The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of _the same_ functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and following Maturana’s autopoietic theory of cognition, I introduce a conceptual distinction between mind and cognition. I argue that cognition corresponds to the natural behaviour that every living being exhibits in the realization of its existence, and that, viewed in that way, cognition is a dynamic process of structural coupling that, unlike mental phenomena, involves no representational contents. On the basis of this distinction, I try to show that while life suffices for cognition, it does not suffice for mind. That is, that the strong continuity is not between life and mind but between life and cognition.

Key words: Life-mind continuity thesis, autopoiesis, mind, cognition

The genotype-phenotype (genome-form) distinction is considered by many to be fundamental to modern evolutionary thinking. Indeed, the premises that: DNA solely constitutes the genotype; that the phenotype is a transient product of the genotype, with the latter not only describing, but also implementing the construction of the former; and that the constructed materials and systems of the cell have no impact on the genotype, have become dogmas. Yet a vast body of data from molecular genetics reveals that cellular systems, directly and indirectly, alter the genome. Some of these data are reviewed. Proteins can influence mutations along the chromosomes, heritably modify the information content of DNA sequences, and, in some instances, reorganize the germline or somatic genome via DNA engineering pathways. These data suggest that the constructed (proteins, chromatin arrays, and metabolic pathways) has an important role in shaping the descriptor. Insofar as it is biochemically possible for states adopted by cellular structures to be stabilized and eventually memorized by engineering chromosomes, semantic closure can be transcended-meaning can be transferred from the domain of form to the genome, and this presumably ongoing process is termed teleomorphic recursivity. Throughout the paper, I implicitly argue that the genome-form partition is strictly a formal one, with no deeply material basis.

Open peer commentary on the article “Religion: A Radical-Constructivist Perspective” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: I address two topics that I consider particularly problematic in Quale’s target article. First, I question the purported distinction between cognition and non-cognition, and second, I inquire into a rather vague construal of “mystical philosophies.” Given that both topics play important roles in the overall argumentative chain, their unfoundedness threatens to have serious consequences for the main conclusions of the article.

In the past two decades, the notion of embodiment has been quickly gaining currency in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Although virtually unknown at the beginning of the 1990's, it has now become, in the guise of embodied and enactive cognitive science, a serious contender against the classical (cognitivist) conceptions of mind, cognition, and consciousness. By drawing on the thematizations of the body found in Husserl and MerleauPonty, especially on the distinction between body as lived body (Leib) – a prereflective bodily awareness that shapes our experiential landscape –, and body as physical body (Körper) – a thematic experience of the body as an object –, it is maintained that mind and cognition are embodied in a twofold sense: (i) structurally, i.e., in the sense of being constituted by extracranial (neural, bodily, environmental, and social) processes, and (ii) phenomenologically, i.e., in the sense of including the experience of oneself as a bodily agent situated in the world. It is contended that this Janus-faced nature of corporeality, divided between “being a body” (Leibsein) and “having a body” (Körperhaben), may help undermine some of the age-old dualities (mind-body, interiorityexteriority, etc.) and thereby help anchor experience in materiality and materiality in experience. The main focus of the volume at hand is to analyze, evaluate, and critically reflect upon, what might be termed “horizons of embodiment.” First, it purports to examine the scope and applicability of the notion of embodiment in relation to not only human, but also animal, vegetative, and perhaps even artificial life. Specifically, it aims to investigate to what extent, if at all, different construals of embodiment might contribute to a better understanding of different life forms – of their unique, if tentative, modes of being, cognizing, and experiencing. Second, it purports to examine, from both practical and theoretical perspectives, possibilities for a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) between structural and phenomenological approaches to embodiment: How can objective (third-person) and experiential (first-person) aspects of corporeality be combined so as to provide efficient means for the study of the living? Both perspectives wish to enrich and broaden our grasp of different grades, modes and dimensions of embodiment, bringing forth their tentative limitations and paving ways for their overcoming.

Key words: Phenomenology, cognitive science, philosophy of mind, embodiment, body.

This article introduces and discusses the difference between big theory and strong theory. While the former centres on identity, symmetry, and universality, the latter insists upon the self-reflexive, autopoietic, and paradoxical nature of theory and theorizing. Taking off from this distinction, the article investigates the crucial interconnections between strong theory, systems theory (Luhmann), deconstruction (Derrida), and form theory (Spencer-Brown), while simultaneously stressing the problematic use of ontological ideas and concepts in these theories that otherwise seek to transgress a Western tradition of a metaphysics of ontology. The article consist of three parts. First, a general sketch of the partition of big and strong theory is laid out. Second, an introduction to main aspects of the form logic of Spencer-Brown is presented in order to portray the principal, systemic apparatus of Luhmann and more generally to discuss the structural design of strong theory. Third, a comparison of Derrida’s practice of textual dissemination and Luhmann’s systems theory is focused upon. Conclusively, some tentative remarks of the inherent limits of strong theory vis-à-vis systems theory are optioned.

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: This commentary asks if Schmidt’s latest process-orientated philosophy is based on a vicious infinite regress argument. The commentator uses recent literature on the distinction of vicious and benign infinite regresses (from Claude Gratton and Nicholas Rescher) and tries to show that – taken verbatim – there is a serious logical problem in Schmidt’s argumentation.

Spencer-Browns Calculus of Forms is based on an elementary operation, distinction. Reading this effort as a contribution to philosophy, means to concentrate on the concept of distinction. In this perspective, the first step must be to question the abstraction of a form of distinction. Our practices of distinguishing are manifold and at least four practices of distinguishing play an elementary role in common sense and scientific life: first distinguishing in a narrower sense as contrasting two or more sides, second dividing, third determining and fourth differentiating. The article shows, that SpencerBrown identifies the form of distinction with the practice of determining. This procedure is dependent on a philosophical development of the net of practices of distinguishing, their interrelations and dependencies. The theories of difference and their most important philosophical sources, like Platos Sophist, provide arguments for this task.

Key words: Distinction, Plato, Spencer-Brown, difference, theories of difference

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: This commentary aims to sharpen the conceptual distinction between the breadth and the depth of dream experience. I discuss several possible readings and argue that the best one construes breadth and depth as distinct but complimentary research strategies distinguished not just by the kinds of evidence they rely on, but also by the degree to which different types of data are integrated and focused on the same experiential episode. I identify promising candidates for depth approaches and challenges for future research.

Excerpt: Much research in cognitive science, and in particular artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (ALife), has since the mid-1980s been devoted to the study of so-called autonomous agents. These are typically robotic systems situated in some environment and interacting with it using sensors and motors. Such systems are often self-organizing in the sense that they artificially learn, develop, and evolve in interaction with their environments, typically using computational learning techniques, such as artificial neural networks or evolutionary algorithms. Due to the biological inspiration and motivation underlying much of this research (cf. Sharkey and Ziemke 1998), autonomous agents are often referred to as “artificial organisms”, “artificial life”, “animats” (short for “artificial animals”) (Wilson 1985), “creatures” (Brooks 1990), or “biorobots” (Ziemke and Sharkey 1998). These terms do not necessarily all mean exactly the same; some of them refer to physical robots only, whereas others include simple software simulations. But the terms all express the view that the mechanisms referred to are substantially different from conventional artifacts and that to some degree they are “life-like” in that they share some of the properties of living organisms. Throughout this article this class of systems will be referred to as “artificial organisms” or “autonomous agents/robots” interchangeably. \\The key issue addressed in this article concerns the semiotic status and relevance of such artificial organisms. The question is whether and to what extent they are autonomous and capable of semiosis. This is not straightforward since semiosis is often considered to necessarily involve living organisms. Morris (1946), for example, defines semiosis as “a signprocess, that is, a process in which something is a sign to some organism”. Similarly, Jakob von Uexküll considered signs to be “of prime importance in all aspects of life processes” (T. von Uexküll 1992), and made a clear distinction between organisms, which as autonomous subjects respond to signs according to their own specific energy, and inorganic mechanisms, which lack that energy, and thus remain heteronomous.

Key words: cognitive science, artificial intelligence, artificial life, semiotics, umwelt, mechanistic theories, self-organization