Ackermann E. K. (2015) Amusement, Delight, and Whimsy: Humor Has Its Reasons that Reason Cannot Ignore. Constructivist Foundations 10(3): 405–411. https://cepa.info/2165
Context: The idea for this article sprang from a desire to revive a conversation with the late Ernst von Glasersfeld on the heuristic function - and epistemological status - of forms of ideations that resist linguistic or empirical scrutiny. A close look into the uses of humor seemed a thread worth pursuing, albeit tenuous, to further explore some of the controversies surrounding the evocative power of the imaginal and other oblique forms of knowing characteristic of creative individuals. Problem: People generally respond to humor, i.e., they are inclined to smile at things they find funny. People like to crack jokes, make puns, and, starting at age two, human infants engage in pretense or fantasy play. Research on creativity, on the other hand, has mostly scorned the trickster within. Cognitivists in particular are quick to relegate wit, whimsy, and even playfulness to the ranks of artful or poetic frivolities. Method: We use the emblems of the craftsman, the trickster, and the poet to highlight some of the oblique ways of knowing by which creative thinkers bring forth new insights. Each epitomizes dimensions intrinsic to the art of “possibilizing.” Taken together, they help us better understand what it means to be playful beyond curious, rigorous beyond reasonable, and why this should matter, even to constructivists! Results: The musings characteristic of creative individuals (artists, scientists, children) speak to intelligent beings’ ability to use glitches intentionally or serendipitously as a means to open up possibilities; to hold on to a thought before spelling it out; and to resist treating words or images as conventional and arbitrary signs regardless of their evocative power. To fall into nominalism, Bachelard insisted, is a poet’s nightmare! Implications: Psyche is image, said Jung, and when we feel alive we rely on the imaginal to guide our reason. Note that image is not here to be understood as a picture in the head or a photographic snapshot of the world. The imaginal does not represent, it brings forth what we understand beyond words. It does not lock us into a single mode. Instead, it is a call to be mindful, in Ellen Langer’s sense: in the present, mentally alert, and on the outlook for our psyche’s own surprising wisdom (sagacity. Constructivist content: Debates on the heuristic function and epistemological status of oblique ways of knowing have long occupied constructivist scholars. I can only guess whether my uses of Jung’s imaginal or Bachelard’s anti-nominalism would have amused or exasperated Ernst! I do know that, on occasion, Ernst the connoisseur, bricoleur, and translator allowed the rationalist-within to include the poet’s power to evoke as a legitimate form of rationality. He himself has written about oblique knowing as legit!
Breuer R. (1984) Self-reflexivity in literature: The example of Samuel Beckett’s Novel trilogy. In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality. Norton, New York: 145–168. https://cepa.info/7659
Excerpt: Taking as a point of departure the constructivist concept of self-referentiality, I will attempt to consider the problem of self-reflexivity, which has become so important in modern literature. In other words, I shall attempt to discuss the phenomenon of metaliterature, a literature that, above all, is concerned with itself, that reflects the conditions which make possible its own composition, that treats in general of the possibility of fictional speech, or that questions the basis of the fictional contract between the work and the reader. This attempt concurs with a suggestion in an essay by Heinz von Foerster [10], where, from the fact that there can be no objective perception as such, in other words, no objects without observers, the conclusion is drawn that we need, above all, a theory of the observer or the “describer.” Von Foerster continues that since only living organisms are possible candidates for observers, the construction of such a theory must be the task of the biologist. Since, however, the latter also is a living creature, he must not only take account of himself in his theory, but must also include the theory- building process itself in the theory. This is, in fact, the situation of many writers in the twentieth century who no longer desire to lustily tell stories but have found, just as scientists and philosophers in other fields have found, that their medium language, together with all the traditional processes of writing, has, after a period of optimism, become problematic. Thus they have found themselves forced to reflect on the process of writing itself.
Candiotto L. & De Jaegher H. (2021) Love in-between. The Journal of Ethics 25(4): 501–524. https://cepa.info/7687
In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation.
The author uses physiological, psychological and clinical examples to place the aesthetic problem of architecture within an ethical context. Drawing on a clinical report and an experiment in perception, he argues that perception consists largely of invention on the part of the perceiver. He disputes the possibility of an objective reality, linking the popular belief in objectivity to a desire to avoid responsibility. He outlines the opposition between objectivity and ethics and, likewise, between “monologic” and “dialogic.” His discussion of the distinction between denotation and connotation leads to conclusions concerning the role of ethics in architecture.
Gellman J. (2019) On Mysticism and Constructive Gaps. Constructivist Foundations 15(1): 11–12. https://cepa.info/6148
Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivism and Mystical Experience” by Hugh Gash. Abstract: I list four suggestions for ways Gash might consider refining and advancing his target article: Defending RC as being needed, attending more to mystical traditions, clarifying mystical traditions and social consensus, and considering the desire for self-transcendence as relevant.
Glasersfeld E. von (1972) Semantic analysis of verbs in terms of conceptual situations. Linguistics 94: 90–106.
First paragraph: Although investigations of meaning have in the last ten or fifteen years managed to acquire a sort of respectability and are now no longer considered an unforgivable breach of etiquette by professional linguists. There is still a great deal of reluctance to push semantic analysis beyond the boundaries that, for one reason or another, have been accepted by lexicologists in the past. This reluctance is no less noticeable among psycholinguists, psychologists, and philosophers of language, and it would seem that in most instances it is due to a strong and very understandable desire not to become involved in the tricky and treacherous problems of epistemology.
Although the desire for an education that emphasizes depth of understanding and meaningful learning has a long and distinguished history, constructivist reforms have not led to a comprehensive and coherent reform of educational practice in our schools. In fact, two previous “great reforms” based on constructivist principles have failed during this century. In this special issue ofEducational Psychology Review, authors focus on specific challenges faced in the current constructivist reform, including the need for viable intradisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and cross-disciplinary integration. Exemplars of the reality of progress made in integrated, constructivist approaches in the classroom follow. Diversity in our schools and classrooms and the challenge of high standards for all students contribute to the need for an integrated, constructivist approach that does not fail our students.
Starting from Varela’s epistemological reflections, the author attempts to review, in short fragments, the history of the concept of autonomy. After a brief reference to the Ancient Greeks, the author’s attention focuses on the tension between will and desire that characterized the concept of autonomy in Rousseau and Kant. After briefly considering Kant’s image of the baby-walker, the investigation moves to Hegel and his master/slave dialectic and, on the basis of reflections by Jessica Benjamin, to Winnicott and his idea of a child’s autonomization in his relation to the mother. Via a brief comparison between Winnicott’s concept of third area and Bateson’s idea of frame, the author signals out Winnicott’s reflection as a decisive moment for the idea of autonomy in relations. The goal of this attempt consists in putting forward an idea of autonomy capable of cohabiting with the concept of relation without opposing it, and that may at the same time satisfy certain requirements set by research like Francisco Varela’s.
Open peer commentary on the article “The Tangled Dialectic of Body and Consciousness: A Metaphysical Counterpart of Radical Neurophenomenology” by Michel Bitbol. Abstract: Michel Bitbol offers a well-thought-out system of metaphysical coordinates. Despite the elegance and soundness of the proposed system, I nevertheless have concerns about the very need for a tailor-made metaphysics for the area of neurophenomenological research. I see two main issues with focusing on metaphysics at the present stage of development of phenomenology-based empirical research: (a) For a fruitful investigation of consciousness, it is necessary that the elements that are epistemically accessible be clearly and distinctly separate from metaphysical speculations; (b) Most of what used to belong to the realm of the metaphysical can be empirically examined. Rather than focusing on metaphysics, I propose an opposite course of action: bracketing the desire for metaphysical construction, and instead focusing on an examination of epistemological characteristics of non-trivial research domains.
Martin R. J. (2018) Are We Professors If No One Is Learning? Changing University Education. Constructivist Foundations 13(3): 329–330. https://cepa.info/5293
Open peer commentary on the article “Heterarchical Reflexive Conversational Teaching and Learning as a Vehicle for Ethical Engineering Curriculum Design” by Philip Baron. Upshot: Philip Baron focuses on changing university curricula in South Africa to enable students to succeed who do not share the culture, expectations, and experience of their teachers. With increasing need and desire for more education worldwide, his article is relevant to university education in all countries, especially in those with underserved populations. This commentary focuses on the factors Baron describes which can be generalized to all university education.