Niklas Luhmann and Jacques Derrida start with a common assumption in their analyses of the law and the economy – the foundational paradox of social institutions. But then autopoiesis and deconstruction move into opposite directions. Luhmann pursues the question of how de-paradoxification constructs the immanence of social institutions and builds a world of autopoietic social systems. By contrast, Derrida’s thought aims at the transcendence of social institutions through their re-paradoxification. However, there is a hidden supplementarity of autopoiesis and deconstruction which makes it worthwhile to relate the theories to each other. Derrida’s distinction of writing/speech is necessarily blind toward Luhmann’s distinction of consciousness/communication, but is, at the same time, continuously provoked by it. On another level, the opposite happens. Luhmann’s autopoiesis is permanently irritated by Derrida’s différance but is at the same time unable to conceptualize it. This complementary blindness of their distinctions directrices is a permanent source of mutual irritation which requires a reformulation of the social and of the possibility of justice.

Key words: autopoiesis, deconstruction, justice, paradox, systems theory

A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre) he draws an excessively sharp, qualitative distinction between imagination and perception, and because of his flawed, empirically ungrounded conception of hallucination. His arguments in defense of these views are rebutted in detail, and the traditional, passive, Cartesian view of visual perception, upon which several of them implicitly rely, is criticized in the light of findings from recent cognitive science and neuroscience. It is also argued that the apparent intuitiveness of the passive view of visual perception is a result of mere historical contingency. An understanding of perception (informed by modern visual science) as an inherently active process enables us to unify our accounts of perception, mental imagery, dreaming, hallucination, creativity, and other aspects of imagination within a single coherent theoretical framework. Relevance: Argues for an enactivist approach to understanding perception, mental imagery, and imagination. Critiques Cartesian (including merely implicitly Cartesian) approaches to the same.

Excerpt: Constructivism as a philosophical orientation has been widely accepted in mathematics and science education only since the early 1980s. As it became more broadly accepted, it also became clear that there were incongruous images of it. In 1984, Ernst von Glasersfeld introduced a distinction, echoed in Steier’s paper at this conference, between what he called “naive” constructivism and “radical” constructivism. At the risk of oversimplification, suffice it to say that naive constructivism is the acceptance that learners construct their own knowledge, while radical constructivism is the acceptance that naive constructivism applies to everyone – researchers and philosophers included. Von Glasersfeld’s distinction had a pejorative ring to it, and rightly so. Unreflective acceptance of naive constructivism easily became dogmatic ideology, which had and continues to have many unwanted consequences. On the other hand, I will attempt to make a case that to do research we must spend a good part of our time acting as naive constructivists, even when operating within a radical constructivist or ecological constructionist framework. To make clear that the orientation I have in mind is not unreflexive, I will call it “utilitarian” constructivism, and will use Steier’s and Spiro’s papers as a starting point in its explication.

An attempt is made to present an idea of morals and ethics without essentialism and without normative presuppositions. Inspired by Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, morals is defined as a code, or a distinction between right and wrong. Moral observation is using the moral code with a view of designating one or the other side of the code. In order to distribute the two sides, the code must be combined with a program which must be interpreted in concrete situations. As both code, program and interpretation may be contested, morals is a controversial affair. Despite classical ambitions, its validity is not universal, but local. Moral pluralism is used as point of departure for a new concept of ethics, using an extreme reduced version of the Apel-Habermasian idea of discourse ethics, but without any normative idea of rationality. Ethics has to do with shared values among parties with different moral positions. This concept of ethics may be used in organizations, which are defined as autopoietic systems with decisions as the self-created elements. Ethics may be used as a new premise for decision making in organizations and may compensate for problems which are inherent in using the normal codes of money and power. Four problem areas are dealt with: the problem of identity, the problem of blindness, the problem of non-knowledge, and the problem of control of the uncontrollable.

An attempt is made to present and organize some basic concepts from the universal systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Working in the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and second order cybernetics the point of departure is not ontology but distinction and observation. The basic distinction is the distinction between system and environment. Concentrating on social systems the element of which are ephemeral communications Luhmann operates with concepts as self-reference, time, and paradox in constructivist systems science. As Luhmann considers modern society in functional subsystems such as economy, science and politics he presents a picture of society with no center and no important place for the individual.

Open peer commentary on the article “Examining the Role of Re-Presentation in Mathematical Problem Solving: An Application of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Conceptual Analysis” by Victor V. Cifarelli & Volkan Sevim. Upshot: Cifarelli & Sevim outline the distinction between “representation” and “re-presentation” in von Glasersfeld’s thinking. After making this distinction, they identify how a student’s problem solving activity initially involved recognition, then re-presentation, and finally reflective abstraction. I use my commentary about the Cifarelli & Sevim article to identify two ways they could extend their current line of research.

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivist Model Building: Empirical Examples From Mathematics Education” by Catherine Ulrich, Erik S. Tillema, Amy J. Hackenberg & Anderson Norton. Upshot: I address the value of Ulrich et al.’s distinction between three types of second-order models. I conclude that their work contributes to the theorizing of adaptive teaching on the basis of a constructivist stance on knowing and learning.

Context: This paper is intended for readers familiar with Humberto Maturana’s theory of autopoietic systems and with the still unresolved debate concerning the existence of non-biological autopoietic systems. Because the seminal work of the Chilean biologist has not yet been fully and correctly understood in other disciplines, I consider that it is necessary to offer a more generalized concept of the autopoietic system, derived by implication from Maturana’s grounding definition. Problem: The above-mentioned debate is rooted in a deficient application of some rigorous distinctions, definitions, and epistemological considerations introduced by Maturana when he coined the term “autopoiesis.” Some researchers think that social or economic organizations could be considered as autopoietic systems of a higher order because they appear to behave autonomously and be self-organized and self-producing. However, in practice some precise distinctions would need to be verified through observation in order to claim properly their autopoietic nature. These distinctions were defined by Varela, Maturana and Uribe in 1974 as a set of six decisional rules (“MV&U rules”) whereby an observer may possibly justify this stand. My aim is to pinpoint clearly the basic cognitive tasks that an observer should perform in order to ascertain such a claim. Method: I accomplish this with a thorough analysis of the entailments derived from each rule when applied to the most general case – when the observational domain where the system manifests itself is not specified. A bottom-up approach is used to avoid referring to “apparent autopoietic behavior” as a starting point distinction (top-down approach): the aim is to distinguish “autopoietic behavior” as an outcome of more basic distinctions, not as a premise for these. These may be used as abstract tools to facilitate a rigorous description of observations and lead to precise explanations of the emergence of complex self-generated dynamic systems. In theory, this conceptual frame is not limited to the macro-molecular domain and may therefore be applicable to non-biological systems. Results: According to MV&U rules, the most important distinctions are those that refer to intra-boundary phenomenology: this focus is necessary to explain how the key processes involved in the emergence of autopoiesis actually manifest themselves. These explanations are crucial to validating a claim about the “autopoietic nature” of an observed system. Implications: This work could help multidisciplinary researchers to apply properly the theory of autopoietic systems beyond the realm of biology and to settle ongoing debates. It could also help investigations related to the specifications of software simulation processes for modeling a minimal artificial autopoietic system. However, the rigorous focus on the role of intra-boundary phenomenology and self-production of components reveals that our chances of detecting “natural” meta-molecular autopoietic systems are scarce.

Key words: autopoiesis, self-production, autonomy, causation structure, artificial life, organizational knowledge

Context: The construction of a product is fundamental. However, students’ having produced something is not enough to ensure that they have constructed knowledge. Problem: The objective of this article is to understand how maker education can contribute to the process of students’ knowledge construction. Method: Initially we discuss aspects related to the theory of constructionism, subsequently, using Piaget’s notions of conceptualization, we discuss how knowledge can be constructed in a makerspace, then turn to a case study that illustrates our theoretical commentary, and end with conclusions about our main research question: “Where is the knowledge construction in making?” Results: We show that in makerspaces students can develop sophisticated artifacts by using digital technologies, and that besides the product, this process allows for the representation of the actions with these machines, expressed as concepts and strategies used. Implications: The action representation constitutes the “window into the mind” of the learner, allowing one to understand and identify the knowledge used and, with that, help the learner reach a new stage in knowledge construction. However, in order to know whether the student has constructed knowledge, the teacher can use different strategies, such as Piaget’s clinical method, analysis of results gathered throughout product testing, and use of simulation software related to concepts involved in the maker activity. Constructivist content: The discussion in this article is based on Papert’s constructionist ideas. However, we use Piaget’s distinction between success and understanding to discuss how knowledge can be constructed by students in makerspaces. Key words: Makerspaces, fabrication technologies, constructionism, knowledge evaluation.

Open peer commentary on the article “Religion: A Radical-Constructivist Perspective” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: An essential feature of Quale’s point of view is the strict distinction between the cognitive and the non-cognitive. I argue that this position is untenable and hence that a radical constructivist can discuss religious matters.