Learning Mechanism for Coupled Agent–Environment Systems. Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 46–56. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/954
Context: The advent of a general artificial intelligence mechanism that learns like humans do would represent the realization of an old and major dream of science. It could be achieved by an artifact able to develop its own cognitive structures following constructivist principles. However, there is a large distance between the descriptions of the intelligence made by constructivist theories and the mechanisms that currently exist. Problem: The constructivist conception of intelligence is very powerful for explaining how cognitive development takes place. However, until now, no computational model has successfully demonstrated the underlying mechanisms necessary to realize it. In other words, the artificial intelligence (AI) community has not been able to give rise to a system that convincingly implements the principles of intelligence as postulated by constructivism, and that is also capable of dealing with complex environments. Results: This paper presents the constructivist anticipatory learning mechanism (CALM), an agent learning mechanism based on the constructivist approach of AI. It is designed to deal dynamically and interactively with environments that are at the same time partially deterministic and partially observable. CALM can model the regularities experienced in the interaction with the environment, on the sensorimotor level as well, as by constructing abstract or high-level representational concepts. The created model provides the knowledge necessary to generate the agent behavior. The paper also presents the coupled agent environment system (CAES) meta-architecture, which defines a conception of an autonomous agent, situated in the environment, embodied and intrinsically motivated. Implications: The paper can be seen as a step towards a computational implementation of constructivist principles, on the one hand suggesting a further perspective of this refreshing movement on the AI field (which is still too steeped in a behaviorist influence and dominated by probabilistic models and narrow applied approaches), and on the other hand bringing some abstract descriptions of the cognitive process into a more concrete dimension, in the form of algorithms. Constructivist content: The connection of this paper with constructivism is the proposal of a computational and formally described mechanism that implements important aspects of the subjective process of knowledge construction based on key ideas proposed by constructivist theories.
Peschl M. F. (2007) Triple-Loop Learning as Foundation for Profound Change, Individual Cultivation, and Radical Innovation: Construction Processes beyond Scientific and Rational Knowledge. Constructivist Foundations 2(2-3): 136–145. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/41
Purpose: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s question concerning the relationship between scientific/rational knowledge and the domain of wisdom and how these forms of knowledge come about is the starting point. This article aims at developing an epistemological as well as methodological framework that is capable of explaining how profound change can be brought about in various contexts, such as in individual cultivation, in organizations, in processes of radical innovation, etc. This framework is based on the triple-loop learning strategy and the U-theory approach, which opens up a perspective on how the domains of scientific/rational knowledge, constructivism, and wisdom could grow together more closely. Method: This article develops a strategy which is referred to as “triple-loop learning,” which is not only the basis for processes of profound change, but also brings about a new dimension in the field of learning and knowledge dynamics: the existential realm and the domain of wisdom. A concrete approach that puts into practice the triple-loop learning strategy is presented. The final section shows, how these concepts can be interpreted in the context of the constructivist approach and how they might offer some extensions to this paradigm. Findings: The process of learning and change has to be extended to a domain that concerns existential issues as well as questions of wisdom. Profound change can only happen if these domains are taken into consideration. The triple-loop learning strategy offers a model that fulfills this criterion. It is an “epistemo-existential strategy” for profound change on various levels. Conclusion: The (cognitive) processes and attitudes of receptivity, suspension, redirecting, openness, deep knowing, as well as “profound change/innovation from the interior” turn out to be core concepts in this process. They are compatible with constructivist concepts. Von Glasersfeld’s concept of functional fitness is carried to an extreme in the suggested approach of profound change and finds an extension in the existential domain.
Context: The debate around and about constructivism in German-language communication studies. Problem: The reception of constructivism in German-language communication studies exhibits all the features of an instructive lesson: it makes clear how an academic field reacts, and how it can react, to the introduction of specific theories. Moreover, this case highlights the persistent virulent fundamental conflict between realist and relativist epistemologies in conjunction with a matching catalogue of accusations raised – whether rightly or wrongly – towards all those representatives of communication studies that have adopted a constructivist approach making use of constructivist arguments. Method: By reconstructing the debate as precisely as possible it is mapped onto the fundamental problems of the conception of constructivist theory. Results: It is demonstrated that the depicted reservations and accusations can essentially be mapped onto three fundamental problems of constructivist theory development. 1. The problem of practice-relevance. The central question is how the relationship between (constructivist) epistemology and everyday practice ought to be spelled out in concrete terms, because this very relationship is the source of many worries (“Constructivism undermines the journalistic ideal of objectivity,” etc.). 2. The problem of self-contradiction. It is essentially represented by the question of how one ought to present and promote a relativist epistemology – without at the same time, explicitly or implicitly, introducing absolute claims of validity that contradict one’s own initial premises. 3. The problem of terminological imprecision and referential confusion: concepts and terms such as “truth,” “reality” and “objective knowledge” are used in many different ways. It is not always clear whether an author wants to refer to an absolute reality or whether he or she is talking about a concept that is admittedly created within given frontiers of knowledge.