Constructivism is an approach to knowledge and learning that focuses on the active role of knowers. Sanchez and Loredo propose a classification of constructivist thinkers and address what they perceive to be internal problems of present-day constructivism. The remedy they propose is a return to the genetic constructivism of James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. In this article we first raise the question of whether thinkers like Baldwin, Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela are adequately depicted as constructivists, and subsequently argue that constructivism is caught in an overly epistemic version of the subject/object dichotomy. We then introduce a genetic logic that is not based on the Hegelian dialectics of negation and mediation, but rather on the idea of the recursive consensual coordination of actions that give rise to stylized cultural practices. We argue that a genuinely genetic and generative psychology should be concerned with the multifarious and ever-changing nature of human “life” and not merely with the construction of knowledge about life. Relevance: The article deals with perceived “internal” problems of constructivist approaches and proposes a genetic and generative psychology that is centrally concerned with human life-as-lived and not merely with life-as-known. The article furthermore raises the question whether key thinkers like Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela and are adequately depicted as constructivists.

Key words: Constructivism, genetic logic, generativity, expressivism, enactivism.

The present article analyses the signficance and relevance of dialectic in Piaget’s and Vigotsky’s psychological studies. On one hand, it highlights the common dialectical methodology present in units of analysis in research. On the other hand, it focuses on the peculiar features dialectic acquires within both authors’ explanation of psychological development. Lastly, a characterization of dialectic features based on previous analysis is introduced. The present article argues against the unique dialectic and its a priori features in Developmental Psychology and Human Sciences areas. It also justifies its diversity in relation to the subject matters under investigation as well as the existence of certain limits in the use of that category in empirical research. The use of dialectics requires the adoption of diverse forms regarding different issues and theoretical focuses.

Key words: dialectic, unit of analysis, contradiction, dialectic inference, equilibration.

Prompted by our commentators, we take this response as an opportunity to clarify the premises, attitudes, and methods of our enactive approach to human languaging. We high-light the need to recognize that any investigation, particularly one into language, is always a concretely situated and self-grounding activity; our attitude as researchers is one of knowing as engagement with our subject matter. Our task, formulating the missing categories that can bridge embodied cognitive science with language research, requires avoiding premature abstractions and clarifying the multiple circularities at play. Our chosen method is dialectical, which has prompted several interesting observations that we respond to, particularly with respect to what this method means for enactive epistemology and ontology. We also clarify the important question of how best to conceive of the variety of social skills we progressively identify with our method and are at play in human languaging. Are these skills socially constituted or just socially learned? The difference, again, leads to a clarification that acts, skills, actors, and interactions are to be conceived as co-emerging categories. We illustrate some of these points with a discussion of an example of aspects of the model at play in a study of gift giving in China.

Key words: enactive epistemology, enactive ontology, dialectics, languaging, shared know-how.

I discuss the notion of bodies proposed by Villalobos and Razeto-Barry. I consider it a good move in a direction away from overly formal aspects of autopoietic theory, but in need of refinement. I suggest that because organismic boundaries are dialectical processes and not immanent walls, some autopoietic bodies can extend by incorporating parts of their environment as in the case of insects that use trapped air bubbles to breathe underwater.

Key words: autopoiesis, individuation, boundary, incorporation, dialectics.

The aim of this article is to present to the reader the theoretical construction of Jean-Louis Le Moigne. It starts with a discussion of the background that is relevant for this construction, which is: a few words about Le Moigne himself, some influences on his thinking and an overview of the theoretical framework together with some domains of application. The following exposition of Le Moigne’s Systemics (LMS) is articulated in three groups: the what, the why and the how of knowing. The what presents the two basic hypotheses of LMS’ epistemological version, called Projective Constructivist Epistemology. These are: the phenomenological and the teleological hypotheses. The three dominating properties of the first hypothesis, that is the irreversibility, the recursivity and the dialectics of knowing, are presented as well. The why question presents the criterion for validation, which is projective (or cognitive) feasibility, to be contrasted with the positivist’s aspiration for objective truth. This presents LMS’ solution to the dilemma between objectivity and relativism. Projective feasibility is possible due to the so-called social contract and the autonomy of science as a domain of thought, both are discussed. The third question, the how, presents a set of cognitive instruments for knowledge constitution. These may be articulated in three sub-categories: modelling rationality, systemic modelling and inforgetic theory. Under the label of modelling rationality the following topics are discussed: formalism, procedural rationality, conjunctive or self-referential system of logic and the discussion of the method for conduct of good reason. Secondly, systemic modelling discusses: complexity, modelling, the canonic model of a General System, LMS’ modelling instrument called Systemography, the canonic model of a General Process, the canonic model of Information Processing System, LMS’ instrument for articulation of complex systems called Teleological Complexification of Functional Levels, a general and a priori identification of pertinent levels of complexification of a complex system’s organisation as manifested in the canonic model called Decision-Information-Organisation System, and finally the paradigm of an active organisation: Eco-Auto-Re-Organisation with its canonic model of organisation, the latter is a conflictful conjunction of three recursive functions: to produce and self-produce, to relate and self-relate, to maintain and self-maintain. Thirdly, inforgetic theory refers to the conceptual relation between information and organisation. It includes: the canonic model of information: Signified-Sign-Signification, the first principle of inforgetics: the principle of self-organisation, and the second principle of inforgetics: the principle of intelligent action. Finally, the article gives a brief summing up of the significance of Le Moigne’s contribution.

This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.

Key words: dialectics, enactivism, language, epistemology, ontology.

Outline a dialectical constructivist epistemology and theory… and then apply it to understanding experiential change processes in psychotherapy / dialectics in its most essential form is rational analysis based on the splitting of a totality into its contradictory parts / the totality of interest here is the dynamic system of a client’s psychological processes / the contradictory parts are the different psychological processes that, when brought into contact, often interact to produce therapeutic transformations, self-development, or novelty through a dialectical synthesis of the components / dialectical constructivism therefore explains human functioning and development in terms of the relations between parts / the dialectic with which we are most concerned is that involved in the type of construction of meaning characteristic of life-engaged consciousness… called vital reason / it is with this dialectic that therapists need to work if they are to produce enduring change illuminate the dialectical construction of meaning through a synthesis of bodily felt internal complexity with language-based explanations, by using the theory [of constructive operators]

Open peer commentary on the article “Neurodialectics: A Proposal for Philosophy of Cognitive and Social Sciences” by Nicolas Zaslawski. Abstract: By taking the proposal of a neurodialectical move seriously, I anticipate three interconnected questions that might appear if the program offered here is expanded to a social scope, namely regarding the specific dialectics the social could imply, the important distinction and articulation of two different aspects of the social, and the originarity of neurodialectics.

Insofar as there is a link to be made between “German philosophy” and enactivism this has typically been thought to be one which focuses on Heidegger, and perhaps more recently, Wittgenstein. However there is a case to be made that the work of Marx, and later Marxian thinkers, is just as relevant. The parallels between Marxian and enactivist thought are often striking. Moreover in some cases these affinities are not coincidental but are the result of traceable influences via Marxist intermediaries such as Merleau-Ponty, Vygotsky, Levins & Lewontin. Somewhat artificially, we might group areas of congruence between Marxian and enactivist thought under three broad headings − Unification of the subject, Praxis and Dialectics. The first of these categories is concerned with those aspects of Marxian thought which focus explicitly on the unification of the subject − with external nature, with his/ her own activity and with his/ her fellow subjects. The Marxian ‘ whole man’ is an embodied agent embedded in a physical and social environment. He realizes/ creates himself through practical activity, a process which is most often characterized in terms of reciprocal interaction between agent and environment, although it is sometimes also characterized along ‘ extensionalist’ lines with nature becoming “ the inorganic conditions of production. In particular, the mental/ manual division of labour gives rise to a disunified conception of the agent whereby thought and activity are considered in separation. The second of these categories is concerned with various Marxian theses concerning the relationship both between ideas and the world, and between thought and action. Marxian materialism grounds ideas in active material being. Considered in relation to questions of origination this means that ideas are “ sublimates of their [ human beings’] material life process.” Considered in relation to questions of temporal precedence – this means that Marxian thought rejects Heine’s account whereby “ thought preceded action as lightning did thunder”, positing in its place the notion of ‘ praxis’ as the “ synthesis of thought and action.” Also relevant here are a number of other Marxian theses which form part of Marx’s ‘ philosophy of practice’ − specifically: that the world cannot be understood in separation from our active relationship to it, that having an adequate account of our active relationship to the world facilitates the dissolution of philosophical problems, and that in certain instances philosophical problems are resolved through practical activity itself. The third category is concerned with ‘ dialectical’ elements of Marxian thought. These have their ultimate origin in Hegelian philosophy and are most explicitly articulated in the work of Engels. As well as an overarching interest in transcending dichotomies in favour of a “ unity of opposites”, a dialectical approach shares with enactivism a holistic view of phenomena under investigation, emphasizing reciprocal causal relations and dynamic change over time.

In this paper, we propose a critical classification of contemporary constructivist orientations. Our fundamental theoretical reference is the notion of genesis, understood as the construction of reality in a way that is neither relativist nor positivist-realist. We identify a nucleus of classic, genetic constructivism that revolves around the ideas of Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky and discuss two tendencies that distort the spirit of that nucleus: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism rules out the psychological, constructive activity of the subject, subordinating (or just reducing) it to objective structures either from nature (like genetic endowment or neural functioning), or from culture (like language or social practices). Subjectivism completely detaches the objectivity of knowledge from its construction on the part of the subject, reducing it to the mere product of individual interest, view, or irrationality. Thus, subjectivism is the non-constructive way to conceive the subject. Then, we attempt to show the dialectics that exists between these two tendencies and the scope of our criteria by analysing a representative (non exhaustive) group of authors who are defined as constructivists or who bring important elements to the debate about constructivism.

Key words: constructivism, co-constructivism, constructionism, objectivism subjectivism, genetic psychology.