Context: This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem: The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce “varieties of scenarios” instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change (e.g., the IPCC. This might leave the impression of vague and indecisive results. As a result, esteem for the sciences seems to be decreasing within public perception. Method: This paper applies second-order observation to climate change research in particular and the sciences in general. Results: Within most sciences, it is still quite unusual to disclose and discuss the epistemological foundations of the respective research questions, methods and ways to interpret data, as research proceeds mainly from some version of realistic epistemological positions. A shift towards self-reflexive second-order science might offer possibilities for a return to a “less polarized” scientific and public debate on climate change because it points to knowledge that is in principle tentative, uncertain and fragmented as well as to the theory- and observation-dependence of scientific work. Implications: The paper addresses the differences between first-order and second-order science as well as some challenges of science in general, which second-order science might address and disclose. Constructivist content: Second-order science used as observation praxis (second-order observation) for this specific field of research.

Key words: Second-order science, climate change research, observation theory, theory-dependency, causality, production of knowledge.

Context: For many people, religion and/or spiritual experiences are an important part of their daily lives - shaping their thinking and actions. Studying these experiences relies on qualitative religious studies (RS) research that engages respondents on a deeply personal level. Problem: Researchers are unable to provide an apolitical, value-free approach to research. There lacks a rigorous methodological approach to qualitative RS research that addresses this epistemological obstacle. This is particularly relevant when studying a cohort with radically different beliefs from the researcher. Method: Researcher coupling is presented as a topic that defines the researcher and her participants as a systemic entity. By demonstrating how the researcher’s worldview is tied to her research, an argument for personalised and relational observer-dependent research is presented. Five reflexive questions are proposed as a starting point for personalised research to demonstrate the relational and intersubjective nature of this activity. Results: By linking the researcher to her research and changing the goal of research from independent and objective research to one that is relational and contextual, the scholar can report on her research in an ethical and socially just manner by linking her worldview to her research. Implications: The traditional research activity is redefined as one that should embrace the scholar’s worldview instead of attempting to hide it. The scientific ideals of independence and objectivity are replaced by interdependence and hence a proposal is made for personalised research that embraces the intersubjective nature of this activity. This proposal is meant to alleviate some of the epistemological weaknesses in RS. This paradigm shift promotes rigour as a qualifier for methodology including changes to how research is categorised. Constructivist content: Margaret Mead’s ideas of observer dependence in anthropological research and how the observer constructs her research findings are discussed. The circularity that exists in this relational context is analysed according to Bradford Keeney’s ideas on recursion and resultant future behavioural correction. Ranulph Glanville’s ideas of intersubjectivity and his concept of “in the between” are used as a foundation for the researcher-participant relationship. Ross Ashby’s notion of experimenter coupling is used as a basis for researcher coupling.

Key words: Epistemology, ethics, personalised and relational research, religious studies, rigour, research methodology, worldview.

The author examines education from a constructivist perspective, assuming that its goal is independent thinking rather than the maintenance of the status quo. He distinguishes training from teaching, stressing that only the latter is concerned with understanding. Concepts and conceptual structures are seen as the material of understanding, and their dependence on language and subjective interpretations is presented. The belief that words refer to observer-independent things rather than to speakers’ and listeners’ experiences is seen as one of the age-old obstacles to conceptual education. After a brief mention of important steps in the history of epistemology, the naïve realism of popular writings on science and science textbooks is shown to be incompatible with the ideas of the great scientists of the last century, whose views were remarkably close to constructivism. The construction of concepts is illustrated by an example from visual perception, the conceptual formation of a well-known constellation, and the construction of pluralities. An examination of these constructions yields principles that may be of interest to educators. These principles are then illustrated by means of a didactic experiment in physics teaching.

Key words: education, philosophy

The deterministic component of the structure of the genetic code, derived from tRNA dimerization as proposed by the self-referential model, is described. Anticodon triplets form well defined modules of dimers that are sites for hosting the amino acid guests. The amino acids are the non-deterministic component, selected evolutionarily at the accomplishment of functions in the nucleoprotein ensembles and coevolving with metabolic pathways. The concomitance of the deterministic and the evolutionary components results in regionalization of the attributions in the matrix of encoded correspondences. The regionalized structure is what explains the error-minimizing property of the code structure. Relevance: Our utilization of the notion of self-reference may be relevant for the discussions on autopoiesis. Our model utilizes self-reference as the original and foundational attribute but compartmentalization is considered a derived function in the construction of the biomolecular machinery. The genetic code also reaches integration through the action of protein-protein interactions, between synthetases. Functional closure is reached when the punctuation subsystem is developed, but also in dependence on complex participation of other genes.

The discourse of postmodernism proclaims with a unified voice the context-dependence or knower-dependence, the relativity or subjectivity, of all truth claims. But the discourse of postmodernism also proclaims universal truths upon which this antirealist epistemology itself rests. These constitute the very foundational claims that the postmodernist campaign, in all its alleged antifoundationalism, strives to subvert. In this article I consider three universal truth claims of postmodernist discourse. And because the antirealism that defines much of postmodernist discourse is often grounded in the doctrine of social constructionism, the three truth claims under consideration constitute the claims of social constructionism itself, especially the claims of social constructionism as it has been propounded within postmodern therapy circles. Each of the three claims is articulated, and then followed by a critique which asks whether the claim is not either (a) simply a variant of the so-called modernist paradigm that is under attack, or (b) the product of the very observational/empirical powers that postmodernist doctrine seeks to erode in its anti-empiricist spirit. Particular attention is given to challenging the value – found within postmodernist circles – of a pragmatic or utilitarian standard for acceptance of theory or discourse.

Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal needs tweaking in a number of ways. This article focuses on one – the need to free it from its dependence on teleosemantics. EAT, so modified, becomes compatible with a truly enactivist understanding of basic emotions.

Key words: emotion, emotional appraisal theory, enactivism, teleosemantics

The role of context-sensitive constraints – first as enablers of complexification and subsequently as regulators that maintain the integrity of self-organized, coherent wholes – has only recently begun to be examined. Conceptualizing such organizational constraints in terms of the operations of far from equilibrium, nonlinear dynamic processes rekindles old metaphysical discussions concerning primary and secondary relations, emergence, causality, and the logic of explanation. In particular, far-from-equilibrium processes allow us to rethink how parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts – so-called “mereological”– relationships are constituted. A renewed understanding of recursive feedback and the role context-dependence plays in generating the boundary conditions and the internal organization of complex adaptive systems in turn allows us to redescribe formal and final cause in such a way as to provide a meaningful sense of heretofore seemingly intractable philosophical problems such as autonomy, self-determination, and agency.

Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren’t re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.

Key words: consciousness, co-consciousness, meta-consciousness, neural correlates of consciousness, unconscious, self-reflection, re-representation, dissociation, dissociative identity disorder, philosophy of psychology.

Excerpt: 4E cognitive science is a broad church housing a number of theoretical perspectives that to varying degrees conflict with each other (Shapiro 2010). In this chapter I will argue that the debates within 4E cognitive science surrounding extended cognition boil down to competing ontological conceptions of cognitive processes. The embedded theory (henceforth EMT) and the family of extended theories of cognition (henceforth EXT) disagree about what it is for a state or process to count as cognitive. EMT holds that cognitive processes are deeply dependent on bodily interactions with the environment in ways that more traditionally minded cognitive scientists might find surprising. The strong dependence of some cognitive processes on bodily engagements with the world notwithstanding, EMT claims that cognitive processes are nevertheless wholly realized by systems and mechanisms located inside of the brain. Thus advocates of EMT continue to interpret the concept of cognition along more or less traditional lines (Adams and Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009). That is to say, they think of cognitive processes as being constituted by computational, rule-based operations carried out on internal representational structures that carry information about the world.

The quantification of phase synchrony between neuronal signals is of crucial importance for the study of large-scale interactions in the brain. Two methods have been used to date in neuroscience, based on two distinct approaches which permit a direct estimation of the instantaneous phase of a signal [Phys. Rev. Lett. 81 (1998) 3291; Human Brain Mapping 8 (1999) 194]. The phase is either estimated by using the analytic concept of Hilbert transform or, alternatively, by convolution with a complex wavelet. In both methods the stability of the instantaneous phase over a window of time requires quantification by means of various statistical dependence parameters (standard deviation, Shannon entropy or mutual information). The purpose of this paper is to conduct a direct comparison between these two methods on three signal sets: (1) neural models; (2) intracranial signals from epileptic patients; and (3) scalp EEG recordings. Levels of synchrony that can be considered as reliable are estimated by using the technique of surrogate data. Our results demonstrate that the differences between the methods are minor, and we conclude that they are fundamentally equivalent for the study of neuroelectrical signals. This offers a common language and framework that can be used for future research in the area of synchronization.

Key words: phase synchrony, neural synchrony, Hilbert transform, wavelet transform, surrogate data