Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: I present a critical review of Depraz et al.’s target article and its promise to provide a novel “generative method” of analyzing first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. I argue that although indeed promising, the generative method may still be haunted by the issues pertaining to the other (neuro)phenomenological methods, like experimenter and respondent biases, and the problem with mistaking first-person with second-person data. In the end, I analyze the category of surprise and the way it was extracted from the data. The Philosopher’s Stone

Social constructionist psychology has no adequate notion of embodied subjectivity, a situation causing conceptual errors, raising methodological issues, and serving to entrench within constructionism the dualisms that structure mainstream psychology. The outline of a solution to this problem is offered, drawing on contemporary work in neuroscience. A framework from Harre – of three ‘grammars’ of causality and influence (P, or persons; O or organisms; and M or molecules) is described and used to structure the integration of Shotter’s notion of subjectivity with two brain systems. Damasio’s ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis enables the feelingful, sensuous aspects of ‘joint action’, whilst Gazzaniga’s ‘interpreter’ enables their discursive aspects. The benefits of theorizing embodied subjectivity in this way are illustrated by a study of the phenomenon of ‘depression’, and it is concluded that such an integration makes constructionism more coherent, credible and critical.

Key words: embodiment, grammars of causality, joint action, social constructionism, subjectivity

Context: The use of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews and their productive interaction with third-person physiological data is a challenging and pressing issue in order to offer an effective and fruitful application of Varela’s neurophenomenological hypothesis. Problem: We aim at offering a generative method of analysis of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. Our challenge is to describe this generative first-person analysis with the third-person physiological framework rather than put Varela’s hypothesis into practice in a generative way (as we did in another paper. Method: The present contribution is a first pioneering study as far as the exposition of such an interactive generative methodology is concerned. It is also a new issue insofar as it deals with a case study, surprise in depression, that has not been thoroughly dealt with so far, either in philosophy or in psychopathology. Results: We show that the analysis of first-person data is an intrinsic generative one, insofar as new refined categories and multifarious circular micro- and macro-processes were discovered in the very process of analyzing. They provide the initial structural generic third-person description of surprise inherited both from philosophical phenomenological a priori categories and from the experimental startle setting with a refined micro-segmentation of the dynamic of the experience. Implications: Our article could be of interest to neurophenomenologists looking for an effective application and to researchers in quest of a method of analysis of first-person data. The present limitations are due to the still preliminary data-results we need to complete. Constructivist content: The article is directly linked to Varela’s neurophenomenological program and aims at extending and reforming it with a cardio-phenomenological approach. Keywords: First-person micro-phenomenological interviews, surprise, generative analysis of first-person data, depression, cardio-phenomenology, generative categories.

Cognitive models have contributed significantly to the understanding of unipolar depression and its psychological treatment. Our research group has been working on the notion of cognitive conflict viewed as personal dilemmas according to personal construct theory. We use a novel method for identifying those conflicts using the repertory grid technique (RGT). This study aims to empirically test the hypothesis that an intervention focused on the dilemma(s) specifically detected for each patient will enhance the efficacy of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for depression. We expect that adding a dilemma-focused intervention to CBT will increase the efficacy of one of the more prestigious therapies for depression, thus resulting in a significant contribution to the psychological treatment of depression. Relevance: This article describes the protocol of a controlled study aimed at testing the efficacy of dilemma-focused therapy (DFT) as an intervention in the treatment of depression. DFT is a constructivist-oriented intervention targeting the cognitive conflicts that block the pathway to change. Constructivist epistemology has shown its potential for creation and innovation across a variety of psychotherapy approaches. Personal construct therapy is one of these approaches, and DFT arises from it as a structured, but still flexible, intervention aimed at making explicit and fostering resolution of the specific dilemma(s) found for that particular patient in the initial repertory grid assessment.

Purpose of review To survey recent developments in phenomenological psychopathology. Recent findings We present the concept of embodiment as a key paradigm of recent interdisciplinary approaches from the areas of philosophy, psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience. This requires a short overview on the phenomenological concept of embodiment; in particular, on the distinction of subject and object body. A psychopathology of embodiment may be based on these and other distinctions, in particular on a polarity of disembodiment and hyperembodiment, which is illustrated by the examples of schizophrenia and depression. Recent contributions to phenomenological accounts of these disorders are presented. Finally, the study discusses the relationship of phenomenological and neuropsychiatric perspectives on embodiment. Summary A phenomenology of embodiment may be combined with enactive approaches to cognitive neuroscience in order to overcome dualist concepts of the mind as an inner realm of representations that mirror the outside world. Phenomenological and ecological concepts of embodiment should also be conjoined to enable a new, advanced understanding of mental illness.

Key words: depression, embodiment, enactive cognitive science, phenomenology, psychopathology, schizophrenia

Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: Supplementing physiological measures with first-person data involves several benefits and challenges. The collection and analysis of the two types of data might not be optimal within the same procedural framework. Therefore, the synthesis of the two remains problematic.

This paper utilizes the enactivist notion of ‘sense-making’ to discuss the nature of depression and examine some implications for treatment. As I understand it, sensemaking is fully embodied, fundamentally affective, and thoroughly embedded in a social environment. I begin by presenting an enactivist conceptualization of affective intentionality and describing how this general mode of intentional directedness to the world is disrupted in cases of major depressive disorder. Next, I utilize this enactivist framework to unpack the notion of ‘temporal desituatedness,’ and maintain that the characteristic symptoms of depression result from a disruption to the futuredirected structure of affective intentionality. This can be conceptualized as a loss of Bonline intelligence^ and a shrinking of the field of affordances. Then, I argue that two of the standard modes of treatments for depression, medication and cognitive behavioral therapy, are not fully sufficient means of restoring online intelligence, and that these limitations stem partly from the approaches’ implicit commitment to a brainbound, overly cognitivist view of the mind. I recommend expressive arts interventions such as dance-movement therapy and music therapy as important supplementary treatment methods that deserve further consideration. Insofar as they revitalize subjects’ bodies and emotions, cultivate an openness to the future, and promote self-insight and social synchrony, these treatment modes not only reflect key insights of enactivism, but also offer great potential for lasting healing.

Key words: enactivism, depression, dance-movement therapy, music therapy, expressive arts therapy.

Kelly’s personal construct psychology proposes that attributing meaning to experience is the most fundamental process of human psychological functioning. He describes psychological activity as a continuous process of creating, testing and revising personal theories (usually implicit) that allow people to understand and anticipate events. Depressive mood is highly influenced by the subject’s view of him or herself and others, and by the organization of his or her constructs. The content of these personal constructs has received far less attention from researchers. The main goal of this article is to complement the PCP model of depression through the content analysis of personal constructs. The results indicate that content patterns of depressed people show various specific thematic emphases.

Viewing the brain as an organ of approximate Bayesian inference can help us understand how it represents the self. We suggest that inferred representations of the self have a normative function: to predict and optimise the likely outcomes of social interactions. Technically, we cast this predict-and-optimise as maximising the chance of favourable outcomes through active inference. Here the utility of outcomes can be conceptualised as prior beliefs about final states. Actions based on interpersonal representations can therefore be understood as minimising surprise – under the prior belief that one will end up in states with high utility. Interpersonal representations thus serve to render interactions more predictable, while the affective valence of interpersonal inference renders self-perception evaluative. Distortions of self-representation contribute to major psychiatric disorders such as depression, personality disorder and paranoia. The approach we review may therefore operationalise the study of interpersonal representations in pathological states.

Key words: self-representation, other-representation, free energy minimisation, active inference, personality disorder, paranoia

Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: The generative method outlined in the target article produces some interesting results, demonstrating the value of cardio-phenomenology. The proposed division of categories reflecting the structure of experience into sub-categories suggests that prior theoretical commitments may have influenced the process of analysis in ways the authors might not have foreseen or intended. This commentary discusses potential areas for future work, proposing that some modifications to the methodology might lessen possibly unforeseen influences on the central process of classification.