Bausch K. C. (2015) Luhmann’s social systems: Meaning, autopoiesis, and interpenetration. In: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second edition, Volume 14: 390–395. https://cepa.info/7870
The problem of double contingency and its accompanying parable of the black boxes informs Luhmann’s conception of meaning and frequently provides illustration at critical junctures. In life, (we) ‘psychic systems’ and (societies) ‘social systems’ are constantly faced with situations that require choices. Our meanings develop from those choices. Each choice that we make is an element of our meaning. Autopoiesis forms the background of Luhmann’s theory. Psychic and social autopoietic systems live by constantly maintaining their reproduction as a closed system. At the same time, they constantly interact with their environment by incorporating elements from it and releasing unneeded elements back into it. In this process, what remains the same is the reproductive process, which incorporates those elements that foster its life and evolution. Interpenetration describes how closed autopoietic systems come to share meaning and come to cooperatre and understand each other.
Beaton M. (2013) Phenomenology and Embodied Action. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 298-313. https://constructivist.info/8/3/298
Context: The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem: I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method: The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view against various objections. Results: This account of experience matches certain first-person features of experience better than an internalist account could. It is fully tractable as “normal science.” Implications: The neuroscientific conception of brain function should change from that of internal representation or modelling to that of enabling meaningful, embodied action in ways that constitutively involve the world. Neurophenomenology should aim to match the structure of first-person experience with the structure of meaningful agent-world interactions, not with that of brain dynamics. Constructivist content: The sensorimotor approach shows us what external objects are, such that we may enact them, and what experience is, such that it may present us with those enacted objects.
Becerra G. (2014) The Relevance of “Differentiation” and “Binary Code” for Simulating Luhmann. Constructivist Foundations 9(2): 217–218. https://constructivist.info/9/2/217
Open peer commentary on the article “Subsystem Formation Driven by Double Contingency” by Bernd Porr & Paolo Di Prodi. Upshot: I acknowledge the value of Porr & Di Prodi’s piece for simulating Luhmann’s key process of subsystem formation and exploring how the concepts of “differentiation” and “binary code” relate to their model.
Bergman M. (2011) Beyond the Interaction Paradigm? Radical Constructivism, Universal Pragmatics, and Peircean Pragmatism. The Communication Review 14(2): 96–122.
In this article, the author examines Colin Grant’s recent criticism of the so-called “interaction paradigm” and Jürgen Habermas’s universal pragmatics. Grant’s approach, which is presented as an open challenge to communication theories grounded in philosophical conceptions of communality and dialogue, can be construed as an exemplar of a radical constructivist approach to vital questions of contingency and incommensurability in communication studies. In response, the author outlines a classical pragmatist approach to the problem areas identified by Grant, with the aim of outlining how a pragmatist outlook can offer promising theoretical alternatives to universal pragmatics and radical constructivism. It is argued that moderate Peircean pragmatism, appropriately interpreted, can provide a philosophical platform capable of addressing issues of contingency, uncertainty, and autonomy in communication theory without succumbing to incommensurabilism, traditional objectivism, or nominalistic individualism.
Cariani P. (2013) Self-organization in Brains. Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 35–38. https://constructivist.info/9/1/035
Open peer commentary on the article “Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory” by Etienne B. Roesch, Matthew Spencer, Slawomir J. Nasuto, Thomas Tanay & J. Mark Bishop. Upshot: Artificial life computer simulations hold the potential for demonstrating the kinds of bottom-up, cooperative, self-organizing processes that underlie the self-construction of observer-actors. This is a worthwhile, if limited, attempt to use such simulations to address this set of core constructivist concerns. Although we concur with much of the philosophical perspective in the target article, we take issue with some of the implied positions related to dynamical systems, sensorimotor contingency theory, and neural information processing. Ideally, we would like to see computational approaches more directly address adaptive, constructive processes and mechanisms operant in minds and brains. This would entail using tasks that are more relevant to the psychology of human and animal learning than performing digit sums or sorts. It also could involve relating the dynamics of agents more explicitly to ensembles of communicating neural assemblies.
Chettiparamb A. (2018) Meta-operations, autopoiesis and neo-systems thinking: What significance for spatial planners? Planning Theory 17(4): 628–643. https://cepa.info/6261
This essay introduces the theory of legal autopoiesis to planning. It discusses the main tenets of neo-systems thinking and elaborates on select claims and concepts from legal autopoiesis for planners. The claims and concepts are then used to re-analyse a published case study describing the after-effects of the implementation of a Compulsory Purchase Order in the regeneration of the Docklands in Cardiff. The re-interpretation draws attention to the added insights brought into focus by the theory. The significance of neo-systems thinking for planning is then discussed. The article concludes that the new epistemological framings connects the universal to the particular with implications for current understandings of planning concepts such as public interest, consensus, situatedness, contingency and justice. Neo-systems thinking thus deconstructs ‘how to’ dilemmas for planners from a non-normative standpoint at a meta-operational level.
De Jaegher H. & Di Paolo E. A. (2008) Making sense in participation: An enactive approach to social cognition. In: Morganti F., Carassa A. & Riva G. (eds.) Enacting intersubjectivity: A cognitive and social perspective to the study of interactions. IOS Press, Amsterdam: 33–47. https://cepa.info/323
Research on social cognition needs to overcome a disciplinary disintegration. On the one hand, in cognitive science and philosophy of mind – even in recent embodied approaches – the explanatory weight is still overly on individual capacities. In social science on the other hand, the investigation of the interaction process and interactional behaviour is not often brought to bear on individual aspects of social cognition. Not bringing these approaches together has unfairly limited the range of possible explanations of social understanding to the postulation of complicated internal mechanisms (contingency detection modules for instance). Starting from the question What is a social interaction? we propose a fresh look at the problem aimed at integrating individual cognition and the interaction process in order to arrive at more parsimonious explanations of social understanding. We show how an enactive framework can provide a way to do this, starting from the notions of autonomy, sense-making and coordination. We propose that not only each individual in a social encounter but also the interaction process itself has autonomy. Examples illustrate that these autonomies evolve throughout an encounter, and that collective as well as individual mechanisms are at play in all social interactions. We also introduce the notion of participatory sense-making in order to connect meaning-generation with coordination. This notion describes a spectrum of degrees of participation from the modulation of individual sense-making by coordination patterns, over orientation, to joint sense-making. Finally, we discuss implications for empirical research on social interaction, especially for studies of social contingency.
De Loor P. (2018) Three Other Challenges for Artificial Constructivist Agent from an Enactive Perspective. Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 298–300. https://cepa.info/4628
Open peer commentary on the article “Plasticity, Granularity and Multiple Contingency - Essentials for Conceiving an Artificial Constructivist Agent” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: This commentary aims to deepen the proposition made by Füllsack about the possibility of minimal constructivist agents from an enactive perspective. Even though I agree with the main purpose of his target article, I maintain that it could be interesting to go further and to introduce notions such as boundary, viability, multi-scale modelling and phenomenal domain separation. I also argue that the examples and models proposed in the target article are challenged by these concepts.
Désautels J., Garrison J. & Fleury S. C. (1998) Critical-constructivism and the sociopolitical agenda. In: Larochelle M., Bednarz N. & Garrison J. (eds.) Constructivism and education. Cambridge University Press, New York NY: 253–270. https://cepa.info/5940
Excerpt: In this chapter we would like to stress the contingency of the socially constructed world along with the social and political consequences of reifying and decontextualizing knowledge so as to make it appear necessary, indubitable, and unalterable. We want to develop a critical-constructivist stance toward the production and ownership of knowledge, in particular scientific knowledge, in society at large. We will examine some of the issues of power and social regulation involved in the social production of knowledge.
Di Paolo E. A., Rohde M. & lizuka H. (2008) Sensitivity to social contingency or stability of interaction? New Ideas in Psychology, 26(2), 278294. https://cepa.info/4483
We introduce a series of evolutionary robotics simulations that address the behaviour of individuals in socially contingent interactions. The models are based on a recent study by Auvray, Lenay and Stewart [(2006) The attribution of intentionality in a simulated environment: The case of minimalist devices. In Tenth meeting of the association for the scientific study of consciousness, Oxford, UK, 23–26 June, 2006] on tactile perceptual crossing in a minimal virtual environment. In accordance, both the empirical experiments and our simulations point out the essential character of global embodied interaction dynamics for the sensitivity to contingency to arise. Rather than being individually perceived by any of the interactors, sensitivity to contingency arises from processes of circular causality that characterise the collective dynamics. Such global dynamical aspects are frequently neglected when studying social cognition. Furthermore, our synthetic studies point out interesting aspects of the task that are not immediately obvious in the empirical data. They, in addition, generate new hypotheses for further experiments. We conclude by promoting a minimal but tractable, dynamic and embodied account to social interaction, combining synthetic and empirical findings as well as concrete predictions regarding sensorimotor strategies, the role of time-delays and robustness to perturbations in interactive dynamics.