This chapter situates the conception of language (and communication) in enaction in the context of the research program of the cognitive sciences. It focuses on the formulation of the synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts and the vision of language according to the metaphor of structural coupling. The exclusion of expressive speech acts in this design is problematized. An examination is offered of the critical steps to the theory of language as a reflection and the linguistic correspondence of cognitivism. We examine the foundations of the proposal in the line of language and social enaction as emergent phenomena which are not reducible to autopoiesis but which constitute a new neurophenomenological position in the pragmatic language dimension. A proposal is made for the integration of hermeneutic phenomenology with genetic and generative phenomenology in social semiotics. The inclusion of expressive speech acts based on the functions of language in the Habermas–Bühler line is also addressed. An opening is proposed of enaction to the expressive dimension of language and meaning holism with the referential use of language.

Key words: enaction, neurophenomenology, performative speech acts, expressive speech acts, background, meaning holism.

The article considers the complexities of thinking about the computer as a model of the mind. It examines the computer as being a model of the brain in several very different senses of “model‘. On the one hand the basic architecture of the first modern stored-program computers was „modeled on“ the brain by John von Neumann. Von Neumann also sought to build a mathematical model of the biological brain as a complex system. A similar but different approach to modeling the brain was taken by Alan Turing, who on the one hand believed that the mind simply was a universal computer, and who sought to show how brain-like networks could self-organize into Universal Turing Machines. And on the other hand, Turing saw the computer as the universal machine that could simulate any other machine, and thus any particular human skill and thereby could simulate human intelligence. This leads to a discussion of the nature of “simulation” and its relation to models and modeling. The article applies this analysis to a written correspondence between Ashby and Turing in which Turing urges Ashby to simulate his cybernetic Homeostat device on the ACE computer, rather than build a special machine.

Discusses the correspondence between constructivist design and the creation of multimedia projects. Argues that if students and teachers are exposed to multimedia presentations and are offered opportunities to participate in workshops or classroom activities using multimedia technology, those with interest will use it to demonstrate content area knowledge, generating further interest among faculty and students.

Key words: active learning, constructivism (learning), educational technology, educational theories, multimedia, multimedia materials, student motivation, student projects, technological literacy.

There are many varieties of epistemological and cognitive constructivism. They have in common an appreciation of the failures of centuries of attempts to realize a correspondence notion of truth and representation, and they all propose some constructivist programme as an alternative. The programmatic proposals, however, can differ greatly. Some contemporary constructivisms that are being vigorously advocated propose a social form of idealism with a consequent relativism. Such proposals risk giving constructivism a bad name. The main burden of this article is to show that such an idealism and relativism is not forced by constructivism, but, instead, is the result of an additional and questionable presupposition. Constructivism per se is a strong epistemological position that is fully compatible with realism.

Key words: cognition, constructivism, correspondence, encoding, epistemology, idealism, realism, relativism, representation

Context: We are presently witnessing a revival of introspective methods, which implicitly challenges an impressive list of in-principle objections that were addressed to introspection by various philosophers and by behaviorists. Problem: How can one overcome those objections and provide introspection with a secure basis? Results: A renewed definition of introspection as “enlargement of the field of attention and contact with re-enacted experience,” rather than “looking-within,” is formulated. This entails (i) an alternative status of introspective phenomena, which are no longer taken as revelations of some an sich slice of experience, but as full-fledged experiences; and (ii) an alternative view of the validity of first-person reports as “performative coherence” rather than correspondence. A preliminary empirical study of the self-assessed reliability of introspective data using the elicitation interview method is then carried out. It turns out that subjects make use of reproducible processual criteria in order to probe into the authenticity and completeness of their own introspective reports. Implications: Introspective inquiry is likely to have enough resources to “take care of itself.” Constructivist content: It is argued that the failure of the introspectionist wave of the turn of the 19th/20th centuries is mostly due to its unconditional acceptance of the representationalist theory of knowledge, and that alternative non-representationalist criteria of validity give new credibility to introspective knowledge.

Key words: Introspection, first-person, phenomenology, consciousness, awareness, epistemology, non-representationalism, experience, subjectivity

Excerpt: The early history of the cybernetics movement in the United States was marked by widespread difficulties stemming from differences in opinion and disciplinary background, accompanied by a lack of willingness to accept different philosophical points of view. In this article we will explore how, despite these differences, a determined group of transdisciplinary thinkers – with interests ranging from engineering to neurophysiology – came together to establish what is now the American Society for Cybernetics (ASC) Although previous articles have addressed the history of this group, newly archived documents and correspondence among the founders of the Society shed light on the difficulties they encountered in their attempt to define a field of inquiry involving researchers from many disciplines. The goal of the present article is to use these newly archived documents to illuminate the difficulties encountered by the field of cybernetics in subsequent years.

Recent advances in brain imaging have improved the measure of neural processes related to perceptual, cognitive and affective functions, yet the relation between brain activity and subjective experience remains poorly characterized. In part, it is a challenge to obtain reliable accounts of participant’s experience in such studies. Here we addressed this limitation by utilizing experienced meditators who are expert in introspection. We tested a novel method to link objective and subjective data, using real-time fMRI (rt-fMRI) to provide participants with feedback of their own brain activity during an ongoing task. We provided real-time feedback during a focused attention task from the posterior cingulate cortex, a hub of the default mode network shown to be activated during mind-wandering and deactivated during meditation. In a first experiment, both meditators and non-meditators reported significant correspondence between the feedback graph and their subjective experience of focused attention and mind-wandering. When instructed to volitionally decrease the feedback graph, meditators, but not non-meditators, showed significant deactivation of the posterior cingulate cortex. We were able to replicate these results in a separate group of meditators using a novel step-wise rt-fMRI discovery protocol in which participants were not provided with prior knowledge of the expected relationship between their experience and the feedback graph (i.e., focused attention versus mind-wandering). These findings support the feasibility of using rt-fMRI to link objective measures of brain activity with reports of ongoing subjective experience in cognitive neuroscience research, and demonstrate the generalization of expertise in introspective awareness to novel contexts.

Key words: Real-time neurofeedback, Real-time fMRI, Focused attention, Posterior cingulate cortex, Default mode network, Meditation

This paper analyses the paradigm of constructivism, relating it to current theoretical and empirical developments within social science. I am meeting the demand for describing social and cultural phenomena beyond correspondence-theoretical approaches by critically discussing various forms of constructivism and elaborating on the epistemological position of ‘The Social Construction of Reality’ (Berger & Luckmann). I argue that Berger and Luckmann are epistemologically ‘unscrupulously’ and, subsequently, show analytical weaknesses. This critical discussion forms the backdrop of an unfolding of the position of practice theories and a discussion of their innovative potential to social science research. In this context, the question of how to deal with media as artefacts and technologies is evaluated. I discuss this relationship and analyse it from a communication studies point of view, by means of two prominent analysis concepts, namely the ‘actor-network-theory’ of Bruno Latour and the ‘boundary objects’ approach of Susan Leigh Star from the field of science and technology studies. Finally, I outline central theoretical challenges and analytical perspectives for communication and media research.

Key words: Constructivism, practice theory, actor-network-theory, science and technology studies, boundary objects, communication analysis, media analysis

This paper is a memorandum of working with Francisco Varela on our joint paper “Your inside is out and your outside is in.” It is intended to show how we worked together – something of the process and the mood. The paper that was the outcome may be found in the literature (Glanville and Varela 1981), but working notes and outlines, correspondence, and a condensation written some time after the paper are published here for the first time, together with a certain amount of commentary and context. In the quoted material, I have altered nothing save occasionally tuning the language (though I have retained Francisco’s American spellings): the point of this paper is not to correct, extend or otherwise modify the argument, which we developed between 1977 and 1981 (which I continue to believe has validity). This account is a tribute, an example, and a little piece of history.

Accepting Ceccato’s theory of the operational structure of human thought, the author demonstrates the possibility of breaking up the meaning of words into combinations of smaller constant elements (semantic particle) of meaning. Taking as an example a group of related English verbs, the analysis shows that the differences between their meanings can always be accounted for by a difference in the combination of semantic particles constituting their nominata. A comparison with a closely related group of German verbs shows that one can never expect to find an exact interlanguage correspondence between the signification of words, even when they are given as equivalents in traditional dictionaries. The semantic patterns indicated in this essay are the result of a first analysis and may be subject to correction when the research is extented to a larger vocabulary.

Key words: semiotics