Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher. Abstract: I intend to explore some of the implications of Gallagher’s target article. Retracing the circulation of concepts such as “embodied,” “embedded,” “extended,” etc. in social epidemiology, feminist science and epigenetics, I advocate for studying E-approaches from an epistemological, historical and political viewpoint in order to critically assess the transformations of knowledge that we are currently witnessing.

Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher. Abstract: In this commentary I suggest that the “E-approaches” advocated by Gallagher should move a step further, beyond the negative critiques that they address to the classical (representationalist and neurocentered) framework in cognitive science. If these approaches do not want to look like a “decapitated program,” neglecting the rational dimension of our experience, more should be said about our higher-level capacities and their perceptual and pragmatic foundation.

Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher. Abstract: In agreement with Gallagher’s call to re-examine the standard neurocentric view, we situate the target article within constructivist epistemology. We point to certain similarities between E-approaches to cognition (in particular predictive processing accounts) and constructivist ideas originating from the tradition of second-order cybernetics, demonstrating the potential for a productive dialogue between contemporary cognitive science and constructivist theory. Further elaborating Gallagher’s proposal, we suggest an alternative, autopoiesis-based metaphor of the mind.

Excerpt: E is the letter, if not the word, in todays sciences of the mind. E-approaches to the mind – those that focus on embodied, enactive, extended, embedded, and ecological aspects of mind – are now a staple and familiar feature of the cognitive science landscape. Many productive scientific research programs are trying to understand the significance of E-factors for the full range of cognitive phenomena, with new proposals about perceiving, imagining, remembering, decision-making, reasoning, and language appearing apace (Wilson and Foglia 2016). Some hold that these developments mark the arrival of a new paradigm for thinking about mind and cognition, one radically different from cognitive science as we know it (e.g., Thompson 2007; Chemero 2009; Di Paolo 2009; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014). Others maintain that accommodating E-factors, while important, requires either only very modest twists or, at most, some crucial but still limited revisions to the framework of otherwise business-as-usual cognitive science (Goldman 2012, 2014; Gallese 2014; Clark 2008; Wheeler 2010). By conservative lights, radicals vastly exaggerate the theoretical significance of the so-called E-turn. Moderates hold that whatever changes are required will fall short of reconceiving cognition. Who is right? Are we, in fact, witnessing a revolution in thinking about thinking? ||

Context: Shaun Gallagher’s work is very influential in contemporary philosophy, especially when it comes to the mind, to philosophical issues raised by developmental psychology, and to intersubjectivity. Problem: Classical cognitivism” has been, and often still is dominating the sciences of the mind. The reasons for this dominance include being implementable on computers, being consistent with Darwinism, and being allegedly experimentally testable. However, this dominance could just as well be a historical phase as cognitivism is disconnected from biological, anthropological, and neuroscientific research. Method: We historically and epistemologically contextualize how Gallagher contributed to bringing the body and subjectivity back to the center of the sciences of the mind by focusing on two examples: theory of mind and evolutionary psychology. Results: Both contemporary epistemologists and Gallagher’s work indicate why classical cognitivism provides a flawed model of cognition, especially when it comes to its explanatory scope: embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, among other things, are fundamentally mistreated by cognitivism. Implications: Gallagher helped to structure what Andler calls “heterodoxical” approaches to cognition by conceptualizing a unifying framework, the so-called “E-approaches.” This unification has the major implication of leading Gallagher to a model in which cognition is “decentered,” which helps tackle the philosophical issues one might encounter when narrowing down philosophy of cognition. Constructivist content: We apply E-approaches to the philosophy of cognition, psychology and social sciences.

Key words: Philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, history of science, embodiment, E-approaches