This paper presents a pilot study that explores instances of objectless awareness during sleep: conscious experiences had during sleep that prima facie lack an object of awareness. This state of objectless awareness during sleep has been widely described by Indian contemplative traditions and has been characterised as a state of consciousness-as-such; while in it, there is nothing to be aware of, one is merely conscious (cf. Evans-Wentz, 1960; Fremantle, 2001; Ponlop, 2006). While this phenomenon has received different names in the literature, such as ‘witnessing-sleep’ and ‘clear light sleep’ among others, the specific phenomenological profile of this state has not yet been rigorously studied. This paper aims at presenting a preliminary investigation of objectless consciousness during sleep using a novel tool in qualitative research that can guide future research. Five participants experiencing objectless consciousness during sleep were interviewed following the Micro-phenomenological Interview technique (MPI; Petitmengin, 2005, 2006). All participants reported an experience they had during sleep in which there was no scenery and no dream. This period labelled as ‘No Scenery/Void’ was either preceded by the dissolution of a lucid dream or by other forms of conscious mentation. The analysis of the results advances four experiential dimensions during this state of void, namely (1) Perception of absence, (2) Self-perception, (3) Perception of emotions, and (4) Perception of awareness. While the results are primarily explorative, they refer to themes found in the literature to describe objectless sleep and point at potential avenues of research. The results from this study are taken as indications to guide future operationalisations of this phenomenon.

Key words: dreamless sleep, micro-phenomenological interview, qualitative research, witnessing-sleep

The intended study is to reveal the importance of values in the process of constructing our implicit knowledge. There is a strong connection between emotions and knowledge and this relationship appears especially in the process of evaluation. Our approach describes knowledge as more intuitive and emotional and unconscious than is traditionally proclaimed. It serves especially practical and useful purpose and our former experience is its foundation. As we evaluate the world which we get to know, our system of knowledge contains also its meaning for us, our value system is hidden in it and it influences our further conduct. Our activity is the aim of our life, through which we cause changes in the world as well as in us.

Key words: value, evaluation, implicit knowledge, constructivism, emotions, knowledge, activity.

This paper challenges proceduralized, rule-bound approaches to ethics and considers how social workers and teams can develop an attitude of compassionate concern and become more effective in dealing with ethical problems in their day-to-day practice. It introduces the work of Humberto Maturana, a widely respected theorist, whose work has received little attention in social work. It stresses the importance of emotions, particularly love, and considers the way in which ethical action is shaped by culture. It emphasizes the importance of engaging in reflection on professional practices and team, professional and organizational culture in order for social workers to improve their awareness of ethical dilemmas and promote ethical practice. For those teaching ethics, this paper suggests an alternative to the rational consideration of moral dilemmas and proposes approaches to training that can help social workers become more attuned and responsive to ethical conflicts. Relevance: The paper argues that Maturana’s biology of cognition provides an approach to ethics that takes into account the spontaneous nature of everyday work in which social workers undertake their ethical actions.

Excerpt: The Origin of Humanness, written in the early 1990s, brings together two strands of research: Maturana Romesin’s research into the origin of humanness and Verden-Zöller’s research into the rise of self-consciousness in the child during early mother-child play relations. The authors’ core claim is that the human species has evolved by conserving love as a fundamental domain of cooperation expressed through the basic emotions or moods of mutual respect, care, acceptance and trust (Homo sapiens-amans) rather than competition and aggression (Homo sapiens aggressans or arrogance). In this, they do not declare an ethical imperative, but rather situate ethics in biology, since, in their view, a responsible concern for the well-being of the other (human, species, biosphere, etc.) arises naturally from a manner of living in the biology of love. This is what they propose as a way for conserving the existence of social human beings (and what they call “social consciousness”) and for countering the dominant culture of domination, submission or indifference in Western society. Ethics, in this sense, is a choice of emotioning on an individual basis that in relation to a social community defines how a particular manner of living is to be conserved over the coming generations.

Excerpt: The capacity to engage in collective intentionality is a key aspect of human sociality. Social coordination might not be distinctive of humans – various nonhuman animals engage in forms of cooperative behavior (e.g., hunting together) – but humans seem to possess a specific capacity for intentionality that enables them to constitute forms of social reality far exceeding anything that can be achieved even by nonhuman primates. During the past few decades, collective intentionality has been discussed under various labels in a number of empirical disciplines including social, cognitive, and developmental psychology, economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, ethology, and the social neurosciences. Despite all this work, however, many foundational issues remain controversial and unresolved. In particular, it is by no means clear exactly how to characterize the nature, structure, and diversity of the we to which intentions, beliefs, emotions, and actions are often attributed. Is the we or we-perspective independent of, and perhaps even prior to, individual subjectivity, or is it a developmental achievement that has a firstand second-person-singular perspective as its necessary precondition? Is it something that should be ascribed to a single owner, or does it perhaps have plural ownership? Is the we a single thing, or is there a plurality of types of we?

Often we like to attribute credit for something we have accomplished by saying that we could not have done it except for the far greater work done by some predecessor. As Isaac Newton put it If I have seen further, it is by standing on ye shoulders of Giants. This phrase has now become common usage, and we use it to pay our deepest respect to someone whose work has substantially contributed to what we ourselves do. Many people in the American Society for Cybernetics have my deepest respect and have contributed greatly to my thinking. Not the least of these is Heinz von Foerster who I had the opportunity to visit several times over the last seven years. However I would not speak of myself as standing on his shoulders; it does not seem like a comfortable thing to do, and furthermore, like many memorable phrases, it evokes various listenings; various thoughts and emotions which do not pertain to the way I related to this wonderful man. Sometimes the claim I stand on the shoulders of is heard as trivial, as a stock phrase used in a formal dance to satisfy a perceived requirement for deference. Sometimes it is heard as trite, in the sense of superficiality. Of course it is sometimes both uttered and heard as having both conviction and depth, yet even then a number of interesting ambiguities persist, and it is those that I wish to reflect on now.

Open peer commentary on the article “Construction of Irreality: An Enactive-Constructivist Stance on Counterfactuals” by Andrey S. Druzhinin. Abstract: What Druzhinin, in the target article, names as “counterfactuals” are stories that an observer claims are more valid than another story. Normally, we treat such conjectures lightly, though all reflections change us somewhat. When strong emotions pertain to alterative conflicting criteria for the acceptance of the validity of one story over another, this may lead to difficulties.

Excerpt: In summary, the human MNS is thought to help process other people’s actions and intentions, support motor and social imitation, and may contribute to our felt experience of the emotions of others through embodied simulation. This chapter reviewed how MNS regions, along with other neural networks, may contribute to better sensorimotor and socioemotional learning processes. It also supports classroom use of imitation learning, an emphasis on embodied learning strategies, and attention to social and emotional learning.

Embodied Cognition represents the most important news in cognitive psychology in the last twenty years. The basis of its research program is the idea that cognitive processes depend, mirror, and are influenced by bodily control systems. A whole class of novel perspectives entered into the psychologists’ agenda only after the emergence and success of EC. In the paper we will deal with some of the main topics debated within EC, from the discussion on the role of representation, to the relationship with enactivism, with functionalism and with the extended mind view. Against an interpretation according to which EC is simply an evolution of the classical cognitivist program, we will focus on the aspects that highlight crucial discontinuities with it, suggesting instead that the EC perspective is indebted to previous theoretical traditions such as American pragmatism, ecological psychology and phenomenology. In the present paper we will discuss some of the most important achievements of EC in different areas of experimental research, from the study of affordances to that of the bodily experience, from the investigation on emotions to that on language. Our aim is to force the Italian public, particularly recalcitrant to EC, to critically reflect on the debts to previous traditions. Relevance: The paper reviews embodied theories with a special focus on enactivist approaches.

Open peer commentary on the article “Body Awareness to Recognize Feelings: The Exploration of a Musical Emotional Experience” by Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati. Upshot: A complete account of musical emotions implies examining how factors in the music, the situation, and the person interact, producing objective and subjective changes on affective, bodily and cognitive levels simultaneously. Therefore, a first-person phenomenological method can only provide a limited understanding of these experiences.