Constructivism is an approach to knowledge and learning that focuses on the active role of knowers. Sanchez and Loredo propose a classification of constructivist thinkers and address what they perceive to be internal problems of present-day constructivism. The remedy they propose is a return to the genetic constructivism of James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. In this article we first raise the question of whether thinkers like Baldwin, Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela are adequately depicted as constructivists, and subsequently argue that constructivism is caught in an overly epistemic version of the subject/object dichotomy. We then introduce a genetic logic that is not based on the Hegelian dialectics of negation and mediation, but rather on the idea of the recursive consensual coordination of actions that give rise to stylized cultural practices. We argue that a genuinely genetic and generative psychology should be concerned with the multifarious and ever-changing nature of human “life” and not merely with the construction of knowledge about life. Relevance: The article deals with perceived “internal” problems of constructivist approaches and proposes a genetic and generative psychology that is centrally concerned with human life-as-lived and not merely with life-as-known. The article furthermore raises the question whether key thinkers like Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela and are adequately depicted as constructivists.

Key words: Constructivism, genetic logic, generativity, expressivism, enactivism.

The present article analyses the signficance and relevance of dialectic in Piaget’s and Vigotsky’s psychological studies. On one hand, it highlights the common dialectical methodology present in units of analysis in research. On the other hand, it focuses on the peculiar features dialectic acquires within both authors’ explanation of psychological development. Lastly, a characterization of dialectic features based on previous analysis is introduced. The present article argues against the unique dialectic and its a priori features in Developmental Psychology and Human Sciences areas. It also justifies its diversity in relation to the subject matters under investigation as well as the existence of certain limits in the use of that category in empirical research. The use of dialectics requires the adoption of diverse forms regarding different issues and theoretical focuses.

Key words: dialectic, unit of analysis, contradiction, dialectic inference, equilibration.

I discuss the notion of bodies proposed by Villalobos and Razeto-Barry. I consider it a good move in a direction away from overly formal aspects of autopoietic theory, but in need of refinement. I suggest that because organismic boundaries are dialectical processes and not immanent walls, some autopoietic bodies can extend by incorporating parts of their environment as in the case of insects that use trapped air bubbles to breathe underwater.

Key words: autopoiesis, individuation, boundary, incorporation, dialectics.

The aim of this article is to present to the reader the theoretical construction of Jean-Louis Le Moigne. It starts with a discussion of the background that is relevant for this construction, which is: a few words about Le Moigne himself, some influences on his thinking and an overview of the theoretical framework together with some domains of application. The following exposition of Le Moigne’s Systemics (LMS) is articulated in three groups: the what, the why and the how of knowing. The what presents the two basic hypotheses of LMS’ epistemological version, called Projective Constructivist Epistemology. These are: the phenomenological and the teleological hypotheses. The three dominating properties of the first hypothesis, that is the irreversibility, the recursivity and the dialectics of knowing, are presented as well. The why question presents the criterion for validation, which is projective (or cognitive) feasibility, to be contrasted with the positivist’s aspiration for objective truth. This presents LMS’ solution to the dilemma between objectivity and relativism. Projective feasibility is possible due to the so-called social contract and the autonomy of science as a domain of thought, both are discussed. The third question, the how, presents a set of cognitive instruments for knowledge constitution. These may be articulated in three sub-categories: modelling rationality, systemic modelling and inforgetic theory. Under the label of modelling rationality the following topics are discussed: formalism, procedural rationality, conjunctive or self-referential system of logic and the discussion of the method for conduct of good reason. Secondly, systemic modelling discusses: complexity, modelling, the canonic model of a General System, LMS’ modelling instrument called Systemography, the canonic model of a General Process, the canonic model of Information Processing System, LMS’ instrument for articulation of complex systems called Teleological Complexification of Functional Levels, a general and a priori identification of pertinent levels of complexification of a complex system’s organisation as manifested in the canonic model called Decision-Information-Organisation System, and finally the paradigm of an active organisation: Eco-Auto-Re-Organisation with its canonic model of organisation, the latter is a conflictful conjunction of three recursive functions: to produce and self-produce, to relate and self-relate, to maintain and self-maintain. Thirdly, inforgetic theory refers to the conceptual relation between information and organisation. It includes: the canonic model of information: Signified-Sign-Signification, the first principle of inforgetics: the principle of self-organisation, and the second principle of inforgetics: the principle of intelligent action. Finally, the article gives a brief summing up of the significance of Le Moigne’s contribution.

Open peer commentary on the article “Neurodialectics: A Proposal for Philosophy of Cognitive and Social Sciences” by Nicolas Zaslawski. Abstract: By taking the proposal of a neurodialectical move seriously, I anticipate three interconnected questions that might appear if the program offered here is expanded to a social scope, namely regarding the specific dialectics the social could imply, the important distinction and articulation of two different aspects of the social, and the originarity of neurodialectics.

In this paper, we propose a critical classification of contemporary constructivist orientations. Our fundamental theoretical reference is the notion of genesis, understood as the construction of reality in a way that is neither relativist nor positivist-realist. We identify a nucleus of classic, genetic constructivism that revolves around the ideas of Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky and discuss two tendencies that distort the spirit of that nucleus: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism rules out the psychological, constructive activity of the subject, subordinating (or just reducing) it to objective structures either from nature (like genetic endowment or neural functioning), or from culture (like language or social practices). Subjectivism completely detaches the objectivity of knowledge from its construction on the part of the subject, reducing it to the mere product of individual interest, view, or irrationality. Thus, subjectivism is the non-constructive way to conceive the subject. Then, we attempt to show the dialectics that exists between these two tendencies and the scope of our criteria by analysing a representative (non exhaustive) group of authors who are defined as constructivists or who bring important elements to the debate about constructivism.

Key words: constructivism, co-constructivism, constructionism, objectivism subjectivism, genetic psychology.

This paper has two parts. In the “Notes on Dialectics” I develop some ideas that apply to dualities quite generally. In the “Epilog,” I have stated my ideas on the Mind-Body Problem from the perspective taken in the notes. Briefly stated, my feeling is that if there is going to be a change be our perception of the Mind-Body relation, there has to be a change in the context in which the problem is seen to arise. This implies, at least, a change (i) in the logic used to understand that dialectics and wholes are; (ii) in the scientific ideas about what mind is, (moving away from the brain-secretion image, towards an understanding of mind as conversational domain); and (iii) in the cultural conceptions about mind, (which restrict the kind of experience that are socially and individually accessible).

Open peer commentary on the article “Neurodialectics: A Proposal for Philosophy of Cognitive and Social Sciences” by Nicolas Zaslawski. Abstract: I examine Zaslawski’s proposal for a dialectical (re)construal of neurophenomenology. While generally sympathetic to his approach, I argue that, instead of reverting to Hegel’s “dialectics of ideas,” a more suitable candidate for the job would be Merleau-Ponty’s “dialectics of existence.”

Upshot: First, we argue that our contribution was not meant as a mythization of Varela’s work, but rather as a Varelian-inspired existential reconstrual of enaction. Second, we expand and elaborate on the notion of dialectics and the role of Buddhist philosophy. Third, we briefly formulate three main domains (theoretical, empirical, educational) of investigation for enacting enaction.

Context: Most recent attempts to define cognition dialectically lack the philosophical completeness necessary to explain neurocognitive and mental processes. Problem: Under what conditions could neurophenomenology be thought of as dialectical and what would be the implications of such a conception for contemporary issues such as “social cognition” and phenomenological subjectivity? Method: I assess dialectical approaches to neurocognitive processes and mind mostly within the recent neurophenomenological literature and provide reasons as to why these approaches could be further improved using Hegel’s conception of dialectical processes. Results: As suggested in the context of research on extended cognition, mostly by Gallagher and Crisafi, a cognitively shaped understanding of Hegel’s philosophy allows us to understand how neurophenomenology can be conceptualized dialectically. It allows us to conceive precisely of how dialectical processes can help shape our understanding of cognition from individual neurocognitive operations to socially embedded processes. A dialectical interpretation of Varela’s conception of neurocognitive processes can help achieve the endeavor of recent sociological work to understand the “continuity” from individual to social “entities” through a “relational ontology.” This amounts to expanding, through a neurodialectical framework, Gallagher’s research on extended cognition as well as articulating it with his most recent conception of “decentered” cognition. Implications: Neurodialectics has straightforward implications for phenomenological understandings of subjectivity as well as for recent sociological research: in both cases, it can provide us with a philosophically meaningful and empirically sustainable framework. In particular, it could help philosophically expand Gallagher’s “decentered” model of brainhood. Constructivist Content: I argue in favor of a general philosophical perspective, the neurodialectical one, stressing the “primacy of moulding on being.”

Key words: Dialectics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, neurophenomenology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of cognitive science.