Füllsack M. (2012) Communication Emerging? On Simulating Structural Coupling in Multiple Contingency. Constructivist Foundations 8(1): 103-110. https://constructivist.info/8/1/103
Problem: Can communication emerge from the interaction of “self-referentially closed systems,” conceived as operating solely on the base of the “internal” output of their onboard means? Or in terms of philosophical conceptions: can communication emerge without (“outward” directed) “intention” or “will to be understood”? Method: Multi-agent simulation based on a conceptual analysis of the theory of social systems as suggested by Niklas Luhmann. Results: Agents that co-evolutionarily aggregate probabilities on how to cope with their environment can structurally couple and generate a form of “eigenbehavior” that retrospectively (i.e., by an observer) might be interpreted as communication. Implications: The “intention” or the “will to be understood,” as prominently claimed to be indispensable in communication by theoreticians such as Jürgen Habermas, can be seen as a retrospective ascription to an emergent property of complex interaction. Constructivist content: The paper attempts to base constructivist reasoning on data generated in simulations.
The main aim of the paper is to reinforce the notion that emergence is a basic characteristic of the molecular sciences in general and chemistry in particular. Although this point is well accepted, even in the primary reference on emergence, the keyword emergence is rarely utilized by chemists and molecular biologists and chemistry textbooks for undergraduates. The possible reasons for this situation are discussed. The paper first re-introduces the concept of emergence based on very simple geometrical forms; and considers some simple chemical examples among low and high molecular weight compounds. On the basis of these chemical examples, a few interesting philosophical issues inherent to the field of emergence are discussed – again making the point that such examples, given their clarity and simplicity, permit one to better understand the complex philosophical issues. Thus, the question of predictability is discussed, namely whether and to what extent can emergent properties be predicted on the basis of the component’s properties; or the question of the explicability (a top down process). The relation between reductionism and emergentism is also discussed as well as the notion of downward causality and double causality (macrodeterminism); namely the question whether and to what extent the emergent properties of the higher hierarchic level affect the properties of the lower level components. Finally, the question is analyzed, whether life can be considered as an emergent property. More generally, the final point is made, that the re-introduction of the notion of emergence in chemistry, and in particular in the teaching, may bring about a deeper understanding of the meaning of chemical complexity and may bring chemistry closer to the humanistic areas of philosophy and epistemology.
Mazzocchi F. (2012) Complexity and the reductionism-holism debate in systems biology. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Systems Biology and Medicine 4(5): 413–427.
Reductionism has largely influenced the development of science, culminating in its application to molecular biology. An increasing number of novel research findings have, however, shattered this view, showing how the molecular-reductionist approach cannot entirely handle the complexity of biological systems. Within this framework, the advent of systems biology as a new and more integrative field of research is described, along with the form which has taken on the debate of reductionism versus holism. Such an issue occupies a central position in systems biology; nonetheless it is not always clearly delineated. This partly occurs because different dimensions (ontological, epistemological, methodological) are involved, and yet the concerned ones often remain unspecified. Besides, within systems biology different streams can be distinguished depending on the degree of commitment to embrace genuine systemic principles. Some useful insights into the future development of this discipline might be gained from the tradition of complexity and self-organization. This is especially true with regard to the idea of self-reference, which incorporated into the organizational scheme is able to generate autonomy as an emergent property of the biological whole. Relevance: It is asserted that systems biology has developed basically within the boundaries of first-order cybernetics. To better integrate the idea of complexity into the development of its framework, insights from the tradition of second-order cybernetics and self-organization need to be taken into consideration more fully. It advances the notion of self-reference as being especially significant.
Mossio M., Bich L. & Moreno A. (2013) Emergence, closure and inter-level causation in biological systems. Erkenntnis 78(2): 153–178. https://cepa.info/2313
In this paper, we advocate the idea that an adequate explanation of biological systems requires appealing to organisational closure as an emergent causal regime. We first develop a theoretical justification of emergence in terms of relatedness, by arguing that configurations, because of the relatedness among their constituents, possess ontologically irreducible properties, providing them with distinctive causal powers. We then focus on those emergent causal powers exerted as constraints, and we claim that biological systems crucially differ from other natural systems in that they realise a closure of constraints, i.e. a higher-level emergent regime of causation such that the constituents, each of them acting as a constraint, realise a mutual dependence among them, and are collectively able to self-maintain. Lastly, we claim that closure can be justifiably taken as an emergent regime of causation, without admitting that it inherently involves whole-parts causation, which would require committing to stronger ontological and epistemological assumptions.
Rowe D. L. (2001) Beyond representationalism: A dynamical approach transcending symbolism in cognitive psychology. In: Morss J. R., Stepehnson N. & Van Rappard H. (eds.) Theoretical issues in psychology. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell MA: 131–143. https://cepa.info/5833
Representationalism has defined the premise that cognition must involve a capacity to manipulate symbolic information. Although this approach has provided a good metaphoric and descriptive view of cognition, it ignores the distinct neural properties of the brain. This chapter has explored this problem by providing a more neurologically plausible account through the use of dynamical and chaotic systems theory. Symbols or representations were suggested to be epiphenomenonal to actual neural function and were considered as descriptions of behavior rather than cognition. Instead such entities were presumed to be embedded and decomposed in low level chaotic activity of the brain in such a manner that their localisation to specific neural entities was not a critical factor. The formation of knowledge, memories, or action was considered as an emergent property of distinct neural patterns of activity that result from the interaction of various neural groups.
Singer W. (1999) The observer in the brain. In: Riegler A., Peschl M. & Stein A. (eds.) Understanding representation in the cognitive sciences. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York/Dordrecht: 253–259. https://cepa.info/4254
Consciousness has many different connotations, some of which are amenable to treatment within neurobiological description systems while others are not. It is possible to define in neurobiological terms the brain states associated with conscious-ness. It is also conceivable that neurobiology will ultimately provide a reductionistic explanation of mechanisms which enables the brain (1) to construct from the sparse and diverse signals of its sensors coherent models of its environment, including the or-ganism itself, and to generate abstract descriptions, (2) to iterate the same strategy to monitor its own states, thereby generating meta descriptions, (3) to weigh the combined results of these analyses in order to reach decisions and to generate adapted behavioural responses, and (4) to communicate through various channels at different levels of ab-straction the results of these cognitive processes to other brains. Since it became clear that the concept of the Cartesian theatre is untenable, that processes in the brain are highly distributed and that there is no single convergence center where the results of the numerous parallel operations are brought together for joint interpretation and decision making, analysis of processes that are in principle amenable to neurobiological explanation is in itself a major challenge. \\Problems of different nature are encountered if one attempts a reductionistic explanation of the subjective connotations of consciousness associated with self-awareness, attributes that are assessed by introspection and by extrapolation from one’s own awareness of mental states to that of others. I shall defend the position that these aspects of consciousness cannot be understood as emergent properties of individual brains alone but come into existence only through communication among brains whose cognitive abilities must be sufficiently developed to generate a theory of mind, i.e. to generate models of presumed states of the respective other brain. Thus, self-awareness and the ability to experience sensations as subjective reality would have to be considered as cultural achievements or, and this is equivalent, as the result of experiencing dialogues of the kind: “I know that you know that I know.” Hence, these aspects of consciousness come into existence only through a social learning process in which brains experience a class of mental phenom-ena that emerge only from mutual reflection. These phenomena are ontologically different from those qualified above as amenable to direct neurobiological investigation because unlike the latter they are the result of a dialogue among brains that got in-creasingly refined during cultural evolution. This is probably the reason why these phenomena appear as not deducible from analysis of individual brains in the same way as one can analyse the neuronal substrate of pattern recognition, memory or motor con-trol. My proposal is that the phenomena that give rise to the so called “hard problems” in the philosophy of consciousness, problems resulting from the ability to be aware of one’s own brain functions can be understood as emergent properties of brains without having to take a dualistic position; however, because these phenomena have a social or cultural origin and hence both a historical and interpersonal dimension, they cannot be understood as an emergent property of an isolated brain alone and hence transcend the reach of conventional neurobiological approaches.