Gerard de Zeeuw has headed various research organisations and has published widely – mainly concerning matters of research design and knowledge creation. He is Emeritus Professor of Complex Social Systems and Innovation of the University of Amsterdam.
de Zeeuw G. (2001) Constructivism: A “next” area of scientific development? Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 77–98. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2745
Radical Constructivism has been defined as an‘unconventional approach to the problem ofknowledge and knowing’. Its unconventionalityis summarised by its claim that it isimpossible to attribute unique meaning toexperience – as no mind-independent yardstick canbe assumed to exist against which to identifyuniqueness, and hence to produce knowledge andknowing. In other words, it is claimed thatthere is no ‘reality’ that is knowable to allindividual knowers. This claim appearsindefensible by itself, as it does not explainwhy the successes of traditional science appearas such. However, it is defensible in thecontext of numerous failures to achieve uniqueattributions, or of the history of science. Even so, what is missing are concrete methodsand research designs. This often leaves RadicalConstructivism to be critical only, toconcentrate on justifying the impossibility ofsuccess without contributing itself. Where this is the case it reduces scientiststo individuals considered unable to communicatewith others on public (and unique)attributions-who may do so only by borrowingmethods from previous approaches. It is arguedthat a more valuable contribution is possibleif Radical Constructivism is seen as a responseto the challenge defined by frequent failuresof traditional approaches. The latter may beextended such that the extensions converge toRadical Constructivism. Such extensions arebased on reported observations, rather than onexperiences in general, and are to beattributed meanings – uniquely as well asnon-uniquely – by way of a collective. The lattershould allow its ‘actors’ to restrict whatmaintains the collective to what is observableto others, as well as use the collective torestrict their own observations. The study ofcollectives thus allows for the study ofrestrictions or values, and hence for includingsubjective or constructivist experiences beyond(reportable) observations.
In some domains acquiring knowledge has proved successful in ways that have not been equalled elsewhere notwithstanding long-term efforts. As the lack of success in the latter must be due to the combination of approach and content, this suggests searching for new approaches, and interpreting the ‘not’ as a possibly ‘never’. The alternative is to see the ‘not’ as a ‘not yet’. The argument Von Foerster (1970) brings to this dilemma is that in the social domain the ‘not’ is due to an extra, mainly action-bound, source of variation. Constraining this source will allow for a (reasonable) ‘not yet’. To remind of Heinz’s surprising and sophisticated argument it is re-used.
de Zeeuw G. (2004) Fighting for science. Kybernetes 33(3/4): 717–725.
What deliverables did Stafford Beer envision when he developed his “science of effective organisation”? This paper answers this question as: the organisations that use the distinctions of Beer’s viable system model. Such organisations are part of daily life, but develop to become knowledge by continuously striving to identify experiences that falsify their existence. They will be irreducible in the sense that any acceptable model of the organisation will be the organisation itself. The notion of knowledge involved is made explicit in the paper as a tribute to Stafford Beer’s pioneering work. It allowed Stafford Beer to introduce and develop insights that began to be developed by others only much later.
Knowledge is defined as the result of successful attempts to transfer expected effort in the future to effort spent in the present. The less effort remains to be spent in the future, the more knowledge is exhaustive and complete. It is shown that some efforts remain necessary in the future for accidental reasons, e.g. to correct mistakes, to estimate parameters, to act. Some efforts will also be required for fundamental reasons. They are needed to compensate as and when testing for exhaustiveness proves ineffective. It is argued that the need for such additional effort may be met by starting collectives as a form of pre‐containment. Such collectives may include non‐ordered experiences. They will maintain themselves by striving to serve as equivalents to knowledge. They help in two ways: they indicate what is needed to create which knowledge. The design of collectives serving as knowledge is linked to second‐order cybernetics.
de Zeeuw G. (2007) Forgotten Distinctions in the Critique of Radical Constructivism. Constructivist Foundations 3(1): 15–16. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/52
Open peer commentary on the target article “Arguments Opposing the Radicalism of Radical Constructivism” by Gernot Saalmann. First paragraph: Gernot Saalmann applauds radical constructivism’s (§35) use of human constructs “to understand the foreign,” but bemoans its refusal to accept any additional claim that these may “correspond with reality” (§§33, 34). The author seems to forget, unfortunately, that the refusal was meant to solve a problem – that of the absence of an observed referent in social research. His plea for a replacement by “critical realism” does not deal with that problem, and thus falls flat.
de Zeeuw G. (2013) Quality and Qualifications. Constructivist Foundations 9(1): 138–139. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/979
Open peer commentary on the article “A Cybernetic Computational Model for Learning and Skill Acquisition” by Bernard Scott & Abhinav Bansal. Upshot: The paper is an admirable example of first-order cybernetics. It does not appear to be developed as part of the constructivist paradigm and of second-order cybernetics. It neglects research as the context that generates problems of observation.
de Zeeuw G. (2016) To Expect the Unexpected. Constructivist Foundations 12(1): 101–102. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3820
Open peer commentary on the article “A Cybernetic Approach to Contextual Teaching and Learning” by Philip Baron. Upshot: Philip Baron is challenged to clarify the link between his admirable efforts at teaching and research. To allow for a counterchallenge a method to transfer his experiences is summarised that is equivalent to the scientific method.
de Zeeuw G. (2017) Eigenform and Expertise. Constructivist Foundations 12(3): 258–260. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4166
Open peer commentary on the article “Eigenform and Reflexivity” by Louis H. Kauffman. Upshot: Kauffman proposes to understand scientific thinking as including not only observations but also the act that enables their intentional use. This provides a constructivist opportunity: extending scientific thinking to gaining personal expertise.