Key word "dancer"
Blaschke S. (2008) Structure and dynamics of autopoietic organizations: Theory and simulation. Gabler, Wiesbaden.
Blaschke S.
(
2008)
Structure and dynamics of autopoietic organizations: Theory and simulation.
Gabler, Wiesbaden.
Excerpt: The genuine purpose and objective of this work is to develop a clear-cut distinction between (1) individuals and organizations, and between (2) individual and organizational knowledge, learning, and memory. individuals and organizations lend themselves to theoretical scrutiny as two ontologically distinct entities despite being one perceptual phenomenon in practice. the distinction yields insights into knowledge, learning, and memory of both individuals and organizations as if the positions and movements that constitute a dance are observed devoid of the dancer, and vice versa. it provides the initial backdrop against which old and new questions in management science and organization theory are put, for example, “what is the effect of organizational structure on the knowledge of organizations?”, “how does personnel turnover and layoff affect organizational learning?”, and “under which conditions are communities of practice beneficial to organizational memory?”
Ravn S. & Høffding S. (2021) Improvisation and thinking in movement: An enactivist analysis of agency in artistic practices. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online first. https://cepa.info/7300
Ravn S. & Høffding S.
(
2021)
Improvisation and thinking in movement: An enactivist analysis of agency in artistic practices.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online first.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7300
In this article, we inquire into Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and Michele Merritt’s descriptions and use of dance improvisation as it relates to “thinking in movement.” We agree with them scholars that improvisational practices present interesting cases for investigating how movement, thinking, and agency intertwine. However, we also find that their descriptions of improvisation overemphasize the dimension of spontaneity as an intuitive “letting happen” of movements. To recalibrate their descriptions of improvisational practices, we couple Ezequiel Di Paolo, Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran’s (2017) enactive account of the constitution of agency with case studies of two expert performers of improvisation: a dancer and a musician. Our analyses hereof show that their improvisations unfold as a sophisticated oscillation of agency between specialized forms of mental and bodily control and, indeed, a more spontaneous “letting things happen.” In all, this article’s conclusions frame thinking in movement concerning improvisational practices as contextually embedded, purposively trained, and inherently relational.
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