At present, due in part to our insufficient understanding of the traumatic experience, we are unable to account for the fact that while some people develop post-traumatic symptoms following a traumatic event, others do not. This article suggests that by adopting the enactive approach to perception – according to which perceiving is a way of acting – we may be able to improve our understanding of the traumatic experience and the factors which result in the development of post-traumatic symptoms. The central argument presented in this paper is that when the options of flight or fight are unavailable as a coping/defense mechanism, one freezes (freeze response). In this situation, the ability to master one’s movements is damaged and, in radical cases, the ability to move is lost altogether; as a result the sensorimotor loop may collapse. This, in turn, leads to distorted perception and, in consequence, memory disorders may develop.
Farb N. A., Segal Z. V., Mayberg H., Bean J., McKeon D., Fatima Z. & Anderson A. (2007) Attending to the present: Mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural modes of self-reference. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 2(4): 313–322. https://cepa.info/6929
It has long been theorised that there are two temporally distinct forms of self-reference: extended self-reference linking experiences across time, and momentary self-reference centred on the present. To characterise these two aspects of awareness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine monitoring of enduring traits (’narrative’ focus, NF) or momentary experience (’experiential’ focus, EF) in both novice participants and those having attended an 8 week course in mindfulness meditation, a program that trains individuals to develop focused attention on the present. In novices, EF yielded focal reductions in self-referential cortical midline regions (medial prefrontal cortex, mPFC) associated with NF. In trained participants, EF resulted in more marked and pervasive reductions in the mPFC, and increased engagement of a right lateralised network, comprising the lateral PFC and viscerosomatic areas such as the insula, secondary somatosensory cortex and inferior parietal lobule. Functional connectivity analyses further demonstrated a strong coupling between the right insula and the mPFC in novices that was uncoupled in the mindfulness group. These results suggest a fundamental neural dissociation between two distinct forms of self-awareness that are habitually integrated but can be dissociated through attentional training: the self across time and in the present moment.
Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren’t re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.
Silverman P. (1974) Radical constructivism in psychological explanation: A synthesis of negative feedback and operationism. In: Smock C. D. & Glasersfeld E. (eds.) Epistemology and education. Follow Through Publications, Athens GA: 99–122. https://cepa.info/3640
Excerpt: The radical constructivist philosophy serves as an epistemological framework for a discussion of the role of feedback in theories of behavior and for the application of operational analyses to cognition. It posits that biological organisms build their “realities” or “environments” and respond to those constructions. The environment, then, is a model which is internally organized and which cannot be directly known. The philosophical origins of this position lie in Bishop Berkeley’s rationalist dissociation of sensible object and material object (which is unknowable). As an epistemology, radical constructivism cannot be defended with “evidence” derived from empirical findings since evidence is itself the product of the constructor. Rather, the test of constructivism lies in the generation of a system of formal descriptions of the psychological processes by which the organism constructs a world. As will be shown, these formal descriptions are subject to tests.
In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and García (Psychogenesis and the history of science, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989). Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by developing our main tool: the no arbitrariness principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the observer, analysing then the relation objective–subjective and seeking objectivity going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justifed a-posteriori (because it is convenient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than efort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction.